21
This comes in the early morning hours and I give the pertinent orders,9 sending someone to find Fiallo and in general mobilizing all of Crecencio’s people to come here. Fonso’s men go to cover Gabiro’s zone, while Angelito and Raúl [Castro Mercader] come here. Raúl had arrived last night at my call and continued with me, taking control of the other trail that goes up to Las Vegas, behind Las Minas de Frío, while Angelito covered the principal point with a squadron of escopeteros [scouts] and a scope.
I spoke with Fidel who gave me instructions to place a 100 lb. mine in the house of Antonio, el Gallego, and let the guardsmen go inside and then blow it up. He also agreed to replace Horacio as head of the platoon and to take the guns away from several of them, including Horacio himself. El Guajiro will replace him. He said he would come the same night but didn’t. I reached Antonio’s house with the bomb to wait for him to coordinate plans.10
22
The positions were perfectly visible from Las Vegas and the men climbed up and down with an awesome calmness. It seemed like an army of heroes, but the fantastic retreat indicates that that’s just the result of the lack of responsibility. El Guajiro arrives and we go down to coordinate plans. I made the first line withdraw some 200 meters and also the right wing that is now under the command of Fajardo, as Montero has been replaced and disarmed because of the retreat, along with Horacio11 and the four from Lara’s group who ran. We decide to place the bomb in the home of el Gallego Antonio, so that the first serious resistance will be below, leaving the house free so they can go inside. I had to leave at night to avoid being seen and stay in the Mompié house because of an asthma attack and flu.
23
After speaking with Fidel the defense system was established with Fiallo, who arrived with 18 men as a reserve, and we studied the possibilities of attacking the rearguard. I visited Raúl, indicating that he should go lower to protect el Guajiro’s left flank adequately. I realize there is a slope without defenses, but there are no men available to close that point, so it will be necessary to change how some of our forces are distributed.
24
In the early morning hours I went to check on Angelito and Daniel’s positions, later continuing on to Jíbaro, where I gave final instructions to Fonso and withdrew Angelito Frías to Montería, giving them orders to look for supplies in a place they know near Manzanillo. Tonight I disarmed eight of Angelito’s men who had been insubordinate and removed Daniel from his post.
25
The day passed calmly, there were just two small changes to improve the positions, sending Daniel to La Vela Hill and six of Fiallo’s men to a slope that’s between El Purgatorio and La Esmajagua. Twenty-one of Crescencio’s men arrived at night. Celia informed me that on the Caguara slope Pedrito hadn’t found the men who should have been there; I told Celia that Fidel was really disgusted with Pedro and René because they hadn’t lived up to expectations.12
26
I went to Mompié, where Fidel spoke with me and ordered me to stay here. I then went in the direction of the heights of Caguara but my animal tired out on the way, so I stayed in the home of Santos Pérez while the messenger tried to make contact. I found Lino very influenced by the defeatist environment that reigns here. He passed on a series of peasant demands that are okay, but I don’t know if Fidel will be able to act on them right now. At night a messenger arrived with a message from [Fernando] Chávez, “the artist,” who informed me that Rural Guards were in El Jigüe and in Caguara, and that none of our people were there. I returned, informing Fidel, who gave orders to move the reserves in that direction, and if the guardsmen advanced by Naranjal to push them back, taking them by surprise.
27
“The artist” appeared when I had just sent Fiallo to reinforce Caguara and establish contact with Padio. “The artist” told me a very artistic tale about a nocturnal attack on the camp where the Rural Guards were, from which I had the impression that he’d used up a lot of bullets without any significant results. At night there were three desertions and one of them was a double blow: Rosabal, who had been condemned to death as a snitch, Pedro Guerra from Sorí’s squadron and two military prisoners. Pedro Guerra was recaptured; he had stolen a revolver for his flight and was executed immediately. Later Fidel came to the conclusion that “the artist” was not the best person for the position of zone chief, and sent me to give the counter-order to Fiallo for him not to return and assume leadership of the zone. I did this, but figuring that the men wouldn’t be able to arrive until just before dawn, Fidel sent me a squadron led by Daniel (a commander), all with automatic weapons. The Rural Guards have climbed to the slope of La Victoria and taken Taita José. I went at night to see el Guajiro, who told me that he had seen five guardsmen watching from the slope. The Guards saw our people too. I gave the necessary orders and went to sleep right there, returning to Mompié just before dawn.
28
The day passed with nothing new here, as the Rural Guards only seized a cow. Fiallo didn’t receive the note and arrived here with half of the men having been sent to Caguara with the mission of detaining the army at that point, taking charge of the defense. Part of the reserves stayed here. From midday you could hear the rumble of the mortars. In the afternoon Fidel advises me that an intense battle is shaping up in Santo Domingo.13 At 4:00 Daniel heads over there, the night is tense, the news keeps coming.
29
At dawn the panorama becomes clearer. The first reports talk of 30 weapons captured, including a tripod and several Cristobal [carbines], later some 50-60 weapons are added to the picture, a mortar with its grenades, the tripod, a short-wave radio, 60 backpacks, cartridge belts, bullets, etc. This morning 21 prisoners were captured, many of them wounded, along with their weapons in a cave. The interrogation revealed that they belonged to a company sent to aid Sánchez Mosquera, who ordered a major to continue advancing and to make camp farther away, at a place where he was surprised by Lalo and a squadron of Camilo’s men; the battle spread out, with Huber Matos, Duque, Geonel, Cuevas, etc. intervening. Camilo was sent to cover the retreat of the guardsmen, and by the afternoon a loud explosion was heard accompanied by gunfire. At night Camilo’s report arrived saying that they had 11 guns, that they had seen about eight dead and they had one prisoner, and that they had retreated because the Rural Guards had taken over the slope. Along with Duque, who had been guarding their rear, Fidel ordered them to go higher up the Sierra Maestra.
30
This morning we heard gunfire on the Las Minas side and some isolated shooting coming from Santo Domingo. Tonight I went to see Fidel and proposed that he send a letter to Finalé,14 an army major whose former lover is with us; he thought it was a good idea. I slept there. It was reported that Orlando Pupo had held back the Rural Guards, causing them four casualties.
1. Ernestina Otero was a journalist sent by Bohemia magazine to do a story on Fidel Castro on May 25, 1958, in Las Vegas de Jibacoa before Batista’s offensive.
2. The role Huber Matos played is explained by Fidel in La Victoria Estratégica, writing, Matos “was a captain because he had distinguished himself in the construction of trenches. He had arrived in the Sierra in the plane that brought [Pedro] Miret and other worthy compañeros […]. He was only in the Sierra Maestra for a few months. Later, he turned out to be ambitious and a traitor, who used anticommunist tricks to sow plots.” p. 120
3. Allan Robert Nye, a US government intelligence agent, who had come with the mission to kill Fidel in the Sierra Maestra.
4. Sic.
5. Delsa Pueblo (Teté) was second-in-command of the Mariana Grajales platoon, a women’s brigade under the command of Fidel. She is currently a general in Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces.
6. Vicente de La O. was the doctor in Che’s column.
7. In La Victoria Estratégica, Fidel writes: “From a message Che sent me at 2:10 in the afternoon, I confirmed that in his retreat, Horacio had left the entire zone of El Mango [open]. […] This meant
that the enemy could pass through with no impediment whatsoever, precisely in the zone where resistance would have been most effective.” p. 110.
8. The message Che sent to Fidel stated: “Today, as has occurred only a few times in this revolution, I’ve received such an exasperating blow as this. […] I should tell you that in these two days no shots have been fired. Your order to save bullets has been fulfilled.” Cited by Fidel Castro in La Victoria Estratégica, p. 113.
9. The orders from Fidel were: “Communicate to Che my order to investigate what happened, disarm everyone who engaged in this act of cowardice and send young men from the school to take over those guns.” Cited in La Victoria Estratégica, p. 113.
10. The actions carried out by Che are summarized by Fidel in La Victoria Estratégica: “…my intention was always that Che would be in charge, if the circumstances required it, of the defense of the westernmost sector of our front.[…] I must say that during those weeks of preparation for the defense of our territory, in preparation for Batista’s offensive and during its development up to this moment, Che has functioned, in fact, as second-in-command of the front.” p. 115.
11. Horacio was replaced by el Guajiro Luis Crespo in the command of the people at Las Minas del Infierno. Later in the revolutionary war, Horacio Rodríguez showed signs of courage and qualities as a guerrilla chief. He died in combat the day after the triumph of the revolution while pursuing various thugs of the Batista dictatorship who were fleeing from justice.
12. These events are described by Fidel in La Victoria Estratégica: “The Guards encountered no resistance until they arrived at Boca de Manacas, where a little after midday they fell into a rebel ambush. There was a brief battle with the surprising result that our forces retreated to Jigüe and left the path open to the enemy. […]. You can easily understand the disappointment I felt on receiving the first reports of that event […]. That night I arranged to relieve Pedrito and René [Rodríguez] of personal command of La Plata River.” pp.149-50.
13. The first battle of Santo Domingo had already begun.
14. Armando González Finalé was the chief of Batista’s 23rd Battalion, situated in Arroyones. Che’s message was sent to Captain Carlos Durán Batista, head of the troop located in Las Vegas: “I have in my hands a communiqué from commander Finalé inviting me to confer with him. You know that tomorrow will be too late for that and I am trying to avoid bloodshed.” Cited by Fidel in La Victoria Estratégica, p. 301.
July 1958
1
Heavy firefighting is heard coming from Gabiro all day. I send Ciro del Río with his squadron there and ask for reports, which arrive at night indicating that the heights of San Lorenzo in the Sierra Maestra have been lost. The letter for Finalé is written.
2
I leave for Las Minas de Frío with a reinforcement of six men to place on the Meriño heights. I station them with Mario and go to review the points on the Sierra Maestra, near San Lorenzo, when I’m advised that the Rural Guards are climbing to Meriño. I have to return rapidly without being able to review Fonso’s position, whose group and that of César Suárez were the ones that I had most doubts about. I ordered an immediate exploration, but there was nothing there. It was all a false alarm.
3
I went out early to review the position on Meriño, but when I got there I found that the Rural Guards were already advancing. We got tangled up in a little skirmish that we withdrew from very quickly. The position was bad and they were surrounding us, but we put up little resistance. I personally noted something I’d never felt before: the desire to stay alive. This must be corrected at the next opportunity. On the other hand, Angelito Verdecia, who had gone down further toward Las Vegas, reported a battle in which he wounded two and took one prisoner with his weapon, which was handed over. By nightfall the report arrived from Fajardo indicating that Fidel was coming toward El Roble, which has still not been taken by the guardsmen. He arrived in the pre-dawn hours.
4
Fidel spent the day organizing the men in El Roble; the Rural Guards did not move. Cuevas will be in charge of opening fire, two squads will be on his right flank and I will be on his left; Cordoví will attack to break up the column and Ciro will go behind them. Fidel reached Las Minas by night and we went to sleep there.
5
The planes were active all day; this morning they bombed Las Minas, this afternoon La Plata. News arrived from Paz,1 saying that he had an encounter in which he caused the army four casualties, remaining master of the field and capturing a Springfield.2 At night a report arrived from Fonso indicating that the soldiers had advanced, forcing him to retreat. By dawn the impression was confirmed that they retreated for lack of decision, as the attack simply became bursts of machine-gun fire.
6
We spent a rainy day waiting, without them moving from their positions. Acevedo’s 30 men arrived and dug trenches.
7
Another rainy day and a fruitless ambush. The 50 arrived and are sent off to look for the mortar.
8
The soldiers were seen early harnessing the mules. The pertinent warnings were given, and when they unexpectedly took off for Meriño, we fell in behind them. I sent Ciro del Río to take a slope on one flank while I advanced on the other. In a little while Lalo’s first ambush on Meriño worked perfectly, and later another group on the road to Limones pushed them back completely.
I tried to make contact with Lalo but Miguel came back saying that he couldn’t find him. The air force had machine-gunned heavily, so I thought that was probably true. This impression was enhanced by the fact that the Rural Guards advanced on the ambush almost without firing a shot and kept advancing. In a while the mules arrived and the mortar caused confusion among them. I decided to advance independently from the others and shoot at the mules, which I did. It was later seen that they withdrew and we advanced along the slope, encountering seven mules, one of them was okay for riding. There were two dead and two wounded (mules) that we left there.
When we returned we heard that Lalo was [where he was supposed to be]. But I didn’t believe it. Fidel advanced and we conferred. I thought there hadn’t been any guardsmen on the slope, but Fidel thought there were. Then Cuevas affirmed that he had been shot at from above, which removed all doubt.
9
Lalo occupied the entire slope and fell behind the soldiers who lost all their mules in the retreat. Thirty-nine mules, cooking utensils, food, 97 backpacks, a pistol, 1,000 30.06 bullets, 500 M-1s were our booty. Fidel quickly decided to go and attack El Jigüe and mobilized the men to take that route, deciding to leave me in Mompié. In Santo Domingo Sánchez Mosquera’s column was forced to retreat after one of his men was killed and his weapon seized.
10
I remained in Las Minas organizing the resistance that must be centralized in the spot where Raúl Castro [Mercader] remains the chief.
11
On arriving at Mompié a tremendous bombardment broke out that included napalm bombs, from which we collected an unexploded shell. I came with one of the auditors from Raúl’s column, who brought along a manifesto to the whole world he had signed. It was too strong and, after the arrest of the 49 North Americans, it seemed to adopt a tone of dangerous “extremism.”3 A dispatch arrived from Fidel in which he announced the first skirmish which left the army with five dead, one gravely wounded and one soldier taken prisoner along with his weapons. At night the mortar shots could be heard, and within an hour I was advised that Geonel Rodríguez was seriously wounded by a mortar that fell on the house where he was cooking; it also killed the owner of the house.
12
At dawn we received word of Geonel’s death after an extremely long operation. [He was] one of the most beloved collaborators, a true revolutionary.4 The farewell to him was read by Camilo over our radio. Fidel continues accumulating men and gave orders for Ramiro and Almeida’s column to move everything here. No news yet about the plane bringing weapons. The recruits are waiting in Pa
lma Mocha.
13
The El Jigüe troops are still silent. Raúl sends word that they are climbing up via Meriño, so I tell him to send Angelito, who is resting in Las Minas, to cover the hill. It seems that there was a mistake on the part of Angelito (or the guide) because they fell into an ambush in which Angelito was killed and his weapon was lost.5 It hasn’t been clarified who was to blame as the guide hasn’t shown up. The order was given to evacuate Las Minas and withdraw the ambushes on the way there, sending Ciro [del Río] to occupy El Roble Road.
A telegram arrived tonight from the International Red Cross asking for wounded prisoners to be turned over without conditions, but in the area around Bayamo; if taken literally this will be difficult to do so by the requested date of July 15. I asked for this to be clarified. There were also various requests, such as a declaration of unity, that Matthews’ questionnaire be answered, why haven’t all of the North Americans been released, what’s going on with Virelles in Venezuela, etc. There is news of the plane that was unable to take off and some minor things. I also hear a report of the death of Carlitos Mas, old-young combatant who died as the result of burns and fractures suffered [in the same attack that wounded] Geonel.
14
News comes from Las Minas indicating that the soldiers are advancing along the Moro slope, so I call on the telephone for reinforcements to be sent. But they soon tell me that Ciro, who was going to bring reinforcements, had withdrawn and that the Rural Guards were encircling Las Minas, which has already been evacuated except for the pigs. I initiate a march there, finding the last of the recruits in retreat, with the telephone that I had installed at the edge of the woods in a place called El Pino that falls away into the valley of Las Vegas. I reached the foot of the hill that overlooks Las Minas hearing only isolated shots very far away. I had the telephone line taken up, except a piece that couldn’t be done at night. The situation seems very delicate, as Fonso, César Suárez, Angelito [Frías], Roberto [Fajardo] and Orlando [Pupo] would remain isolated; however, all of those people had regrouped and the only ones missing were Angelito Verdecia’s men, now commanded by Silva. At nightfall the news arrived from Silva indicating that he was still on El Moro Hill and that the soldiers were a short distance away. Two army men had been killed. I ordered that everyone retake their old positions, that Orlando reinforce Silva on the hill and that Ciro take the other slope. All this had to be done during the night. News came from El Jigüe that they had repelled a column that was trying to leave, taking 32 mules and four men with their weapons. I write explaining the situation to them and expressing the hope of detaining them there.