Even before the requalification, the two cavalry squadron commanders had begun teaching their units how to maneuver and fire as a group. First at the platoon, then at the troop level, Colonel Martinez and Colonel Greczyn worked their small units into teams that could maneuver at squadron level. This would be required of them at the NTC. It should be noted that this is not something special being done just for the NTC deployment, but the actual process that the regiment would go through if they were given a combat deployment order to go overseas. In fact, the entire regiment was involved in doing the same jobs they would have just before a combat deployment, from the support squadron getting equipment and supplies ready to ship, to the legal and medical sections updating wills and immunization shots.
After the requalification, squadron-level exercises were run (one squadron at a time) against an opposing unit made up of Colonel Gunzelman’s 3rd Squadron, plus some Marines invited from the Twenty-Nine Palms desert training center. The unit would defend an objective on the range north of El Paso, with the troopers from either 1st or 2nd Squadron trying to dislodge them.
To keep score, there was a set of electronic gear called the Multiple Integrated Laser Exercise System (MILES). MILES provides a “no-shoot” way for units to practice ground combat (and some limited air combat), while scoring and recording their actions. MILES uses eye-safe lasers to simulate firing weapons; and MILES gear is available to simulate most weapons in the Army inventory, plus a few Soviet systems. Everything from main tank guns to assault rifles can be simulated with the right MILES transmitter.
In addition, small pyrotechnic charges (big, safe firecrackers) called Hoffman Devices are set off by the MILES electronics to simulate the noise and smoke when a gun or missile fires. Whenever a target is “hit” by the laser beam of a firing unit, a sensor on the target vehicle detects the laser “hit” and scores it either as a near miss or a simulated “kill.” If a target vehicle is “killed,” a yellow strobe light on top of the vehicle begins to blink, so everyone knows that it is out of action. To prevent arguments like “We shot you first,” when a vehicle is “killed,” the MILES system immediately disarms all of its lasers.
A U.S. Army soldier with a full set of infantry MILES gear. The “buttons” on his web harness and helmet sense laser “hits” from enemy weapons, while his M16 assault rifle is equipped with a laser generator of its own.
OFFICIAL U.S. ARMY PHOTO
There are MILES systems for dismounted soldiers also, and they fit over the helmets and web gear of the users to score simulated personnel casualties. When a soldier in a MILES ensemble is “hit,” the sensor harness lets out an unpleasant beeping sound for a “near miss” and a shrill continuous whine for a “kill,” until the soldier disables it (and his weapon) with a small yellow key. In addition to “kills” scored by enemy vehicles, the “Observer/Controller” (O/C) referees (if present) can also simulate a kill with a small laser transmitter called a “God Gun” by the troops.
The fights begin with a night road march to what is called the “line of departure,” the point where the attack actually kicks off. Along the line of march, “phase lines” are overlaid on the command maps. These imaginary lines, perpendicular to the line of advance, are usually given code names for clarity over the radio channels. First Squadron likes to designate phase lines by women’s names, such as Debbie, Ginger, Zelda, etc. As each unit crosses a particular phase line, it radios a report to the squadron commander. This tells the commander if the attack is running on schedule, as well as who is doing what.
Frequently, the exercise director will throw in difficulties, such as simulated chemical and artillery attacks. For example, if a unit moves through a zone contaminated with persistent chemical agents (a referee would notify them of this), it must immediately don MOPP-IV chemical-protection suits, use its Fox NBC vehicles to survey the contaminated zone, report the results to squadron HQ, conduct decontamination if necessary, and then continue on to the objective.
In the event, these early, full-sized squadron exercises showed us the reason why soldiers train. A lot of things didn’t go right. For example, right after the 4th of July break, we watched an exercise involving Colonel Martinez’s 1st Squadron. The objective was a hilltop in the eastern part of the Fort Bliss range overlooking 1st Squadron’s approach from the southwest. To make things harder, 3rd Squadron and the Marines had been given several days to dig in on the objective and along the approach route.
A 3rd ACR M1A1 HC tank kicks up dust during exercises at Fort Bliss, Texas.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
During the pre-exercise briefing the day before, we tried to motivate the colonel and his officers by promising “donuts and coffee” at the objective—but our good intentions didn’t help them much. 1st Squadron became a victim of what Clausewitz (the great German philosopher of war, 1780-1831) called “friction”: One little thing after another conspires to keep you from achieving your objective. “Everything is very simple in war,” Clausewitz wrote, “but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine who has not seen war.”
In this case, dust and the cover of darkness caused a few platoons to lose their way and become separated (even with GPS, this sometimes still happens). Meanwhile, some Marine OPFOR teams slipped into 1st Squadron’s rear assembly areas and caused additional confusion. By the time 1st Squadron sorted itself out for the attack on the hill, it was being chopped up by 3rd Squadron’s dug-in tanks and Bradleys.
Now, you might ask:
Q: What is the point of an attack exercise that fails?
A: You learn from your mistakes.
A formal Army review process makes sure that participants learn well. This “After-Action Review” (AAR) is a post-exercise meeting, with all leaders from both sides describing what they saw. The referees go over every detail of the exercise in excruciating detail. And it is expected that the commander of each unit will stand up and give a candid self-criticism of just what happened. If he is unsure of what went wrong, the O/Cs may ask the opposing commander to explain what happened. To further clarify all this, MILES data is displayed to show the movements and lines of fire. When it is all over, “lessons learned” are written down for later distribution to the participants. No Catholic confessional could ever be so uncomfortable and candid as a properly run After-Action Review.
The staff of the OPFOR at a pre-mission brief. The author and series artist Laura Alpher are sitting in the front row of seats.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
By the way, we gave the troopers of the Tiger Squadron the donuts anyway!
The Move to the NTC
When the squadron exercises were completed, the regiment was ready for the move to Fort Irwin. Several weeks before, Colonel Young and his officers visited the NTC to be briefed in great detail on rules of engagement (ROE), range safety procedures, logistics instructions, and other procedures. No effort is spared to ensure that the deployment is a successful learning experience. It was to be a learning experience for me as well; I spent several days observing the 3rd ACR’s NTC exercises.
In order to save wear and tear on its equipment, when a unit goes to NTC, it usually draws most of its vehicles and equipment from a storage depot at Fort Irwin. Consequently, only a few 3rd ACR command vehicles had to be shipped there.
Just prior to Labor Day weekend, most of the soldiers were trucked and bused to Fort Irwin (about 10% went by air) to draw their equipment and head out to the range assembly area called “the dust bowl.”
At the same time, 4th Squadron flew their helicopters directly to the Fort Irwin airfield, and then moved out to a field base where they would operate during the exercise. The regiment now split into two parts for the duration of the exercise. For the first half of the exercise, 2nd Squadron (Lieutenant Colonel Greczyn) went up to the live-fire range. The rest of the regiment headed out to the maneuver area in the southern part of Fort Irwin for their series of “fights” with the
toughest unit to never serve in the Soviet Army, the OPFOR.
The National Training Center Facilities/Staff
When you drive east on Interstate 10 from Los Angeles, you cross Interstate 15, which heads north towards Las Vegas, Nevada. About halfway to “Sin City” on I-15 lies the desert town of Barstow, gateway to the National Training Center, which lies a further thirty-seven miles north. The first thing you notice as you drive to the base are numerous white crosses—memorials to drivers killed along the road to NTC over the last dozen or so years. They are a grim reminder that life at NTC is dangerous enough without reckless or drunken driving. A more intriguing monument is the colorful pile of painted rocks decorating the base entrance. Each bears the crest of a unit that has rotated through.
Fort Irwin is desolate and treeless—just lots of rocks, dust, small brush, and open space for maneuvering and shooting. And yet, amazingly enough, the Army feels confined in its roughly 1,000 square miles/2,687 square kilometers. So it plans to acquire another parcel of land to enlarge the facility by 50%. Currently limited to battalion/squadron-sized actions, the range, when expanded, will be able to host brigade/regimental-sized fights.
Though thousands of troops and their families live and work here, with more arriving all the time, only one combat unit, the 177th Armored (OPFOR) Brigade, is stationed on post. The post itself is not an elegant place. Most of the buildings were built in the no-frills style of government cinderblock architecture after NTC opened in 1981. Before then, the main activity at Fort Irwin was NASA’s Goldstone Deep Space Tracking Facility, a huge dish antenna for communicating with space probes. As for the training facility, that is very elegant indeed. The entire range complex is instrumented with a huge MILES-BASED tracking and scoring system, and there is equipment meant to simulate combat with the highest possible fidelity.
During our visit in late 1993, Brigadier General Robert S. Coffey, a career infantry officer, commanded the NTC and the following units:• Fort Irwin Base Garrison—The permanent force assigned to Fort Irwin runs everything from the Post Exchange to the base housing facilities. It provides maintenance and upkeep for the store of equipment used by units rotating through NTC.
• The NTC Operations Group—These soldiers take care of the MILES sensors, laser weapons, and target arrays. They also run the “Star Wars” building where NTC exercises are monitored and AARs are conducted. They supervise combat exercises on the range and also act as coaches, trainers, referees, range safety officers, data collectors, and target array operators.
• 177th Armored Brigade/60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division—This is the maneuver element of the OPFOR. Based on Soviet organization and doctrine, they simulate enemy forces for the other units training at NTC. They operate old M551 Sheridan light tanks and HMMWVs with sheet-metal add-on kits (“visual modifications” or VISMODS) that make them look like Soviet-designed vehicles. With the apparent end of the Soviet threat, the OPFOR is keeping up-to-date on the tactics and organization of opponents America might face in the Balkans, the Middle East, East Asia, and other trouble spots.
These groups work together to make the NTC the most comprehensive combat training facility in the world. Virtually everything that a combat unit can encounter in a field deployment is simulated at the NTC, and units often find that a trip to Fort Irwin is tougher than actual combat.
Force-on-Force Fight—Wednesday, September 8th, 1993
When Colonel Young, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez, and Lieutenant Colonel Sealock arrived at the NTC, their first task was to get both 1 st and 4th Squadrons and the regimental HQ settled in and ready for action in the series of force-on-force exercises scheduled for the first ten days of the three-week rotation. These simulated battles put the squadrons through a series of engagements with the OPFOR. Every other day for eight days, over 5,000 soldiers would meet in battle up on the range. The scenarios are devised by the O/C group, and their aim is to confront participants with a variety of operational challenges. These can take several forms. Sometimes the two forces are moving simultaneously, and wind up fighting over some piece of desert, wherever their patrols collide. Other times the OPFOR attacks the unit (called the Blue Force) to break through to seize a set objective. Or the reverse: Blue Force might attack the OPFOR, in order to try to seize an objective.
A UH-1 helicopter assigned to the OPFOR at the NTC banks after a simulated firing run on troops of the 3rd ACR. The VIS-MOD on this helicopter allows it to simulate a Soviet/Russian HIND-D attack helicopter.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
Whatever the situation, both sides plan their actions so that the training experience for the Blue Force will be maximized.
Now, from the viewpoint of the OPFOR, maximizing the training experience means doing everything possible to beat a visiting Blue Force, up to and including simulated weapons of mass destruction. And in fact, the OPFOR wins something like 80% of the battles against Blue Force opponents. For the odds are intentionally stacked in the OPFOR’s favor, making every battle a desperate fight for life by the Blue Force. Thus any fight that Blue “wins” requires perfect execution of their own battle plan, and usually some mistakes by the OPFOR. Anything less than perfection means annihilating defeat for the Blue Force, and an AAR with enough humbling self-criticism to fuel a lifetime memory—and a lifetime lesson. Some factors that account for the OPFOR’s track record include:• Scenario Force Ratios-The force ratios for each scenario (depending on Blue Force maintenance and readiness) are determined by the Operations Group, so that the fights are as tough as possible. Since U.S. units are expected to fight and win against enemy forces of larger size, the OPFOR units are up to twice as large as their Blue Force opponents, whether the OPFOR is attacking or defending.
• Weapons-The NTC makes no differentiation between the effectiveness of American weapons (simulated by the MILES gear) and those of the “Soviet-equipped” OPFOR unit. This means that OPFOR tanks and fighting vehicles get the same performance from their guns and missiles as the U.S. units.
• Home Field Advantage—During any six-week period, the OPFOR fights between eight and ten battles on the same terrain, frequently in the same tactical situations. This means that they “fight” more often than any unit in the Army. Like an inner-city high school basketball team playing on its own court, they know every loose floorboard and rough spot by name. Frequently, their Blue Force opponents are seeing the NTC for the first time—which means they pay dearly while adapting to unfamiliar ground. OPFOR units use terrain so skillfully that first-time NTC visitors joke about the “OPFOR Tunnel,” as if the OPFOR could “pop up” out of the ground anywhere it chooses.
• OPFOR Experience—Every member of the OPFOR is an experienced armor officer or enlisted soldier. They all participate in the OPFOR mission constantly, and that means that they are good at their jobs. As in life, so in the combat arena, practice makes perfect.
Col. Bob Young (front) and the command staff of the 3rd ACR’s 4th (Air Cavalry) Squadron plan an NTC force-on-force engagement on a “sand-table” model of the NTC range.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
For several reasons, the situation for 3rd ACR was even tougher on this rotation. For starters, because cavalry troopers consider themselves to be an elite, the OPFOR seems to have a special place in its heart for the cavalry. Therefore, whenever the 2nd ACR-L or the 3rd ACR come to the NTC, the OPFOR likes to knock them down a couple of pegs by devising extra-tough scenarios and taking longer risks to win.
In the event, the first few days of force-on-force battle did not go well for the 3rd ACR. Though they got close to winning once, they were beaten particularly badly on several occasions. So, when the warning order came in on the morning of September 7th for a movement-to-contact the next day (everything down to the operations orders are handled as if they were actual combat situations), Lieutenant Colonel Martinez knew that it was the last chance for a successful fight with the OPFOR. Following this exercise, they would move north to the Drinkwater Lake Live-Fire
Range for their turn at the NTC’s shooting gallery.
The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s fight with the NTC OPFOR forces in Brown’s Pass on September 8th, 1993. As the fight developed, (1) the helicopters of 4th Squadron scouted the north wall of the pass with only limited success. Then (2) 1st Squadron destroyed the OPFOR security force in the southern entrance of the pass, then moved up to the OPFOR positions along the north wall. Here (3), they suffer from OPFOR missile fire. The 1st Squadron’s tank company also is hit heavily, and the survivors are destroyed (5) when they run into the main OPFOR force.
JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA ALPHER
September 7th was spent repairing equipment (armored vehicles wear out at a vicious pace in the desert) and planning the coming battle. Meanwhile, at the 1st and 4th Squadron HQs, the commanders drew battle plans on large sand-table models of Fort Irwin. The objective was to push through Brown’s Pass on the northern end of the range. The staff of the 3rd ACR expected to find the OPFOR dug in on the far side of the pass, though exactly where depended on the pre-battle reconnaissance scheduled for that evening. If they could just find the OPFOR, they would blow them right out of Brown’s Pass and back to the Goldstone tracking center.