Read Airborne: A Guided Tour of an Airborne Task Force Page 37


  Another young officer got a lesson in humility on the night of D-Day+2. That evening, John and I were with Major Beinkemper, sitting in on an evening briefing by the staff in the Brigade TOC. At the precise moment that the young intelligence officer (S-2) announced the apparent demise of most of the enemy mortar teams, several contractor support personnel on all-terrain vehicles pulled up and dumped nine fire markers (mortar-shell simulators) around the TOC. As everyone ran for the cover of the force protection trenches, and the brigade staff tried to get the section of 155mm guns to fire onto the apparent position of the mortar team, you could see Colonel Petraeus smiling at everyone in the TOC and shouting, “No pressure, people!” It was hard not to smirk at the discomfort of the young officer. But such is the way that young officers grow and learn.

  Colonel David “Devil-6” Petraeus, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division’s 1st Brigade, makes a joke with his headquarters staff during a simulated opposing force (OPFOR) Mortar Attack. His comment during the scramble for slit trenches and information? “NO PRESSURE, PEOPLE!”

  JOHN D. GRESHAM

  JRTC/Fort Polk, Sunday, October 16th, 1996

  By D-Day+5, the brigade had achieved all of its planned objectives for the “low intensity” phase of the deployment. Over the past several days, the brigade had enlarged its airhead, gotten caught up on MEDEVAC and casualty replacement, and had finally opened up a secure road route to the west where the brigade aviation element was based, close to the main base at Fort Polk. This had been a bit sticky, because the single company assigned to protect the aircraft and their vulnerable Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) had nearly been destroyed by aggressive patrolling by the rebel forces. In addition, there had been several terrorist incidents, the worst of these being an attack by enemy sappers on the brigade maintenance center near the DZ. For the next few days, maintenance on vehicles and other equipment would be heavily restricted as the personnel went through the replacement system and the equipment was repaired.

  Other attacks at JRTC can be damaging as well. They range from emplacing surprise minefields on roads, to the most wild of the civilian role-players, Grandma “Truck Bomb.” This is an elderly civilian contractor employee who plays the wife of the mayor in one of the civilian settlements around the DZ. What she does is make friends with troopers at a particular roadblock or other important security checkpoint, and bring them snacks and cookies for several days. Then, when she sees them getting complacent, she drives up in a truck, walks away, and remotely detonates a simulated truck bomb which will simulate killing everyone within a large area! While this may sound sick, remember some of the assassinations and bombings of the last fifteen years or so, and ask yourself if a granny truck bomber is possible or not.

  A simulated terrorist truck bomb is detonated at the Joint Readiness Training Center during a unit rotation. Such “real world” events help make the JRTC the world’s finest infantry training center.

  OFFICIAL U.S. ARMY PHOTO

  But now the time had come to transition to the “hot war” phase of the deployment, where the regular forces of a neighboring nation to the south and east were moving into the territory of the host nation for an invasion. The forces, built around a simulated Soviet-style motorized rifle regiment (much like the ones in use at the NTC), are supposed to smash into the lightly armed U.S. infantry units and try to push them off their objectives. Colonel Petreaus had other ideas, though. He is a big believer in winning the intelligence/counterintelligence battle before the big fight develops, and he was aggressively patrolling with his troopers to find the route of the enemy advance, due for the morning of D-Day+8 (October 19th).

  That night, his patrols destroyed many of the enemy reconnaissance units, and had established the likely route of the enemy attack. He quickly put his two infantry battalions side by side along the route, laid a vicious string of mines and barricades, and chopped the enemy regiment to pieces with artillery and Hellfire missiles from the OH-58Ds, lending to a successful defense of their positions.

  This was a stunning victory for 1st Brigade, and it set the OPFOR back on their heels a bit. They did ramp up the threat level a bit with more rebel activity, and even a chemical weapons attack on one of the forward infantry companies, but Devil-6 and his staff were getting stronger now, and their agility on the battlefield was starting to show.

  JRTC/Fort Polk, Friday, October 18th, 1996

  With their victory in the defensive fight, it was time for the 1st Brigade to set up for their final big fight of the deployment: the force-on-force battle for the Shughart-Gordon MOUT facility. As any good infantry leader will tell you, there is no faster way to suffer heavy casualties than to get into a slow urban assault. Nevertheless, Shughart-Gordon was one of the primary objectives that the brigade had to take, so Colonel Petraeus decided to find an indirect route to the objective. Most JRTC participants move to Shughart-Gordon via the east-west Artillery Road that runs from the main base at Fort Polk out to the DZ/airfield in the east. To this end, “Devil-1” decided to grease the wheels of the Shughart-Gordon assault with an indirect approach. To do this, he sent a “pinning” force of M551 Sheridans (the division still had these in late 1996) and Hummers loaded with infantry along the Artillery Road in front of Shughart-Gordon, to draw the attention of the OPFOR blocking force in front of the MOUT site. Then, once he knew that the OPFOR troops were solidly involved with the diversionary force, he force-marched the majority of his force in a wide arc to the south, around the old artillery impact zone that lies in the middle of the range area. Most folks don’t use this area, but Petraeus had checked with the O/Cs and they had ruled the movement legal. So, on the night of the 19th (D-Day+9), the bulk of the brigade moved to a position behind Shughart-Gordon to the northwest of the MOUT site. Then, putting four infantry companies on line together, they just rolled forward over the small security force that the OPFOR had left in the complex. His men just walked in, taking over like a “Big Dog” with a minimum of casualties. Suddenly, the game was all but over. There would be several other terrorist bombings, including a truck bombing of the FARP after it was moved to the north end of the DZ. However, only a couple of UH-60L Blackhawks were lost, and the rest were able to hold the load.

  A C-130 Hercules from the 314th Airlift Wing at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, comes in to land on the dirt landing strip in the Fort Polk Training Range. During their Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) deployments, airborne units draw their supplies from airdrops and air deliveries like this one.

  JOHN D. GRESHAM

  To try and put some further pressure on 1st Brigade, the O/Cs and OPFOR forces counterattacked, and staged a number of air attacks with the Russian attack helicopters as well as F-16s used to simulate Soviet Su- 22 Fitter fighter bombers. However, the brigade’s Avenger and MANPAD SAM systems gave as good as they got, and the attacks generally were blunted. By the time the “ENDEX Time” (End of Exercise signal) message was sent on D-Day+11 (October 23rd), the brigade had achieved virtually all of its pre-deployment objectives.

  This is not to say that everything went perfectly. On the contrary, the delay in the setup of the Brigade TOC, the problems with the MEDEVAC system, and the failure to clear the Artillery Road out for the FARP early in the exercise were judged to have been things that required work. But in general, the troopers had learned a lot, and given the perfect October weather, it had been a glorious stay in the “Sportsman’s Paradise.” Oddly, the weather turned ugly and rainy after the ENDEX Time, when the brigade was policing up the battlefield (retrieving defensive wire and filling in excavations). Once this was done, the brigade was loaded up on buses for the twenty-four-hour ride back to Fort Bragg and home. Though JRTC deployments are not supposed to be about “winning” and “losing,” Colonel Petreaus and his 1st Brigade had clearly done well. Not perfectly, but exceptionally by JRTC standards. By the time they arrived home, they were tired but happy. They were now ready to go back onto DRB-1 alert status, which occurred on Novembe
r 1st, 1996.

  Soldiers at the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) breaching a wire obstacle at a MOUT Site. The JRTC/Fort Polk ranges have a number of such facilities, giving rotating soldiers unparalleled training in MOUT tactics.

  JOHN D. GRESHAM

  Good-to-Go: DRB-1 (November 1st to December 13th, 1996)

  Following the end of JRTC 97-1, the brigade finished its preparations to take over as the DRB-1 Brigade. Despite having all three battalions at his disposal this time, Colonel Petraeus decided again to have only two of the three on DRF-1 status during the coming alert period. As planned, the 3/504 would take the alert spot for the first three weeks (November 1st to 22nd), and then 1/504, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leo Brooks and Sergeant Major Curtis Walker, would go DRF for the final three weeks (November 22nd to December 13th) of the rotation. In reserve would be2/504, acting as the “push” battalion for the other two, should a deployment be needed. Fortunately, no such contingency arose.

  However, the XVIII Airborne Corps leadership keeps a few surprises in their bag for the units on DRB-1 alert, and the 1st Brigade was about to be tested again. The test is known as an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE), and these are some of the best evaluations of just how ready a unit is to go off to war should it be required. In this case, the EDRE began on December 3rd, 1996, when the alert order went out to the brigade (the 3/504 had the DRF-1 duty at this time). This was run exactly like a real emergency deployment (in fact, the troopers initially had no idea if it was real or an exercise), complete with a two-hour recall deadline and lock-down of the DRF in the CMA prior to heading over to the Green Ramp at Pope AFB. Less than eighteen hours after the alert was issued, the 3/504, along with the brigade headquarters, a special team of specialists from the 82nd, jumped into a simulated evacuation situation at 0210 hours/2:10 AM on December 4th at the Avon Park Airfield in Florida. Once on the ground, the special team from the division conducted a simulated Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), to remove a number of simulated U.S. citizens from a crisis. In a little over twenty-four hours, the operation was finished, and the entire DRF re-embarked and flew back on December 6th. Once there, the force again jumped at night from their transports, having done so twice in just three days. Overall, it was an outstanding operation that showed just how sharp a combat edge Colonel Petraeus had given the 1st Brigade. By the time that the 1st Brigade handed off the DRB-1 alert status on Friday, the 13th of December, 1996, they were as taut and combat ready as they ever had been.

  Fort Bragg, Wednesday, November 27th, 1996

  There was one other important event in the eighteen-week cycle of the division, and a happy one at that. Shortly after we had seen General Crocker on the ramp at Charleston AFB, the word came down that he was about to be promoted to lieutenant general, and moved up to the command of a corps. Thus it came to be that the day before Thanksgiving, the newly frocked General Crocker and his replacement, Major General Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., stood together in the time-honored way as the baton of responsibility for America’s only airborne division was handed on to a new leader. For George Crocker, this day meant a third star and command of the U.S. I Corps out at Fort Lewis, Washington. However, it was hard to imagine that tough man who embodies everything that makes the airborne community great could hand his command over without a twinge of emotion. But he was giving the job to another skilled paratrooper. In fact, to look at General Kellogg’s biography is to see the standard path for 82nd Airborne Division commanders. He is the latest in a long line of All-American commanders who have commanded America’s best-known combat unit. On the walls of his headquarters are names like Ridgway, Gavin, Stiner, and now George Crocker. Each of these men left their own mark on the 82nd, and it remains to be seen what his will be. Whatever he does accomplish in the next two years of his tour, you can bet that he too will keep up the tradition of America’s Honor Guard.

  The 82nd Airborne in the Real World

  Once again, I’m going to spin a couple of short yarns about just how units like the 82nd Airborne might ply their deadly trade in the real world of the future. To this end, we’re going to look a decade or so into the early years of the 21st century (yes, it really is that close!) at what kinds of things the paratroops from Fort Bragg might be asked to do. Interestingly, and unlike the other kinds of units that we have explored in other books in this series, the 82nd will probably keep doing the same jobs they have always done: peacekeeping, pre-invasion assaults, airfield raids. More difficult and involved jobs, and probably in new places around the globe, but still the same kinds of kick-in-the-door and bust-heads jobs that have been their specialty for over a half century. So read on, and see where and what the All-Americans of the 82nd Airborne may be up to in ten years or so.

  Operation Fort Apache: Sudan, 2007

  Hamed an-Niel Mosque, Omdurman, Sudan, February 5th, 2007

  In the dusty courtyard outside the mosque, Hassan al-Mahdi stood flanked by members of his personal guard, watching men whirl to the beating of hand drums, their arms flung out for balance, their eyes closed, expressions of rapture on their faces as they sought oneness with Allah in the frenzied rhythms of the dhikr. Swirling loosely around their thin, ascetic bodies, the robes were blurs of color under a sky stained red with sunset, a deep bloodred that made al-Mahdi think of those whose path to God had demanded far more than spiritual exercises—those who had suffered the pain of martyrdom so that the Sudanese people might find their destiny. Earlier that day, a decision made by al-Mahdi in Khartoum had thrust them further toward that destiny than anyone outside his ruling council could have imagined.

  His brown, almost black eyes narrowed in the fading light, al-Mahdi rubbed his fingers over his ritually scarred cheeks and reflected on the pivotal meeting that had taken place in the nation’s capital across the confluence of the Blue and White Niles. He was aware of his persuasive leadership abilities, and knew that without his will, his vision, the Islamic Leadership Council (ILC) would never have embarked upon the course they had chosen, never have called for a campaign of open hostilities against the West. However, he was not too proud to acknowledge that every great harvest originated with the planting of small seeds. His success today owed much to the efforts of his predecessors.

  A map of the Airborne Action in Khartoum, Sudan.

  JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA ALPHER

  For years the Sudan had been quietly increasing its power and standing within the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions. Its rise had begun with the institution of Muslim shari’a law two decades before, and continued throughout the 1990s with radical economic reforms and the cleansing of non-Muslims in the rebellious south.

  Also during that period, the Sudanese rulers had strengthened their ties with other Sufist regimes, sponsoring anti-Egyptian guerrillas in the northern border territories, smuggling foodstuffs and other supplies to Iraq during the interminable period of United Nations sanctions, firmly aligning themselves with Yemen and Iran in their campaign to excise the cancerous influence of the West from Arab politics and society.

  At the same time, the Sudan had lured private European and Canadian financiers into investing in the development of its petroleum fields like a cobra doing a subtle dance to confound and draw its prey. Now that Western money, technology, engineers, and laborers had given the Sudanese people the means to extract and process the oil—enough oil to satisfy their needs for at least another decade—the infidels finally could be sent packing.

  Hassan al-Mahdi had waited long for this day. A distant descendant of Mohammed Ahmad—the great Sudanese warrior who in the 19th century led a holy war against European colonialists, laid siege to Khartoum, and displayed its British governor’s head on a pole for all his troops to see—al-Mahdi had since childhood been filled with a sense of exalted and inexorable mission. While still shy of his thirtieth birthday, al-Mahdi had united his country’s two most powerful religious movements, the Ansar and the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, under his so
le authority, and convinced the tribal chieftains to proclaim him as their Mahdi, or messenger of God. Three years ago, he had wrested control of the military government in a swift and bloody coup, selected sympathetic generals from the former regime to command his army, launched a vigorous effort to improve his country’s economic infrastructure, and used the tax profits to increase his backing of anti-Western militias.

  Now the culmination of al-Mahdi’s plans was at hand. At the council gathering that had ended not an hour ago, he had won approval for a positive campaign of harassment of Western—and especially American—nationals in Khartoum.

  For the present, it was essential that these incidents appeared to be random outbursts of mob violence rather than orchestrated assaults. This would not only give the Sudanese government deniability, but allow it to express righteous outrage at the charges America was bound to raise in the United Nations. As long as the godless mongrels were unable to bolster their claims with definitive proof, any retaliatory steps they took could be labeled as acts of aggression. How would it appear to the international community if they sent military planes and warships against the will of righteous street fighters? Surely then, whatever response the Sudan initiated in its defense might be considered justifiable.

  No matter how events unfolded, America and its allies would find themselves in an untenable position. At the very least, their citizens would have to flee the Sudan with their tails between their legs and their flags stuffed in their pockets. And if they were goaded into open hostilities, flare-ups of anti-Western violence would spread throughout the region like chain lightning, prompting further diplomatic and civilian withdrawals. Eventually the hordes of foreigners would return to their own lands, and the balance of power in the Arab domains would shift to those who remained faithful to the word of Allah.