The reason why I don't care to print anything about this is because Max was a very old friend of mine and was very good to me, and his wife might hear about [it] and feel hurt if I actually name names. In my reply in the Partisan Review I put in a note to the effect that I was answering this privately, but I daresay they'll omit both this and your query,1 as I have explained the circumstances to Dwight Macdonald.*
Yours truly
George Orwell
[XIII, 1282, pp. 405-6 (including Comfort's response); typewritten]
Alex Comfort replied on 16 July 1942:
Dear Mr. Orwell
Thank you very much for writing to me. I didn't know about Max in this connection, and you were entirely right. I shouldn't really have replied to you where the Adelphi was concerned, as I have only known it since the war: I rather took it that you meant that Jew baiting in it was a recent thing--a feature which had cropped up during the period you were reporting on. (I suppose Max's foible was of pretty long standing).
I thought some of the things you said should have been far more fully answered, but doubted if P.R. would have room for more than a squib-retort. I honestly don't think that the last lot of us are any more constructively pro-Fascist than our predecessors, but from the people I encounter, I would say they were nearer to Russian nihilism than any contemporary line of thought.
However, I often want to remonstrate with Peace News, not for being Fascist, but for trying, as you say, to get away with both ends of the same argument. I have written a commination to J.M. Murry but he did not print it. He needs another beginning 'cursed is the man who imagines one can assume opposite viewpoints and say that whichever turns out to be true, his main contention is right.'
I'd like an opportunity of congratulating you over that Horizon article on Donald McGilldeg. It was the best example of an analysis I think I ever read.
I'll be writing to the editor of P.R. and explain that I entirely agree with you, on seeing the references. I didn't want to put you on the spot over a personal question like that, and I apologize for my ignorance.
All good wishes and many thanks
Alex Comfort
I'd like to have started an argument over that review of yours,2 but the Adelphi hadn't room to unleash me. Anyhow, thank you for doing it. It made me revise several ideas.
1.Partisan Review omitted all reference to this topic.
2.For Orwell's review of Comfort's novel, No Such Liberty, see XIII, 855, pp. 389-44.
To Routledge & Sons Ltd.
23 July 1942
The BBC
Broadcasting House
London W 1
Dear Sir,
My attention has just been drawn to a book published by you entitled Victory or Vested Interests, in which you have included a lecture of mine delivered last year for the Fabian Society. I submitted this lecture to you in typewritten form, and, I believe, corrected the proofs. I now find that you have been through it and made the most unwarrantable alterations about which I was not even consulted--a fact which I should never even have discovered if I had not bought a copy of the book, as you did not even send me one. I am communicating with my literary agents to see what remedy I have against this treatment, but meanwhile, I should be glad to have an explanation from you. I shall be obliged by an early answer.1
Yours truly,
Geo. Orwell
[XIII, 1319, p. 424; typewritten]
1.T. Murray Ragg, the Managing Director, replied on 24 July explaining that they had made no alterations and had delivered copies as instructed by the Fabian Society. He suggested that someone at the Society had made the alterations. (For a full account see XIII, 884, pp. 66-7.) On 8 August 1942, Captain Basil Liddell Hart wrote to Orwell expressing surprise that someone of his penetration had been misled by Philippe Barres's Charles de Gaulle, which Orwell had reviewed in the Observer on 2 August (XIII, 1346, pp. 443-4), in so far as it discussed the evolution of mechanised warfare and the use of armoured divisions. He sent Orwell six pages of notes to show that it was not de Gaulle who had devised modern methods of tank warfare, which the Germans, rather than the French or British, had adopted, but a British officer, Colonel J. F. C. Fuller (1878-1966; CB, DSO) in 1927. (Fuller was identified by the security service as 'the military strongman willing to take part in, if not preside over, a British Vichy'.) Two years later, the British War Office had issued 'the first official manual on mechanized warfare . . . embodying the new conception'. This included the organisation and methods that were to become the foundation of Panzer attacks. General de Gaulle's book, Vers L'Armee de Metier (1934), had only ten of its 122 pages devoted to tactics, in the English translation. This, said Liddell Hart, was hardly surprising, since de Gaulle's 'first personal experience with tanks was not until three years later, in 1937'. Niall Ferguson in his The War of the World (2006) discusses the considerable influence Liddell Hart had on tank and aircraft strategy - alas, 'it was hugely influential not in Britain but in Germany', especially on Heinz Guderian, commander of the 19th German Army Corps (pp. 386-7).
To B. H. Liddell Hart*
12 August 1942
10a Mortimer Crescent
NW 6
Dear Captain Liddell Hart,
Many thanks for your letter. I am sorry I accepted too readily the legend of the Germans having taken their tank theories from de Gaulle. The Observer had to compress my review of Barres's book by cutting out a passage from de Gaulle's memorandum of early in 1940. I hadn't seen this memorandum till seeing it in Barres's book, and it certainly did seem to me to foretell what happened a few months later with considerable prescience. The story of 'the man the Germans learned from' had already been built up elsewhere, and I had already more or less accepted it, not, of course, being much versed in military literature. I had read many of your own writings but didn't realise that the Germans had drawn on them to that extent. And I was more ready to accept de Gaulle as a revolutionary innovator because of the obviously old-fashioned nature of the French army as a whole. I was in French Morocco from the autumn of 1938 to the spring of 1939, and with war obviously imminent I naturally observed the French colonial army as closely as I could, even to the point of getting hold of some of their infantry textbooks. I was struck by the antiquated nature of everything, though I know very little of military matters. I could if you wish write to the Observer and say that I was mistaken and had transferred some of your thunder to de Gaulle, but from a political point of view I don't like writing de Gaulle down. It was a misfortune that we didn't succeed in getting a leftwing politician of standing out of France, but since de Gaulle is the only figure we have at present to represent the Free French we must make the best of him.
No, I didn't write Bless 'Em All.1 I am not in the army because I am not physically fit (Class IV!) but I have been in the Home Guard from the beginning and could write a rather similar booklet about that. I don't know who the author is except that he is an Australian. The book has had a fairly large sale, 15-20,000 copies, and has probably done a lot of good.
I should like to meet you some time when you are in London. I never get out of London as I am working in the BBC. I expect Humphrey Slater is a mutual friend of ours.
Yours sincerely
Geo. Orwell
[XIII, 1379, pp. 471-2; typewritten]
1.Liddell Hart asked Orwell whether he had written Bless 'Em All because he so admired the book that he had 'distributed quite a number of copies . . . in quarters where I thought it might do some good'. The full title of the book, published pseudonymously by Boomerang, is Bless 'Em All: An Analysis of the British Army, Its Morale, Efficiency and Leadership, Written from Inside Knowledge (1942). 'Boomerang' was Alan W. Wood, an Australian who had worked on Beaverbook newspapers before the war and who, according to Fredric Warburg, 'died far too young'. It sold 37,625 copies in the first fifteen months.
To Tom Wintringham*
17 August 1942
Dear Wintringham,
I am in general agre
ement with the document you sent me,1 and so are most of the people I know, but I think that from the point of view of [a] propaganda approach it is all wrong. In effect, it demands two separate things which the average reader will get mixed up, first, the setting up of a committee, and secondly, the programme which that committee is to use as a basis for discussion. I should start by putting forward boldly and above all with an eye to intelligibility a programme for India coupled with the statement that this is what the Indian political leaders would accept. I would not start with any talk about setting up committees; in the first place because it depresses people merely to hear about committees, and in any case because the procedure you suggest would take months to carry through, and would probably lead to an inconclusive announcement. I should head my leaflet or whatever it is RELEASE NEHRU--REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS and then set forth the plan for India in six simple clauses, viz: 1). India to be declared independent immediately.
2). An interim national government from the leading political parties on a proportional basis.
3). India to enter into full alliance with the United Nations.
4). The leading political parties to cooperate in the war effort to their utmost capacity.
5). The existing administration to be disturbed as little as possible during the war period.
6). Some kind of trade agreement allowing for a reasonable safeguarding of British interests.
Those are the six points. They should be accompanied by an authoritative statement from the Congress Party that they are willing to accept those terms--as they would be--and that if granted these terms they would cooperate in crushing the pro-Japanese faction. Point 6 should carry with it a rider to the effect that the British and Indian Governments will jointly guarantee the pensions of British officials in India. In this way at small cost one could neutralise a not unimportant source of opposition in this country.
All I have said could be got on to a leaflet of a page or two pages, and I think might get a hearing. It is most important to make this matter simple and arresting as it has been so horribly misrepresented in the press and the big public is thoroughly bored by India and only half aware of its strategic significance. Ditto with America.
Yours,
[No name/position]
[XIII, 1391, pp. 479-80; typewritten]
1.Tom Wintringham had sent Orwell a copy of the press release issued by the Common Wealth National Committee on 15 August 1942. This was issued over the names of J.B. Priestley (Chairman), Richard Acland (Vice-Chairman; see 24.11.38, n. 4), and Tom Wintringham* (Vice-Chairman). The stature of the novelist, playwright, and commentator, J. B. Priestley (1894-1984) was considerable at this time and was further enhanced by his inspiring broadcasts, especially after Dunkirk. He was seen by many as akin to Churchill in his dogged determination; even in the darkest days he was sure the war would end in Britain's favour. He also argued forcefully for a better Britain when peace came.
To Leonard Moore*
4 September 1942
10a Mortimer Crescent
NW 6
Dear Mr Moore,
Many thanks for the cheque for PS10-17—1, and the accounts. I return the latter.
I am unfortunately far too busy to write anything except casual journalism. Besides being in the BBC I am in the Home Guard, and between the two I don't have many evenings to myself. However, during 1940-1941 I kept a diary, and when I had been keeping it some time it struck me that it might be publishable some time, though I felt it would be more likely to be of interest after a lapse of 5 or 10 years. But events have moved so fast that it might as well be 10 years since 1940 now, and I am not sure the thing is not worth trying on a few publishers. A friend who had also kept a diary had some idea of making a book out of the two, but this idea fell through.1 At present my diary is being typed, but when that is done, in about 10 days, we might see what we can do with it. Gollancz did hear about [it] and said he would like to see it, but I am not certain whether people are not rather fed up with war diaries. I should think the best place for publishing a thing of this kind would be America, if one could connect with an American publisher and then get the Ms through the censorship. My books have never sold well in the USA, but I think I may have built myself up a small public there via the 'London Letters' I have done from time to time during the last 18 months in the Partisan Review. The editor told me some New York publisher said he thought the 'London Letters' might be worth reprinting in pamphlet form, and if so the diary might have a chance. It is about 25,000 or 30,000 words, an awkward length, and I shouldn't expect such a book to have more than a small sale, but I should think some publisher might think it worth risking a few pounds on.
I hope business is good. Everyone seems to be reading, when they can get hold of books.
Yours sincerely
Eric Blair
[XIV, 1443, p. 5; typewritten]
1.The friend was Inez Holden.* The joint publication was not realised.
To Mulk Raj Anand*
7 October 1942
Dear Mulk,
I am sending back your script on War and Peace because I wish you would rewrite the later part, roughly speaking from page 4 onwards in order to deal more with the sociological aspect of War and Peace. I think it is quite true that Tolstoy marked the beginning of a new attitude towards the novel, but that in itself is not big enough to justify the title 'Books That Changed the World'. What I wanted was a talk on War and Peace as exemplifying the new attitude towards war. If not the first, it is certainly one of the first books that tried to describe war realistically and many modern currents of thought, probably including pacifism, derive from it to some extent. I do not of course want pacifist propaganda, but I think we might make valuable use of a comparison between Tolstoy's description of the battle of Oesterlitz1 and for instance Tennyson's 'Charge of the Light Brigade'.
Gollancz has expressed interest in your idea for a book about India.2 He says it would have to be done quickly, which however would be quite easy by the method we were projecting of doing it. He wants you, or failing you, me to go and see him today week, October 14th, at 11 a.m. at his office. Do you think you could see me between now and then so that we can draw up a synopsis of the book?
Yours sincerely,
George Orwell
[XIV, 1550, pp. 85-6; typewritten]
1.Austerlitz, where Napoleon gained a brilliant victory over the Austrians and Russians in 1805. Tolstoy's account is given in Book 3, chapters 14-19. The letter illuminates Orwell's attitude to his idea for broadcasting to India: far more educational and cultural than crudely propagandist.
2.In a letter to Orwell of 11 October 1942 (which discussed factual aspects of the broadcast), Anand added a postscript to say that he would telephone on Monday (presumably the next day) to discuss the book. He said that the only real basis for a symposium was a constructive plan for the defence of India. That might bring together different points of view and 'reveal the idiocy of reaction more strongly'. There is nothing else on file about this proposed book.
Laurence Brander* to L. F. Rushbrook Williams*
8 October 1942, with copy to Orwell Saturday Weekly News Letter
In conversation with Mr. Eric Blair this morning, I discovered that he writes our Saturday Weekly News Letter which is read by some Indians. The audience in India supposes that the reader is the composer, and the present audience is small. As you know, the universal demand amongst our Indian audience is for well-known Englishmen. If, therefore, it could be arranged that this News Letter be no longer anonymous, but the known work of 'George Orwell' and read by him 1 instead of largely being ignored as at present, it would be looked forward to with the very greatest interest, as few names stand so high with our Indian audience at present as that of George Orwell.
[XIV, 1557, p. 89; typewritten]
1.This was agreed. Orwell read his Newsletters from No. 48, 21 November 1942.
To the Editor of The Times
12 October 1942
1
0A Mortimer Crescent
NW 6
Sir,
May I be allowed to offer one or two reflections on the British Government's decision to retaliate against German prisoners, which seems so far to have aroused extraordinarily little protest?1
By chaining up German prisoners in response to similar action by the Germans, we descend, at any rate in the eyes of the ordinary observer, to the level of our enemies. It is unquestionable when one thinks of the history of the past ten years, that there is a deep moral difference between democracy and Fascism, but if we go on the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth we simply cause that difference to be forgotten. Moreover, in the matter of ruthlessness we are unlikely to compete successfully with our enemies. As the Italian radio has just proclaimed, the Fascist principle is two eyes for an eye and a whole set of teeth for one tooth. At some point or another public opinion in England will flinch from the implications of this statement, and it is not very difficult to foresee what will happen. As a result of our action the Germans will chain up more British prisoners, we shall have to follow suit by chaining up more Axis prisoners, and so it will continue till logically all the prisoners on either side will be in chains. In practice, of course, we shall become disgusted with the process first, and we shall announce that the chaining up will now cease, leaving, almost certainly, more British than Axis prisoners in fetters. We shall thus have acted both barbarously and weakly, damaging our own good name without succeeding in terrorising the enemy.
It seems to me that the civilised answer to the German action would be something like this: 'You proclaim that you are putting thousands of British prisoners in chains because some half-dozen Germans or thereabouts were temporarily tied up during the Dieppe raid. This is disgusting hypocrisy, in the first place because of your own record during the past ten years, in the second place because troops who have taken prisoners have got to secure them somehow until they can get them to a place of safety, and to tie men's hands in such circumstances is totally different from chaining up a helpless prisoner who is already in an internment camp. At this moment, we cannot stop you mal-treatingdeg our prisoners, though we shall probably remember it at the peace settlement, but don't fear that we shall retaliate in kind. You are Nazis, we are civilised men. This latest act of yours simply demonstrates the difference.'