24
We slowly set out toward Las Piñas, near Algarrobo, where the men set up camp while I went to see Tony Santiago to hear about the results of his investigation. I learned nothing concrete and I had to postpone our travels another day. A sympathizer of the July 26 Movement arrived to tell me about some shoes that the groups of captains Sorí and Zábalo had. At the same time Rodríguez, who had been sent to do a super-quick investigation of the possibility of establishing our general headquarters in the area of Pico Tuerto, near Sancti Spíritus, arrived. Rodríguez told me that the ideal area wasn’t there but rather in a nearby wooded area called Caballete de Casa, which had all the necessary conditions. He also told me that Sorí had at his disposal 30 to 40 pairs of shoes sent by the movement.
On returning to the camp I talked with Diego,27 head of the action group in Las Villas; he brought me 5,000 pesos that Sierra had sent and an outdated letter from Fidel, which gave me a series of instructions that were no longer of use and the order to establish the treasury in the Sierra Maestra. Diego committed himself to burning down the electoral commissions of two or three important cities of the llano and to communicate to Camilo the order to attack Caibarién, Remedios, Yaguajay and Zulueta. On November 1, I must inform him if we are ready to leave to attack Santa Clara. Diego denied any involvement in Bordón’s problems.
25
Bordón arrived and I conferred with him. He was found guilty of four things: signing the pact, going to the Sierra Maestra as a delegate of the Second Front, saying that he had conferred with Fidel when that wasn’t true, and signing a document in which he committed himself to going to the Escambray while he was in prison. I thought we should strip him of all rank but Ramiro thought that was an excessive punishment; eventually he was just denied promotion to commander but left with the rank of captain. I spoke to the troops asking that anyone who disagreed should say so and leave.
At night Faure Chomón arrived, accompanied by Cubela. They were not willing to initiate an attack. At that moment the voice of W. Rosales’s mother was heard; this was a signal to advise us that weapons were coming but they didn’t hear it. They left immediately and we were left with the options of either attacking tomorrow or withdrawing.
26
We went into a wood where we were well hidden from indiscreet glances. Thirty of Bordón’s men went; he only brought some 20 armed and was going to bring a total of 210, leaving 30 in his zone. The day before I sent Miguel from Bordón’s troop to look for some shoes and other items. At night we began the journey toward the barracks of Güinía de Miranda.28 Silva and Bordón took another route. Those without weapons were all supposed to go to Sopimpa and wait there for the outcome of the action. The attack plan is as follows:
1 = Barracks
2 = Church
3 = Successive bazooka positions
4 = Silva’s position
5 = Bordón’s position
6 = Joel’s successive positions
7 = Angelito’s position
8 = The vanguard’s position
9 = The command post’s successive positions
10 = People’s park
The action began at 11:30 with a bazooka shot that did not hit the mark, generalizing into a shoot-out. The bazooka changed position three times and I personally hit the target with the fifth shot, which caused the guards to surrender immediately. We used very few bullets and eight rifles and, despite the quantity of munitions spent and of the number of grenades used, we lost two men: Amengual, from the rearguard and Alberto, from Joel’s platoon. Wounded were Angelito (slightly), Silva (grazed), Acevedo (grazed), the guide from Baraguá (hit in a leg), Cabrerita (in a hand and a leg), Maquintoche (slight wound in the head) and one of Rodas’s men (somewhat seriously in the right arm).
27
We set out in no hurry, treating the wounded in a house while we rested. At night we continued the march until we reached Sopimpa by dawn. News arrived of a troop that was coming up toward Algarrobo. We gave a jeep to the Revolutionary Directorate, leaving it near the camp.
28
It was decided to attack Jíquima29 that night, and we proceeded to carry out preliminary explorations, which didn’t provide any significant information. Ramiro was of the opinion that we shouldn’t attack, arguing that the barracks at Banao was a better bet with only 30 guardsmen, while this one had 49. We went ahead, nevertheless, but we delayed a lot and I gave the order to attack only if the bazooka was ready by 3:00. But that wasn’t possible, according to Fonso, because there was no good position for firing. We left at 4:00 in the morning.
29
After resting half the morning we continued traveling toward Gavilanes, where we rested.
30
I received a visit from the action group chiefs from Sancti Spíritus, Cabaiguán, Fomento and Placetas, who agreed with the suggestion I made for attacking Fomento, Cabaiguán and Sancti Spíritus in the days between now and the [November] election.30 They also agreed on the assaults on the banks and promised to help. We left at 3:00 in the afternoon for a march that we were told would take five hours to Banao to attack it tonight. But we walked 11 hours without reaching [Banao] and we had to stop a distance away from our objective.
31
We spent the day waiting, and at night, with all the details in hand, we began the encirclement of the barracks. After an anguished wait, after 2:00 in the morning, Fonso brought the news that the bazooka had misfired nine times. We withdrew before dawn, taking the wrong road.
1. They were actually members of the July 26 Movement: Ottén Mezana Melcón, Miguel Martínez Ruiz and Ornedo Rodríguez Ruiz.
2. On October 9 Rigoberto Alarcón, together with Teodoro Reyes, was captured by the army on the Los Negros to Palo Alto line; the former was assassinated and Reyes was taken to Ciego de Ávila.
3. Rodolfo Pérez Suyaurría, foreman of El Escribano farm, which belonged to Pablo Pelegrín.
4. This marks the end of Notebook VII. Che continues his account of October 8 in the next notebook (Notebook VIII).
5. This was on the municipal boundary of Jatibonico, the last part of the province of Camagüey bordering the province of Las Villas, the destination of Che’s column.
6. The member of Che’s column who was familiar with this area was César Rubén Hernández Vila.
7. The home of Francisco Aquino Valdivia in the hamlet of Atoyaosa.
8. This was a place known as Paso del Diez, which the rebels baptized Paso de la Ceiba because they found an immense ceiba tree on the banks of the river.
9. Miguel Martínez went with José Hernández to the Amazonas sugar mill area to explore the Zaza River and prepare conditions to cross it.
10. Ottén Mezana, accompanied by the peasant Mario Pérez Gallo, explored the trail from the Juan Débil farm to the Paso de las Guásimas, three kilometers from the Amazonas sugar mill.
11. At the home of the peasant Lorenzo Díaz.
12. Luis Triana from the Marianao farm.
13. Actually these people belonged to the July 26 Movement: Joaquín Torres, Leonor Arestuch and Manuel López Marín, who were accompanied by Jorge Sánchez Jiménez (a member of the movement), Pablo Bermúdez (a collaborator), and Félix Martínez (the coordinator of the movement in Sancti Spíritus).
14. Víctor Bordón Machado was a July 26 Movement combatant in the province of Las Villas since its creation. He held the rank of commander at the time of the triumph of the revolution.
15. Joaquín Torres Campos was a worker and movement coordinator in Las Villas.
16. They were actually members of the July 26 Movement. To further understand the complex political situation with the various revolutionary groups that Che encountered on his arrival in the Escambray read “The Final Offensive” and “A Sin of the Revolution” in Reminiscences…
17. This was a place called Planta Cantú, where Pompilio Viciedo had his camp.
18. Sebastián Viciedo Pérez (Pompilio) was a member of the July 26 Movement and later
incorporated into the Second Front until Che’s arrival when he became part of Column Eight.
19. Roberto Sorí Hernández was in charge of delivering a letter to Che in the name of Jesús Carreras, one of the commanders of the Second Front, threatening him to withdraw from the zone under his command.
20. Osvaldo Sánchez (Rafael).
21. Jesús Carreras Zayas was a member of the Escambray Second Front. After 1959 he joined the counterrevolutionary bands, was captured, tried and executed. For more details about the composition and characteristics of the Second Front read “A Sin of the Revolution” in Reminiscences…
22. This order had been issued by the general staff of the Second National United Front of the Escambray for the whole northern zone.
23. Antonio Santiago (Tony) was a commander of the Revolutionary Directorate, who was assassinated after the triumph of the revolution when he was discovered by the enemy to have infiltrated their ranks. His body was dumped at sea.
24. Faure Chomón Mediavilla was a leader of the Revolutionary Directorate and one of those who attacked the presidential palace on March 13, 1957. In 1958 he arrived in Cuba as part of an expedition on the yacht Scapade, organizing a guerrilla detachment in the Escambray.
25. Rolando Cubela Secade was a student leader and member of the Revolutionary Directorate in the Escambray. After the triumph of the revolution he was recruited by the CIA to assassinate Fidel. When he attempted this, he was arrested and sentenced, but was eventually freed and went into exile in Spain.
26. Enrique Oltuski (Sierra) at that time was the provincial coordinator of the July 26 Movement in Las Villas.
27. Victor Paneque later betrayed the revolution.
28. The attack on the Güinía de Miranda barracks for Che constituted an important action to demonstrate the invasion column’s battle capacity and its firm intention to fight, contrary to the intrigues and indecision existing among the forces concentrated in the Escambray.
29. The Jíquima de Peláez barracks.
30. This marked the beginning of the offensive led by Che that culminated in the battle of Santa Clara in December 1958.
November 1958
1
We corrected our course and reached Gavilanes at night, after an exhausting journey, without any sleep. Only volunteers are called on for tomorrow.
2
Bordón left early with the instruction to go to Pedrero, seize cars and get close to Fomento where there would be weapons and the people in Fomento waiting for him with all the information and militia ready. We left later, casually, reaching Pedrero from where Bordón had already left. We sent Manuel to look for trucks while the hours passed. At 10:30 the action chief from Fomento came to say it was impossible to attack now, that the best time was from 5:00 to 6:00 in the evening; there were no [Molotov] cocktails or militia ready. I gave the order to open fire anyway. Much later the trucks arrived initiating the march on Cabaiguán, but our guide got us lost and dawn caught us in Santa Lucía, having to leave Manuel on the outskirts of that village, in a place called Cuatro Esquinas.
3
The day passed with no new developments. The action group chief from Sancti Spíritus came to explain that they hadn’t been able to do anything because the coordinator of the city found out about the plan to rob the bank and refused to help, threatening to resign if that went ahead. I also received a threatening letter from Sierra [Enrique Oltuski] in which he warned me not to [attack the bank]. I sent him a strong response by the same route. I gave the order to attack Cabaiguán from three sides: Angelito with the bazooka, which was already in place, and Manuel would attack the barracks; Joel would advance through the center and Ramiro, with Silva, would try to blow up the Reca refinery. After the usual uncertainty Angelito arrived, close to 4:00, saying that he hadn’t been able to attack because there were too many Guards. This captain’s indecisiveness has meant we have lost a lot of prestige, as everyone knew we were going to attack Cabaiguán and we withdrew without firing a shot. We reached Pedrero before dawn.
4
I ordered the attack on Jíquima for tonight and retired to Gavilanes to organize things in the new quarters under construction. On arriving at night, I found a message from Captain Julio Martínez, from Bordón’s old zone, who sent me the messages signed by W. Morgan,1 in which he threatened to turn over the weapons that had been passed on to him. He told me that Ottén’s brother, who had been expelled from the July 26 [Movement], had been intriguing on behalf of the Second Front. I gave him instructions not to turn over a single weapon and to repel any attack; I wrote a very strong letter to Gutiérrez Menoyo. In Gavilanes I found Dr. Allán Rossell, former provincial coordinator who has come to the mountains with the desire to do something.
5
At midday I receive vague reports that Jíquima wasn’t attacked “for lack of position.” I go to Caballete de Casa where there are several small buildings already constructed.2 I arrive there at night.
6
We devoted ourselves to inspecting the positions and distributing the work among the almost 200 men. Pompilio Viciedo arrived and asked that a trial be held; he gave himself up as a prisoner, agreeing that all the witnesses present be called. The four witnesses made the same statement and they seemed to me to be calm and responsible, except for Naranjo, who was somewhat theatrical. I gave instructions to remove his group and leave him with 25 people, sending the others to the school.
7
Ramiro arrived and explained what had happened in Jíquima: Angelito didn’t find a good position [for an attack] and passed the time without attacking. Pompilio Viciedo’s men arrived to be incorporated [into our group], as did Ulloa, who runs a quarry near Sancti Spíritus. He explained how he had come by the pick-up truck to transport the dynamite, but he hadn’t loaded it that day because the mill was broken.
The pick-up truck is here. René and Ottén arrived, René to say that he had sent the militias to be placed near the plain because they lacked the necessary knowledge and that they were not doing any work whatsoever. Ottén brought me a list of what remained in the mine and announced that there were two of Nela’s inspectors in Gavilanes.
8
I went to see these inspectors, who wanted to know if they could get some milk, because Nela is practically paralyzed. I told them, yes, but that we would charge them an extraordinary war tax, which they agreed to. I met with the two captains, explaining the plan of action: Manuel, Joel and Bordón will continue with me; Silva will operate along the Sancti Spíritus-Cabaiguán and Sancti Spíritus-Trinidad highways; Angelito will rest and will take charge of the school; Peraza is appointed chief of the zone, a post previously occupied by Bordón, and I harshly reprimanded Ottén for having permitted his brother to take the pistol, as well as Juan, Miguel’s brother, who also took his. Later, we worked on drafting various manifestos.3
9
The day passed with nothing new, except information about a demand for money made by Peña’s people via some of the captains he has in that zone, and news brought by the people from San Blas indicating that they had turned over some weapons, but that the Second Front’s attitude continues to be hostile.
10
I was told that a rich plantation owner called Calunga was coming to see me on the outskirts of Caballete de Casa and I made a long trip in vain, because the man didn’t show up. On my return to camp I found the radio technicians had already arrived and announced that the station equipment would come tomorrow or the day after. When I reached Gavilanes I encountered a transportation union leader from Santa Clara, who supported unity but was committed to a combined action in Santa Clara that seems rather premature to me. I told him that I would do it if a meeting of union leaders in the Sierra Maestra agreed with the plan. People came from Placetas to bring me plans and offer help. They brought one of the captains from the Second Front who had hidden $1,500 in his girlfriend’s home. We sent off various people to look for all the members of the Second Front.
11
All the detainees and two complete guerrilla groups began arriving in the morning, and they were warned that they could not operate in this zone, and certainly make no demands for money. Ñero’s guerrilla group was merged into our ranks, but none of Hernández Torrecilla’s. The $3,000 were confiscated and a note was sent to Peña with Military Order No. 1 attached, establishing the boundary of the July 26 Movement’s administrative zone. We set everyone free.
12
We left before dawn, making an easy trip, and then waited for night on the outskirts of Banao, entering the village at nightfall.
13
The shooting broke out just after midnight and lasted until 5:30. We couldn’t take the barracks, despite our efforts and the quantity of [Molotov cocktails] we threw. Two of our men were slightly wounded and six badly wounded. We were fighting from 10 meters away. We remained alert without any new developments, reaching Gavilanes at night. Silva left for the Sancti Spíritus-Trinidad highway.
14
I received a message from the Revolutionary Directorate accepting the suggestion to hold a conference to reach a unity agreement. I answered that I would be there in two days. I went to Caballete de Casa where I was able to see the progress of the construction, thanks mainly to the work carried out by Rodríguez.
15
I spent the day inspecting the construction work.
16
After a day-long trip I made it to the Revolutionary Directorate [headquarters] but we put off the conference to the following day. I spoke a little with the workers’ delegate, who agreed with the idea of unity. They went to Jíquima.
17
We conferred a long time with Cubela, Chomón and Castelló, resulting in a plan for an armed action at Caracusey on November 20, and a decision to make a joint statement leading to unity.4 They also requested that a single tax be imposed throughout the area, dividing what is collected 50/50, and also that the same be done in the sugar mills. I agreed to the first part, but not the second, because that is a national question. I returned the same afternoon, meeting Marcelo Fernández on the way, who was coming to see me very full of himself. We argued all night. This discussion also involved Carlos (the worker coordinator), Sierra ([Oltuski] the provincial coordinator) and Serafín and Demetrio (coordinators of propaganda). We accused each other: they said I was a communist and I said they were imperialists. I told them the facts on which I based my opinion and they did the same to me. After the discussion we remained farther apart than ever.