Unde malum? Has been long a question, and many of the learned have perplexed themselves and readers to little purpose in answer to it. That there are both things and actions to which we give the name of evil, is not here denied, as pain, sickness, want, theft, murder, &c. But that these and the like are not in reality evils, ills, or defects in the order of the universe, is demonstrated in the next section, as well as by this and the following proposition. Indeed, to suppose any thing to exist or be done, contrary to the will of the almighty, is to suppose him not almighty; or that something (the cause of evil) is more mighty than the almighty; an inconsistence that I think no one will defend: and to deny any thing or action, which he consents to the existence of, to be good, is entirely to destroy his two attributes of wisdom and goodness.
There is nothing done in the universe, say the philosophers, but what God either does, or permits to be done. This, as he is almighty, is certainly true: but what need of this distinction between doing and permitting? Why, first they take it for granted that many things in the universe exist in such a manner as is not for the best, and that many actions are done which ought not to be done, or would be better undone; these things or actions they cannot ascribe to God as his, because they have already attributed to him infinite wisdom and goodness; here then is the use of the word permit; he permits them to be done, say they. But we will reason thus: if God permits an action to be done, it is because he wants either power or inclination to hinder it; in saying he wants power, we deny him to be almighty; and if we say he wants inclination or will, it must be, either because he is not good, or the action is not evil, (for all evil is contrary to the essence of infinite goodness). The former is inconsistent with his before-given attribute of goodness, therefore the latter must be true.
It will be said, perhaps, that God permits evil actions to be done, for wise ends and purposes. But this objection destroys itself; for whatever an infinitely good God hath wise ends in suffering to be, must be good, is thereby made good, and cannot be otherwise.
VI. If a creature is made by god, it must depend upon god, and receive all its power from him; with which power the creature can do nothing contrary to the will of god, because God is almighty; what is not contrary to his will, must be agreeable to it; what is agreeable to it, must be good, because he is good; therefore a creature can do nothing but what is good.
This proposition is much to the same purpose with the former, but more particular; and its conclusion is as just and evident. Though a creature may do many actions which by his fellow creatures will be named evil, and which will naturally and necessarily cause or bring upon the doer, certain pains (which will likewise be called punishments;) yet this proposition proves, that he cannot act what will be in itself really ill, or displeasing to god. And that the painful consequences of his evil actions (so called) are not, as indeed they ought not to be, punishments or unhappinesses, will be shown hereafter.
Nevertheless, the late learned author of the religion of nature, (which I send you herewith) has given us a rule or scheme, whereby to discover which of our actions ought to be esteemed and denominated good, and which evil: it is in short this, every action which is done according to truth, is good; and every action contrary to truth, is evil: to act according to truth is to use and esteem every thing as what it is, &c. Thus if a steals a horse from b, and rides away upon him, he uses him not as what he is in truth, viz. The property of another, but as his own, which is contrary to truth, and therefore evil. But, as this gentleman himself says, (sect. I. Prop. Vi.) In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered, not only what it is in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect; and the whole description of the thing ought to be taken in: so in this case it ought to be considered, that a is naturally a covetous being, feeling an uneasiness in the want of B’s horse, which produces an inclination for stealing him, stronger than his fear of punishment for so doing. This is truth likewise, and a acts according to it when he steals the horse. Besides, if it is proved to be a truth, that a has not power over his own actions, it will be indisputable that he acts according to truth, and impossible he should do otherwise.
I would not be understood by this to encourage or defend theft; ’tis only for the sake of the argument, and will certainly have no ill effect. The order and course of things will not be affected by reasoning of this kind; and ’tis as just and necessary, and as much according to truth, for b to dislike and punish the theft of his horse, as it is for a to steal him.
VII. If the creature is thus limited in his actions, being able to do only such things as God would have him to do, and not being able to refuse doing what God would have done; then he can have no such thing as liberty, free-will or power to do or refrain an action.
By liberty is sometimes understood the absence of opposition; and in this sense, indeed, all our actions may be said to be the effects of our liberty: but it is a liberty of the same nature with the fall of a heavy body to the ground; it has liberty to fall, that is, it meets with nothing to hinder its fall, but at the same time it is necessitated to fall, and has no power or liberty to remain suspended.
But let us take the argument in another view, and suppose ourselves to be, in the common sense of the word, free agents. As man is a part of this great machine, the universe, his regular acting is requisite to the regular moving of the whole. Among the many things which lie before him to be done, he may, as he is at liberty and his choice influenced by nothing, (for so it must be, or he is not at liberty) choose any one, and refuse the rest. Now there is every moment something best to be done, which is alone then good, and with respect to which, every thing else is at that time evil. In order to know which is best to be done, and which not, it is requisite that we should have at one view all the intricate consequences of every action with respect to the general order and scheme of the universe, both present and future; but they are innumerable and incomprehensible by any thing but omniscience. As we cannot know these, we have but as one chance to ten thousand, to hit on the right action; we should then be perpetually blundering about in the dark, and putting the scheme in disorder; for every wrong action of a part, is a defect or blemish in the order of the whole. Is it not necessary then, that our actions should be overruled and governed by an all-wise providence? How exact and regular is every thing in the natural world! How wisely in every part contrived! We cannot here find the least defect! Those who have studied the mere animal and vegetable creation, demonstrate that nothing can be more harmonious and beautiful! All the heavenly bodies, the stars and planets, are regulated with the utmost wisdom! And can we suppose less care to be taken in the order of the moral than in the natural system? It is as if an ingenious artificer, having framed a curious machine or clock, and put its many intricate wheels and powers in such a dependence on one another, that the whole might move in the most exact order and regularity, had nevertheless placed in it several other wheels endowed with an independent self-motion, but ignorant of the general interest of the clock; and these would every now and then be moving wrong, disordering the true movement, and making continual work for the mender; which might better be prevented, by depriving them of that power of self-motion, and placing them in a dependence on the regular part of the clock.
VIII. If there is no such thing as free-will in creatures, there can be neither merit nor demerit in creatures.
IX. And therefore every creature must be equally esteemed by the creator. These propositions appear to be the necessary consequences of the former. And certainly no reason can be given, why the creator should prefer in his esteem one part of his works to another, if with equal wisdom and goodness he designed and created them all, since all ill or defect, as contrary to his nature, is excluded by his power. We will sum up the argument thus, when the creator first designed the universe, either it was his will and intention that all things should exist and be in the manner they are at this time; or it was his will they should be otherwise i.e. In a different manner: to say it
was his will things should be otherwise than they are, is to say somewhat hath contradicted his will, and broken his measures, which is impossible because inconsistent with his power; therefore we must allow that all things exist now in a manner agreeable to his will, and in consequence of that are all equally good, and therefore equally esteemed by him.
I proceed now to show, that as all the works of the creator are equally esteemed by him, so they are, as in justice they ought to be, equally used…
[Editor’s note: Franklin includes a second, longer section arguing that pleasure and pain are always equal in the life of each individual.]
I am sensible that the doctrine here advanced, if it were to be published, would meet with but an indifferent reception. Mankind naturally and generally love to be flattered: whatever sooths our pride, and tends to exalt our species above the rest of the creation, we are pleased with and easily believe, when ungrateful truths shall be with the utmost indignation rejected. What! Bring ourselves down to an equality with the beasts of the field! With the meanest part of the creation! ’Tis insufferable! But, (to use a piece of common sense) our geese are but geese though we may think them swans; and truth will be truth though it sometimes prove mortifying and distasteful.
Plan of Conduct
While in London, Franklin lamented that his life had so far been rather confused because he had never outlined a design for how to conduct himself. A very methodical man, he produced the first such plan during his eleven-week voyage back to Philadelphia in 1726. Rule one he had already mastered. Rule three he likewise had little trouble following. As for two and four, he would henceforth preach them diligently and generally make a show of practicing them, though he would sometimes be better at the show than the practicing.
1726
Those who write of the art of poetry teach us that if we would write what may be worth the reading, we ought always, before we begin, to form a regular plan and design of our piece: otherwise, we shall be in danger of incongruity. I am apt to think it is the same as to life. I have never fixed a regular design in life; by which means it has been a confused variety of different scenes. I am now entering upon a new one: let me, therefore, make some resolutions, and form some scheme of action, that, henceforth, I may live in all respects like a rational creature.
1. It is necessary for me to be extremely frugal for some time, till I have paid what I owe.
2. To endeavor to speak truth in every instance; to give nobody expectations that are not likely to be answered, but aim at sincerity in every word and action, the most amiable excellence in a rational being.
3. To apply myself industriously to whatever business I take in hand, and not divert my mind from my business by any foolish project of growing suddenly rich; for industry and patience are the surest means of plenty.
4. I resolve to speak ill of no man whatever, not even in a matter of truth; but rather by some means excuse the faults I hear charged upon others, and upon proper occasions speak all the good I know of every body.
Advice to His Sister on Her Marriage
Franklin’s lifelong advocacy of industry and frugality first appears in a letter to his younger sister Jane when she was getting married. He had thought of sending her a tea table, he said, but his practical nature got the better of him. Spinning wheels and tea sets would become, for him, symbols of industry versus indulgence that he would return to in Poor Richard’s Almanac and other writings.
TO JANE FRANKLIN, JANUARY 6, 1727
Dear Sister,
I am highly pleased with the account captain Freeman gives me of you. I always judged by your behavior when a child that you would make a good, agreeable woman, and you know you were ever my peculiar favorite. I have been thinking what would be a suitable present for me to make, and for you to receive, as I hear you are grown a celebrated beauty. I had almost determined on a tea table, but when I considered that the character of a good housewife was far preferable to that of being only a pretty gentlewoman, I concluded to send you a spinning wheel, which I hope you will accept as a small token of my sincere love and affection.
Sister, farewell, and remember that modesty, as it makes the most homely virgin amiable and charming, so the want of it infallibly renders the most perfect beauty disagreeable and odious. But when that brightest of female virtues shines among other perfections of body and mind in the same person, it makes the woman more lovely than an angel. Excuse this freedom, and use the same with me. I am, dear Jenny, your loving brother,
B. Franklin
A New Creed and Liturgy
Upon his return to Philadelphia, Franklin showed little interest in organized religion and even less in attending Sunday services. Still, he continued to hold some basic religious beliefs, among them “the existence of the Deity” and that “the most acceptable service of God was doing good to man.” He was tolerant toward all sects, particularly those that worked to make the world a better place. Because he believed that churches were useful to the community, he paid his annual subscription to support the town’s Presbyterian minister, the Rev. Jedediah Andrews.
One day Andrews prevailed upon him to sample his Sunday sermons, which Franklin did for five weeks. Unfortunately, he found them “uninteresting and unedifying since not a single moral principle was inculcated or enforced, their aim seeming to be rather to make us good Presbyterians than good citizens.” Franklin reverted to spending his Sundays reading and writing on his own.
Franklin began to clarify his religious beliefs through a series of essays and letters. In them he adopted a creed that would last his lifetime: a virtuous, morally-fortified and pragmatic version of deism. Unlike most pure deists, he concluded that it was useful (and thus probably correct) to believe that a faith in God should inform our daily actions; but his faith was devoid of sectarian dogma, burning spirituality, deep soul-searching, or a personal relationship to Christ.
The first of these religious essays was a paper “for my own private use,” written in November 1728. His opening affirmation, “I believe there is one Supreme most perfect being,” was an important statement, since some mushier deists shied from even going that far. Some commentators read this essay as an embrace by Franklin of some sort of polytheism, with a bevy of gods overseeing various realms and planets. But Franklin seems to be speaking more figuratively than literally. (Given the difficulties Franklin sometimes seems to have in believing in one God, it seems unlikely he could find himself believing in many.)
NOVEMBER 20, 1728
Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion
Here will I hold, If there is a Power above us (And that there is,
all Nature cries aloud, Thro all her Works), He must delight in Virtue
And that which he delights in must be Happy.
—Cato
First Principles
I Believe there is one Supreme most perfect Being, Author and Father of the Gods themselves.
For I believe that Man is not the most perfect Being but One, rather that as there are many Degrees of Beings his Inferiors, so there are many Degrees of Beings superior to him.
Also, when I stretch my Imagination thro and beyond our System of Planets, beyond the visible fixed Stars themselves, into that Space that is every Way infinite, and conceive it filled with Suns like ours, each with a Chorus of Worlds for ever moving round him, then this little Ball on which we move, seems, even in my narrow Imagination, to be almost Nothing, and my self less than nothing, and of no sort of Consequence.
When I think thus, I imagine it great Vanity in me to suppose, that the Supremely Perfect, does in the least regard such an inconsiderable Nothing as Man. More especially, since it is impossible for me to have any positive clear Idea of that which is infinite and incomprehensible, I cannot conceive otherwise, than that He, the Infinite Father, expects or requires no Worship or Praise from us, but that he is even infinitely above it.
But since there is in all Men something like a natural Principle which inclines them to Devotion or th
e Worship of some unseen Power;
And since Men are endowed with Reason superior to all other Animals that we are in our World acquainted with;
Therefore I think it seems required of me, and my Duty, as a Man, to pay Divine Regards to Something.
I conceive then, that the Infinite has created many Beings or Gods, vastly superior to Man, who can better conceive his Perfections than we, and return him a more rational and glorious Praise. As among Men, the Praise of the Ignorant or of Children, is not regarded by the ingenious Painter or Architect, who is rather honored and pleased with the Approbation of Wise men and Artists.
It may be that these created Gods, are immortal, or it may be that after many Ages, they are changed, and Others supply their Places.
Howbeit, I conceive that each of these is exceeding wise, and good, and very powerful; and that Each has made for himself, one glorious Sun, attended with a beautiful and admirable System of Planets.
It is that particular wise and good God, who is the Author and Owner of our System, that I propose for the Object of my Praise and Adoration.
For I conceive that he has in himself some of those Passions he has planted in us, and that, since he has given us Reason whereby we are capable of observing his Wisdom in the Creation, he is not above caring for us, being pleased with our Praise, and offended when we slight Him, or neglect his Glory.
I conceive for many Reasons that he is a good Being, and as I should be happy to have so wise, good and powerful a Being my Friend, let me consider in what Manner I shall make myself most acceptable to him.
Next to the Praise due, to his Wisdom, I believe he is pleased and delights in the Happiness of those he has created; and since without Virtue Man can have no Happiness in this World, I firmly believe he delights to see me Virtuous, because he is pleased when he sees me Happy.