This sort of thing led Buster Glosson to come up with “tank plinking,” where we used small LGBs to destroy armored vehicles. The common wisdom was that it was ridiculous to use an expensive [$12,000] precision LGB against a tank. But when you send four planes out with four bombs each and they come back with an average of twelve kills, that’s cheap.
As February 1991 moved on, a greater percentage of the sorties generated by CENTAF were being dedicated to supporting the planned ground operations that would evict the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Despite what others were judging from the daily results, General Horner had his own criteria for success.
Tom Clancy: Preparing the way for the ground war to start, did you have the feeling that your people were effective? What factors were limiting what you were doing?
Gen. Horner: Quite frankly, we had all the time we wanted. I was not overly concerned about when the ground war would start. I never really worried about “how effective” we were, because we knew by things like Iraqi desertions. If you think about it, we were going to get them all. The weather was really not a factor, because if we didn’t get it today, I was confident we would get it tomorrow. They [the Iraqis] weren’t going anywhere. Where we really started making money was when Buster thought up “tank plinking.” That worked great!
On February 24th, the ground war started, and the air campaign against Iraq began to wind down.
Tom Clancy: What were your impressions of the situation when Desert Storm was completed at the end of February 1991?
Gen. Horner: I was glad to see the ground war go so quickly and so well. I tell you, we were tired of war, really tired of killing people. I guess we all would have liked it if Saddam had gone; but Saddam was not a target, the command and control system was. The Iraqi Army would hold staff meetings, we would confirm the location by “other sources,” and we would bomb the location, destroying the notes from the meeting.
The last few days of the war we were really working hard to find things to hit. My general impressions of the air campaign? I was pleased with it. You’re never totally satisfied, but the overall loss rate was good, the munitions worked better than anticipated. But because of my personality, I was never completely satisfied with it.
Colonel Warden spent the end of the war watching the ground war from the Checkmate center in the Pentagon, and then went home for a well-deserved couple of days of sleep. Afterwards, though:
Tom Clancy: What happened to Checkmate after the war ended?
Col. Warden: Right after the war we had an absolutely marvelous party. Cases and cases of champagne. Our friends from CIA, DIA, and NSA came down. The Secretary of the Air Force [Donald Rice] and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy spent the afternoon with us.
Soon after that, we became a “politically incorrect” organization that seemed counter to Goldwater-Nichols. And so Checkmate was shut down a couple months or so after the war. However, it was eventually reborn. Today, it does a lot of contingency planning for the Air Force Chief of Staff. As for me personally, I left the Pentagon about two months after the war ended, and went to the White House to work as a special assistant to Vice President Quayle. I worked exclusively on non-military things, ironically.
Tom Clancy: Today, the effects of the Gulf War are clear. The plan was executed well in your opinion?
Col. Warden: Yes. On balance, I think we achieved just about exactly what we wanted. For me, though, the really gratifying thing is that we achieved such momentous results with so little blood shed on either side. I am not aware of any war on this scale where so much happened at so little cost in blood. In addition, it also seems to me a demonstration of what you can accomplish with airpower when you use it correctly. I just hope that we continue the revolution and don’t fall back into the old ways of doing things because of bureaucratic pressures in the Department of Defense, and in the Congress.
Today, both General Horner and Colonel Warden are looking forward to their lives after military service. After the war, Chuck Horner was promoted to general (four stars), and took over the unified U.S. Space Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado. There, he handled a variety of tasks, including the direction of the North American Air Defense Command, as well as working on ballistic missile defenses. Following his retirement in the summer of 1994, he and his wife Mary Jo have settled in Florida, where he is writing his own memoirs of the 1990/1991 Persian Gulf Crisis/War. Colonel Warden has finished his career with one of the most satisfying appointments he could have imagined, commandant of the Air Command and Staff College at the USAF Air University, located at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. There he has transformed the curriculum, emphasizing air campaign planning for joint service and international students from all over the world. He will retire from the Air Force in the summer of 1995. Arguably, he has become the Clausewitz or Alfred Thayer Mahan of airpower, having codified the use of airpower in The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Both Horner and Warden have undeniably made their marks in the USAF and the history of airpower.
Combat Aircraft
WHAT is a “classic”? The term has become overused, its meaning fuzzy. Perhaps the best definition I’ve heard goes something like this: “I can’t tell you what it is, but I know it when I see it.” When you talk to the people who fly and maintain today’s fleet of U.S. Air Force aircraft, they use the word classic a lot. There’s a reason: Every USAF fighter, bomber, and support aircraft in service is a classic, because it has to be. It takes so much time, money, and effort to produce a combat aircraft these days, anything less than a roaring success is going to be a disaster for everyone concerned. Every new combat aircraft must be an instant classic, capable of vastly outperforming the plane or planes it was designed to replace. This chapter will help you get to know some of the classic aircraft programs of recent years.
Today, when a military service commits to fund an aircraft program, and a company chooses to jump in and build that airplane, both are literally “betting the farm,” with severe consequences for both if the program fails. Given the risks involved, it is amazing that anyone wants to be in the aircraft business at all—but the payoffs of a successful program can be immense for a company, its stockholders, the surrounding communities, and the military service that takes delivery of the final product.
In order to spread their cost over as long a period as possible, modern aircraft tend to have extremely long service lives. For example, the Boeing KC-135 first came into USAF service in the late 1950s, and is planned to be retired in the later 2020s, a run of over sixty years! Even longer lived is the truly classic C-130 Hercules, which first flew just after the Korean War. A new version (the C-130J) is being built right now for use into the middle of the next century by the USAF, as well as by Great Britain and Australia.
The gestation period of a modern aircraft may take as long as fifteen years from first specification to squadron service. And there may be several generations of production models built, with up to twenty-five years of total production. If this period seems long, consider the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. It was first designed in the late 1960s, went into production in the mid-1970s, and has remained in continuous production ever since. Given the current backlog of orders to Saudi Arabia and Israel, and other possible production orders, the third-generation Eagle variants will be in production and in service for over twenty-five years, until approximately 2015 to 2020.
An F-15C of the 366th Wing/390th Fighter Squadron on the flight line of Nellis AFB during Green Flag 94-3. It carries the standard load of three 610 gallon/2,301.9 liter fuel tanks and eight air-to-air missiles. Craig E. Kaston
So read on, and get to know some of the classic aircraft being flown by the USAF, now and in the future.
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS F-15 EAGLE
In July 1967 at Domodedevo Airport, outside Moscow, the Soviet Air Force proudly unveiled a new aircraft to the world press, the Ye-266/MiG-25. Nomenclature rules used by Western intelligence agencies specified that all “threat” fighter types got names starting w
ith the letter F; so the MiG-25 was called “Foxbat.” Like its namesake, the world’s largest flying mammal, this new plane was a beast with remarkable sensors, sharp teeth, and impressive performance. It quickly established several new world records for altitude, speed, rate-of-climb, and time-to-altitude, all important measures of a fighter’s capability in combat. The best contemporary American fighter of the time, the McDonnell F-4 Phantom, was clearly outclassed; and the U.S. Air Force launched a competition to design a plane that could surpass the Russian achievement. This program became even more vital when you consider that the same airshow had seen the rollout of the MiG-23/27 Flogger-series aircraft, and a number of other impressive Soviet fighters as well. Quickly, the USAF produced a specification for what they called the Fighter Experimental (FX). Several manufacturers competed for the FX contract, which eventually went to McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis. The contract was awarded in December 1969, and the first F-15, dubbed the “Eagle,” was rolled out on June 26th, 1972. By the end of 1975, operations of the first F-15 training squadron at Luke AFB, the famous 555th “Triple Nickel,” were in full swing; and the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Langley AFB, Virginia, was fully equipped with its cadre of the new birds. There were 361 F-15A fighters and 58 combat-capable F-15B trainers produced before the improved -C and -D models went into production in 1979. In early 1995 the Air Force operated about twenty squadrons of F-15s, including five Reserve and National Guard squadrons.
The designers at McDonnell Aircraft produced a 40,000 lb./18,181 kg., “no-compromise” air superiority fighter that, superficially, resembled the Foxbat, with huge, boxy air intakes, large wing area, and tall twin tail fins. The exterior is covered with access panels, most at shoulder level for easy access without the need for work stands. The structure made extensive use of titanium (stronger than steel) for the wing spars and engine bay, and limited use of advanced boron fiber (non-metallic) composite materials in the tail surfaces. Stainless steel is found mainly in the landing gear struts, and the skin is primarily made of aircraft-grade aluminum. By comparison, the Foxbat used heavy steel alloys throughout the airframe. This imposed a huge weight penalty on the Soviet machine. In case you wonder about the strength of the American bird, consider that McDonnell Douglas’s F-15 test airframe has completed over eighteen thousand hours of simulated flight, which represents a potential service life of fifty-three years, based on a flight schedule of three hundred hours per year.
According to the original FX design guidelines, the aircraft was to be a pure air-superiority fighter—“not a pound for air-to-ground.” Earlier designs like the F-4 Phantom and F-105 Thunderchief had traded off air-to-air performance for a multi-role “fighter-bomber” capability, and this often put them at a fatal disadvantage against the more agile Soviet MiGs, such as those that they encountered over North Vietnam. (Later, as it happened, the Strike Eagle derivative of the F-15 became one of the great air-to-ground combat aircraft of all time.)
The F-15 used the very advanced Pratt and Whitney F100-PW-100 turbofan, which pushed then-existing technology to the limits. The 17,600lb./ 8,000 kg. thrust J-79 engine, for example, two of which powered the F-4 Phantom, had a turbine inlet temperature of 2,035°F/1,113°C, while the F-100-PW-100 turbine inlet can sustain a hellish 2,460°F/1,349°C. In full afterburner, the basic F100 produces 25,000 lb./11,340 kg. of thrust—nearly eight times its own weight! A skilled ground crew can remove and replace an engine in thirty minutes; just try that on your Oldsmobile! In service, F100 engines have worn out much faster than expected, principally because the Eagle’s advanced airframe allowed pilots to fly on the “edge of the envelope” at throttle settings and angles of attack that stress the engines severely. But the edge of the envelope is where pilots win air battles, so the price has been paid to maintain the awesome capability that the F100 delivers.
One of the realities of modern jet fighters is that they burn gas faster than teenagers drink diet soda—a lot faster. While the F100 turbofan is more efficient than the older turbojet fighter engines, they still burn a huge load of fuel, especially in afterburner. To feed the two big turbofans, the Eagle carries a huge load of fuel internally, in the fuselage and wings. In addition, all F-15s can carry up to three external 610 gallon/2,309 liter drop tanks, one on the centerline and one under each wing. To extend the Eagle’s unrefueled range even further, McDonnell Douglas developed the Fuel and Sensors, Tactical (FAST) Pack, a pair of bulging “conformal” fuel tanks (CFTs) that fit tightly against the sides of the fuselage below the wings. These are designed to minimize drag and actually generate some lift, so the Eagle’s performance is only slightly affected. Holding 750 gallons/2,839 liters of fuel, each CFT can be installed or removed in fifteen minutes. In addition, there are fittings on each CFT for mounting bomb racks or missile rails. CFTs are not carried on the current fighter version of the Eagle, the F-15C, because the normal internal fuel load, as well as that in the drop tanks, is usually adequate for the missions the Eagle drivers fly.
The business end of the Eagle is the cockpit, which is topped with a large bubble canopy. It provides exceptional panoramic visibility, which is critical to survival in a dogfight. F-15 pilots talk about a feeling of riding “on” the aircraft rather than “in” it. By slightly extending the canopy, the design left sufficient room behind the pilot for a second seat, making it relatively simple to build the F-15/D operational trainer, and ultimately the F-15E Strike Eagle.
The pilot sits in a McDonnell Douglas ACES II ejection seat, which is one of the best in the world. When you sit in one, you are held by a lap belt and shoulder-harness system, and the cushions contain the parachute and rescue packs that deploy when the seat separates. All you need to do to escape from a stricken aircraft is to pull one of the two sets of ejection handles (one on either side of the seat) while sitting firmly in the seat, and you are on your way. Pyrotechnic charges blow off the canopy, and then a rocket motor fires and blasts you free. At that point, everything, including the parachute deployment, is handled automatically. Even the release of the parachute in the event of a water landing is handled by sensors that detect the presence of water and cut the riser lines loose to keep the survivor from fouling the chute and drowning.
While the instrument panel directly in front of the pilot is crammed with a mix of dial gauges, most of what he actually uses centers around just three things, the Heads-Up Display (HUD), the control stick, and the throttles. Earlier we saw how the HUD presents the most vital flight and sensor data to the pilot, without the pilot having to move his gaze down into the cockpit. This is critical, because the last thing you want to do in a dogfight is take your eyes off the target. Most of the controls that an F-15 pilot needs for fighting in the Eagle are located on the control stick; engine throttles are on the left side of the cockpit. Both are studded with small switches and buttons, each shaped and textured differently, so that after a short time, a pilot can rapidly identify a particular switch just by feel. This system—known as Hands on Throttle and Stick (HOTAS)—was developed by a brilliant McDonnell Douglas engineer named Eugene Adam, who is a legend in the business of cockpit design, having also been behind the “glass” (using computer MFDs instead of dials and gauges) cockpits in the F-15E Strike Eagle, the F/ A-18 Hornet, and many other combat aircraft in service today. The HOTAS switches control almost everything a pilot needs in a fight—the radar mode, radio-transmit switch, decoy launchers, and of course the weapons release, which can be controlled by the movement of a finger and a flip of a switch.
A drawing of the McDonnell Douglas ACES II ejection seat.
Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd., by Laura Alpher
While I’ve never flown in the front seat of an actual Eagle, I spent some time on the domed full-motion simulators operated by McDonnell Douglas at their St. Louis facility. When you sit down in the seat of an Eagle, the first thing you notice is that your hands just naturally move to the HOTAS controls and your eyes to the HUD. It takes a while to sort out all the switches and
buttons, though you rapidly identify the really important ones. When they start it up and you’re actually “flying,” the first thing you notice is that your aircraft seems to wobble all over the sky, because the controls are so sensitive. You quickly learn that the trick to maintaining a smooth flight path is to loosen your grip on the control stick and let your right hand just “kiss” it with a light touch. When you start maneuvering the Eagle, the control system is just so quick and responsive to even the smallest control inputs that you feel you’re “behind” the airplane. Even the twin F100 power plants are quick to accelerate and idle, thanks to the digital engine control system.
I mentioned earlier that the Hughes-built radar of the Eagle has been a standard for air intercept (AI) radars since it came into service in 1975. Originally designated the APG-63, it has been updated to the APG-70 standard in the F-15E and the last block of F-15C Eagles. The reason for having a radar so powerful and agile (i.e., able to discriminate and hold lock even on small targets during the high-G maneuvers of a dogfight) on the Eagle was that the designers wanted to be able to scan and attack targets in a vast volume of airspace in front of the new fighter. This requires a lot of power. The brute power of a radar is determined mainly by two factors, the amount of electrical current the aircraft can supply and the space available for the antenna. The sophistication of a modern radar is determined largely by the state-of-the-art in digital signal processing, an arcane branch of computer science. The original APG-63 radar had three main operating modes: low pulse-rate (frequency) for ground mapping, medium pulse rate for close-range maneuvering targets, and high pulse rate for long-range detection at ranges of 100 nm./183 km. or more. Since the most important radar controls are located on the throttle column and control stick, they are easy to use in combat. The most important of these are the switches for selecting where the radar is pointed in elevation and the various radar modes. This system has been continually upgraded to keep pace with advances in technology, and is now designated the APG-70, with a programmable signal processor (PSP). The PSP was added to the APG-63 in later F-15A/B model aircraft; and later -C/D/E models got the APG-70 with the PSP already built in. The upgrade included a variety of new operating modes, such as Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) precision ground mapping in the F-15E model.