Another message was dispatched to Colonel Thomas Dockery, commanding troops at Big Black Bridge. “General Stevenson will send cavalry to co-operate with you. Vigilance should be increased. A guard of a company should be kept at each end of this bridge and trestlework.”
And a fourth order went to Colonel James Jackson, commanding the Twenty-Seventh Alabama Infantry at Edwards Depot a few miles east of the bridge: “Move your regiment at once up to Big Black Bridge.”
Three days earlier upon learning of the raid upon Newton Station, Pemberton had ordered General Franklin Gardner to send all his disposable cavalry from Port Hudson to Tangipahoa, Louisiana, to block a possible southern flight by Grierson’s raiders. As the telegraph line was now cut at Hazlehurst, he was forced to dispatch a courier to the Tangipahoa cavalry commander: “Move up north with your command, and be guided by such information as you receive en route.”
Pemberton also notified General Gardner of the reappearance of the raiders: “You must make every effort to intercept them. They were today, 12 o’clock, at Hazlehurst, on New Orleans & Jackson Railroad.”
Even Barteau’s Second Tennessee Cavalry, fatigued from their long futile pursuit of Hatch’s Second Iowans, was not overlooked by the frantic Pemberton. Cut off from northeast Mississippi by broken telegraph lines, he wired Colonel A. E. Reynolds at Forest Station: “Send a courier to Barteau to continue on down as rapidly as possible to Hazlehurst on the New Orleans & Jackson Railroad.”
Pemberton also found time to send his daily plea for help to General Johnston in Tennessee, informing him of the raid on Hazlehurst: “I cannot defend every station on the road with infantry,” he said. “Am compelled to bring down cavalry from North Mississippi here, and the whole of that section is consequently left open. Further, these raids endanger my vital positions.”
And before the day was over the commanding general also remembered to warn General John Bowen at Grand Gulf that the raiders might possibly be making for that point. “Which way the enemy will move,” he added, “is only a matter of conjecture. Port Gibson or Big Black Bridge most probable.” Bowen was ordered to send Colonel Wirt Adams’ cavalry out to meet the enemy. “Follow them up without delay. Annoy and ambush them if possible. Move rapidly.”
General Bowen obediently but reluctantly ordered Wirt Adams toward Hazlehurst, although this would leave Grand Gulf and Port Gibson without the mobility of a cavalry defense.* To Grant’s former friend and neighbor, John Bowen, the enemy was not a small force of cavalry raiding in the hinterland; the enemy was Grant’s army preparing to lunge at him from across the big river. He made this clear in a message that evening to Pemberton’s headquarters: “I have the honor to report that all the movements of the enemy during the last twenty-four hours seem to indicate an intention on their part to march the army still lower down in Louisiana.”11 Bowen was referring to Grant’s forces; he did not even mention the raiding Yankee cavalry which so perturbed his commander, Pemberton.
V
Not until seven o’clock in the evening did Colonel Grierson give the forward command for the march out of Hazlehurst. The little railroad town had provided food for the entire brigade, as well as hay and grain for the horses. Grierson now felt that the major problem facing him was to elude any Confederate forces moving to snare him somewhere along the forty miles which lay between him and Grand Gulf. His best chance of success, he believed, was to confuse the Confederates, to conceal his real objective from them as long as possible.
As Sergeant Surby observed,
The enemy’s scouts had been sent out, and were watching our movements; couriers were flying in every direction, spreading the news, forces were concentrating and sent to intercept us, hem us in and annihilate us, as they boasted, and felt confident of accomplishing. They certainly had every advantage on their side—a perfect knowledge of the country—every road, public or private—every stream of water, small or large—the fordable places and bridges—forces above and below us on the railroad, in our front at Port Gibson, Grand Gulf and Port Hudson—following in our rear—retreat was impossible, even if such an idea had occurred to us, we having destroyed our only hope in that quarter—bridges and ferries.12
Grierson rode out of Hazlehurst in the advance with his Sixth Regiment, keeping a slow pace to Gallatin, a county seat doomed by the railroad which had bypassed it in 1857 in favor of Hazlehurst. About sunset the first company was sent charging into Gallatin. A few shots were exchanged, but in the gathering darkness no casualties were inflicted by either side, and the Gallatin defenders quietly disappeared while the two regiments marched through the town without further incident.
Six roads met at the courthouse, but instead of taking the northwesterly route which led to Grand Gulf, Grierson deliberately turned southwest on the road to Natchez. This was the beginning of a series of planned diversions which he hoped would deceive both his pursuers and any enemy forces which might be on his front.
A mile or two beyond Gallatin the scouts met an ox-drawn wagon train. They turned off into the woods, riding alongside until they were satisfied it was a military train, then hurried back to give the information to Grierson. He sent the advance company of the Sixth Regiment dashing ahead with orders to surround and capture the wagons.
After a brief flurry of firing in the darkness, the small escort troop of Confederates surrendered. The train proved to be a prize catch for the Sixth; it contained a 64-pounder Parrott gun, machinery for mounting it, a wagon load of ammunition, and 1,400 pounds of powder, all en route to Grand Gulf.
Grierson ordered the gun spiked and the carriages and ammunition destroyed. As he did not wish to be burdened with prisoners, he paroled the rebel soldiers and instructed them to return to their homes.
The column finally halted at Thompson’s Plantation, near Hargraves, going into camp just before midnight. As Grierson prepared for his first sleep in forty-eight hours, he wondered what was delaying Grant’s plans for crossing the Mississippi. None of the civilians or prisoners he had talked with that day had heard anything of an attack anywhere along the big river.
VI
From across the river “near Grand Gulf, Mississippi,” General Grant was sending a report to the general-in-chief, Major-General H. W. Halleck, in Washington: “I am now embarking troops for the attack on Grand Gulf. Expect to reduce it tomorrow.”13
At the same time, Grand Gulf’s cavalry defense, under Colonel Wirt Adams, was marching swiftly away from the river, under Pemberton’s orders to meet and ambush Grierson’s raiders.
* “Their boldness and impudence in some cases were remarkable. A couple of their scouts were sent into Hazlehurst an hour or two before their raid upon the place, who walked boldly into the telegraph office and penned a dispatch to Jackson, stating that the Yankee raiders had turned to the northeast. Their true character, however, being recognized, there was some talk of arresting them, when they—the Yankees—drew their pistols, defied the officers and men of the town, mounted their horses and rejoined their commands, then within two or three miles of the place, after which the whole force entered the town in squads of fifty and a hundred—several hours’ interval between the van and rear guards—as leisurely and with as much nonchalance as our country people would ride into town on a gala day.”—Augusta (Georgia) Chronicle, May 8, 1863.
* Port Gibson, where Colonel Wirt Adams’ cavalry was stationed, was five miles east of the Grand Gulf fortifications.
COLONEL ADAMS SETS AN AMBUSH
THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH Illinois Regiments began moving out of Thompson’s Plantation at six o’clock in the morning, continuing along the road to Natchez. Grierson was not yet ready to turn north for Grand Gulf; he wanted to feel out the country for the presence of enemy forces before revealing his final direction of march.
Grierson’s map indicated no through roads to Grand Gulf anywhere between Gallatin and Natchez, but he had learned from prisoners captured the night before that several dry weather trails cut across northward to
the Mississippi River, the best route running through Fayette. He would let chance and the presence of the enemy determine his choice. His first anticipation this morning was to capture rebel scouts who might give him more information as to the location and strength of the Confederates and some news of a river crossing by Grant’s army.
But his scouts brought in only a few guerillas and armed citizens, who professed to know nothing of any Confederate force closer than the river, or of any battles with the Union Army there.
By ten o’clock Grierson had decided the column had moved far enough along the Natchez road. He ordered a halt and sent his orderly back to bring up the regimental officers for a council.
Grierson frankly admitted to his officers that he was mystified over the absence of rebel resistance; either the Confederacy was a hollow shell or the enemy was laying a trap for them somewhere. He was also puzzled over Grant’s delay in crossing the Mississippi. The big campaign for Vicksburg should have begun, according to plans, at about the time the raiders hit Newton Station and wrecked the Vicksburg railroad.
Undoubtedly, Grierson was tempted to swing to the right at the next side road and march on toward Grand Gulf. It would be a feather in their caps if they came up to the river in time to play a role in Grant’s troop landings. But perhaps Grant had changed his plans. Grand Gulf was strongly manned, with Wirt Adams’ always dangerous cavalry somewhere in the vicinity, and if Grant had postponed or changed his plans the brigade would be so outnumbered on all sides that defeat or capture would be inevitable.
After some discussion with his staff, Grierson finally made his decision. He would throw one battalion in a sudden feint back east to the New Orleans & Jackson Railroad. Bahala appeared to be the closest town.* The battalion would ride in fast, do as much damage as possible, then circle back to rejoin the column. As soon as the detachment returned, the brigade would turn north under cover of darkness while the rebels were still looking for them along the railroad.1
Four companies from the regular First and Third Battalions of the Seventh were selected for the expedition. Captain George W. Trafton of Company G was given command as acting major, and Richard Surby and George Steadman of the Butternut Guerillas were assigned as scouts.2
The battalion moved out toward the east about eleven o’clock, and before the rear guard disappeared among the trees, Grierson gave the forward command for the main column. He planned to march slowly along the Natchez road toward Union Church until he came to a suitable plantation where he could dispose his men in some sort of battle formation and await the return of Trafton’s expedition.
At two o’clock in the afternoon the column halted at Snyder’s Plantation, two miles outside Union Church. Horses were unsaddled and mules unpacked. The usual feeding details went into action, moving a bit slower than usual under the hot April sun.
“While feeding,” Grierson later reported in one terse sentence, “our pickets were fired upon by a considerable force.”3
In a short time the camp was all in confusion, men running as fast as they could in every direction, carrying saddles, leading horses on the gallop, gathering up carbines and sabers and buckling on belts, while the air was filled with cries and oaths and quick impulsive exclamations and sharp stern orders and shouts of “Get out of my way there!” “Catch my horse!” “Who’s got my gun!” “Fall in here, men, quick! Dry up that noise and load your guns!” “Gallop—March!”
The column came in sight, a crowd of greylooking horsemen galloping and shooting in a cloud of dust and smoke, passing by on the road in our front.4
For the first time since leaving La Grange, after eleven days of marching through Confederate-held territory, the Sixth and Seventh Regiments were now challenged by an enemy force.
“A beautiful roll of smoke sprang from the line of carbines with a roar, and a sheet of balls swept through the rebel line bringing it to a sudden halt and sending it back in confusion.”5
Grierson sent the First Battalion of the Sixth in pursuit, while the remainder of the command fell into battle order. No more than 150 Confederate cavalrymen had shown themselves in the charge, and the First Battalion drove them back over the two miles to Union Church, a quiet little country village clustered around a church on high ground commanding the rolling, forested country sloping away on all sides.
At the edge of the town Grierson’s men dismounted, the horse-holders withdrawing with the mounts to a thick grove of oaks.* “The dismounted men went through the village of Union Church by sheer weight,” Grierson recorded. “Whole picket-fences were torn up and overturned by a rush. Right and left went everything that came in their way.”6
Remounting on the other side of the town, the Union cavalrymen skirmished with the rebels until nightfall, pushing them back three miles. When the fighting stopped, the raiders had one man out of action, slightly wounded. At least two Confederates were wounded; they were brought in with several prisoners. “It proved to be a part of Wirt Adams’ Mississippi cavalry,” said Grierson. “After driving them off, we held the town and bivouacked for the night.”7
II
Shortly after General Pemberton ordered General John Bowen at Grand Gulf, on April 27, to “collect Wirt Adams’ cavalry and send them out to meet the enemy,”8 a message was received in Natchez, fifty miles down river, by Captain S. B. Cleveland, commanding a detachment of Adams’ troops. Cleveland’s orders were to march east along the road to Hazlehurst until he either met the Yankee raiders or formed a junction with Adams’ main column coming down from Grand Gulf.
Captain Cleveland departed late in the afternoon of the 27th, marching most of the night, and it was his detachment from Natchez which attacked Grierson’s pickets on Snyder’s Plantation at two o’clock and then retreated through Union Church during the afternoon of the 28th.
In the evening, as soon as Grierson’s Sixth Regiment withdrew into Union Church, Captain Cleveland sent a courier fifteen miles west to Fayette where a military telegraph connected with the Mississippi River forts. The courier carried a message addressed to the telegraph operator: “Notify Colonel Adams, Grand Gulf, General Stevenson, Vicksburg, and General Gardner, Port Hudson, that the enemy are at Union Church, on the Natchez and Hazlehurst road. Tell the operator at Natchez they may look out for them there. I have been skirmishing with them for some hours this evening. Cannot ascertain their strength. They have four pieces of artillery. …”9
Colonel Adams, of course, was far from Grand Gulf, making a forced march across country with two companies and two mounted pieces. His remaining five companies were marching at regular cavalry pace to Fayette to await further orders there. Adams’ intentions were to get behind Grierson, flush him out with his two fastest and best mounted companies, and then ambush him if possible with the others.
About the time Captain Cleveland was sending his communication to the Fayette telegraph operator, Colonel Adams was turning into the Natchez road several miles east of Union Church to pick up Grierson’s trail. From farmers along the way, the rebel leader soon learned that the Yankee cavalry force was stronger than he had expected. He sent scouts some distance ahead, and before midnight they brought back news of the skirmish at Union Church. Adams decided to halt before Grierson’s pickets discovered his presence. He then sent a courier by side roads to notify Captain Cleveland to stand his ground until the five companies at Fayette could be moved into position.
Wirt Adams and Benjamin Grierson had met before on the battlefield, in fights around Corinth and Iuka, and each man held considerable respect for the abilities of the other. Yankee soldiers fighting in the West rated Adams second only to Bedford Forrest; they called Adams’ cavalrymen “a bunch of wild riders.”
Sergeant Forbes had been face to face with the belligerent Mississippian when he was captured near Corinth in June, 1862, by Adams’ cavalrymen and taken immediately to the colonel’s headquarters for questioning. “He was inclined to be very impressively severe,” said Stephen, “but I talked so independently that
I aroused his wrath greatly, and he even so far forgot his position as to threaten violence, saying that they had a short way of disposing of young men like me who wouldn’t listen to reason.”10
Wirt Adams was a grandiose commander when in action, sitting tall in the saddle with his great gray cloak around his broad shoulders, his bearded chin thrust up, the wide nostrils of his aquiline nose quivering, his eyes flashing. President Jefferson Davis had offered him the postmaster-general’s office in the Confederate States cabinet, but Adams wanted to fight—on horseback. “He rode continuously and fearlessly through the whirlwind of war,” said one of his admirers. “Handsome as Philip the Fair, he stood six feet in the stirrups, the noblest paladin of the South who rode to war. At the court of Philip Augustus he would have led the nobles; at the court of England, he would have led the barons, and with the Crusaders, he would have ridden abreast with Godfrey Bouillon or Richard Coeur de Lion.”11
Now this knight-errant of the Confederacy found himself with a chance to avenge some of the bitter defeats his colors had suffered. The unholy invaders lay only a few miles over the wooded hills; with the morrow he would have enough men to go eagerly to battle.
Sometime before midnight, however, Colonel Adams changed his plans. He became convinced that he stood no chance of holding the Yankees with only his two companies on the east and Captain Cleveland’s small detachment on the west of Union Church. The five companies at Fayette must be brought into battle reach before morning. He decided to ride with a fast squad to Fayette and personally spur the companies there into a forced march down to the Natchez road.