Read Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force Combat Wing Page 28


  Table 2—ACC Bomber Aircraft Force

  As with the fighter force, the good news for the bomber community is that a new, highly capable airframe is on the way. With the B-2A, ACC has a penetrating bomber capable of flying a good payload into virtually any air-defense environment in the world. The bad news is that the USAF is only buying twenty of the production B-2s, with further production greatly in doubt. General Loh has stated his support for maintenance of the heavy bomber production capability, and obtained some $125 million in FY-1995 funding to keep the Northrop production line and its subcontractors alive while the question of further production is studied. ACC’s long-term problem is to keep the bomber force viable in the face of pressure to cut ACC force levels.

  This is where the long-standing disputes between the “fighter mafia” and “bomber barons” become most evident. The fighter supporters question both the ability of bombers to operate in a modern war and their relatively high O&M costs. The bomber supporters will tell you that fighters do not have the range or carrying capacity to haul the loads of precision munitions required in future conflicts. Who is right? In a manner of thinking, both of them. Generals Loh and Ralston, as well as the rest of the ACC leadership, have tended to bet on the bird-in-the-hand theory, which is to say that the bombers are here, they are paid for, and as such should be made use of. Nevertheless, there will inevitably be cuts in the bomber force. Though General Loh would prefer to maintain a force of 180 bomber airframes on duty, this number will probably have to be cut, mostly though a mix of B-52H and B-1B mothballing.

  To sustain a force of one hundred available bombers requires a total of about 180 airframes to cover those in test, training, refit, and maintenance. Note that I say mothballed, and not retired or scrapped. ACC wants the bomber airframes that are taken out of service to be protected, so they can be “bought back” should a crisis arise or attrition from combat casualties become critical. Moreover, the ACC leadership have done their best to buy back capabilities that were lost when the last of the B-52Gs were retired in 1993. During a recent visit to ACC headquarters at Langley AFB, General Loh was almost ecstatic when he heard that six B-52Hs of the 2nd Bombardment Wing at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, had been made capable of launching the AGM-142 Have Nap standoff missile, and that their AGM-84 Harpoon anti-shipping missile and mining capabilities would also soon be restored. Such is the state of affairs in the U.S. military that a senior military leader is excited over a restored capability in just six airframes of a forty-year-old bomber design. It is something to keep in mind.

  An EF-111A Raven of the 27th Fighter Wing standoff jamming aircraft on the ramp at Nellis AFB during Green Flag 94-3. Craig E. Kaston

  Of equal concern to the ACC leadership is the problem of their limited fleet of electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. EW aircraft are what is known as “force multipliers,” and no aerial campaign in the last two decades has succeeded without them. Unfortunately, the linchpin of the USAF EW fleet, the SAM hunting Wild Weasel version of the venerable F-4G Phantom II, is—well—ancient. With the airframes hitting their twenty-fifth year of continuous service, it is essential to find a replacement airframe to do the mission of suppressing enemy air defenses. However, since there is absolutely no money to even consider producing a dedicated replacement Wild Weasel aircraft, the two remaining squadrons of F4-Gs will have to soldier on, supplemented by the hundred Block 50/52 F-16Cs equipped with the new Texas Instruments AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) pods and support from other ACC EW surveillance aircraft.

  The other ACC EW airframes are in somewhat better shape, though their numbers are much lower than the ACC leadership would like. The EF- 111A Raven (called the Spark ’Vark by their crews) fleet is in good shape. Unfortunately, they are scheduled to be retired in the next few years. The EC- 130H Compass Call birds are also quite capable, though their lack of numbers is somewhat troubling.

  Certainly the most diverse part of the ACC fleet is the aircraft that fall in the general category of support. At the top of the list is the fleet of E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Few communities in the USAF have more temporary duty (TDY) assignment days than the 552nd Wing at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Like the other force multipliers, the E-3 community is limited by their relatively small number of airframes. In addition, they suffer because of their 1960s computer technology and less-than-efficient turbojet engines. The good news is that the AWACS Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) should resolve the worst of the Sentry’s problems, and the USAF is studying the retrofitting of new engines as well. In the long term, the next generation of surveillance aircraft will have to wait for some time, probably well into the 21st century.

  Table 3—ACC Electronic Warfare Aircraft

  Table 4—ACC Support Aircraft Force

  The problem of numbers is also of concern to the EC-135 Looking Glass and EC-130 Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) communities. These airborne command posts provide command and control for a variety of USAF operations. Both are invaluable national assets, and are beginning to get a bit long in the tooth. Watch for a replacement or supplement for these airframes in the next few years. Happier thoughts surround those in the OA-10 community, whose performance as forward air controllers during the recent Persian Gulf was nothing short of outstanding. Though short on all-weather/day-and-night systems, their crews and support personnel have taken their Warthog attitude of operations and made lemonade from what some folks might consider lemons. Right now they are starting to consider using night vision goggles to get more out of their already busy birds. Finally, in one of the ironies of the 1992 mergers, ACC took over beddown and control of the fleet of E-4s. Once known as the “Doomsday Planes,” these modified 747s still remain on alert to provide a secure, safe haven for the national command authorities in the event of a crisis or national emergency.

  So what will be the next addition to the American fleet of support aircraft? Probably the new E-8 Joint Surveillance Tactical Reconnaissance Systems (JSTARS) aircraft, which will become available in the late 1990s. The E-8 (another modified 707 airframe) will provide information on ground forces the way the E-3 AWACS keeps an eye on airspace. While extremely expensive, the E-8 will undoubtedly become one of the crown jewels of the USAF fleet.

  Nowhere in ACC is there a greater shortfall of capability, or more frustration, than in the airborne reconnaissance community. At the top of the problem list is the fleet of RF-4C Phantom II photo reconnaissance aircraft. These birds are antiquated and obsolete. They suffer from structural fatigue problems, short range (due to their thirsty J-79 turbojet engines), lack of modern radar warning receivers (RWRs), electronic countermeasures (ECM) gear, and outdated sensors. Only the loving care of their operators in units of the Nevada and Alabama ANG is keeping the RF-4C as a viable system. There had been plans to replace the RF-4C with a reconnaissance version of the F-16, carrying a podded version of the Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS). But when the system ran into technical problems, the USAF canceled the program. This caused much shock and displeasure for the other planned ATARS users, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. Following this programmatic fiasco, as well as complaints with the overall direction of airborne reconnaissance, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) was created in 1993 to coordinate all airborne reconnaissance systems for all services. For now, though, the Air Force’s contribution to the tactical photo reconnaissance mission is going to be limited to satellite assets from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the aging fleet of RF-4Cs.

  Table 5—ACC Reconnaissance Aircraft Force

  Operational-level reconnaissance assets are another thing entirely. The USAF fleet of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft is headed into its fifth decade of continuous service, and going strong. It is sometimes hard to believe that this Cold War icon has outlived even the aircraft that was designed to replace it, the SR-71 Blackbird. Presently, the U-2 is the best operational-level reconnaissance aircraft in the world, a
ssuming a benign volume of airspace for it to operate in. The memory of what happened to Francis Gary Powers on May 1st, 1960, is still strong in the minds of the USAF, and they will not operate the U-2 anywhere where there is a significant surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat. How long will the U-2 continue to soldier on? Right now that is anyone’s guess. It does the job, and nothing has yet come along which does the job better or cheaper.

  Perhaps the most valuable airframe in the whole ACC finishes out our look at reconnaissance aircraft, the RC-135 Rivet Joint. These heavily modified airframes are packed from end to end with electronic surveillance equipment to locate enemy radars, communications centers, and command and control sites. The “RJs,” as they are known, are literally electronic vacuum cleaners for electronic intelligence (ELINT)/signals intelligence (SIGINT), and thus are almost irreplaceable national assets. Again the problem is one of numbers. When we visited Nellis AFB in the spring of 1994, we saw two RJs working in the Green Flag exercises being held there. These aircraft were fully one third of the fleet. Meanwhile, Rivet Joint is becoming ever more important to the ACC mission, because their ability to locate and track SAM radars makes them vital in helping the F-16s assigned Wild Weasel duties find their targets and put their High Speed Radiation Missiles (HARMS) on target.

  Of all the challenges borne by General Loh in the 1992 merger, certainly none was more alien to him than taking over beddown and command of the USAFs large fleet of C-130 Hercules transports. Tasked with the job of inter-theater transport, the C-130s are the backbone of combat logistics for deployed air units, and thus it makes perfect sense for them to be assigned to ACC. They also provide the bulk of combat airlift for the paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division within the XVIII Airborne Corps. The C-130 is yet another design with some four decades of service under its belt, with no end in sight. The C-130H model is still in production for the USAF and a number of other nations; and a new version, the C-130J, is being built and tested. It will likely come into service with the USAF in the early 21st century.

  There are no plans to replace the basic C-130, and no perceived shortcomings in the design. The aircraft are structurally sound, and have no vices that anyone who flies them cares to complain about. In fact, if you look at Table 6, you will notice that the vast majority of the C-130 fleet is operated by the forces of the ANG and AFRES. The inter-theater transport mission is made-to-order for the Guard and Reserves, and will remain one of their most valuable contributions for decades to come. Thus, the C-130 will likely become the first combat aircraft to remain in production and service for five decades and in two different centuries.

  Table 6—ACC Transport/Tanker Aircraft Force

  In addition to the C-130s, ACC also took over the small fleet of C-21 Learjets used for VIP travel, and twin-engine C-27 transports used for local logistical support in the Canal Zone down in Panama.

  ACC has also been assigned a small, but significant force of KC-135 Stratotanker and KC-10 Extender aerial tanker aircraft. These have been assigned to various units, such as the 4th and 366th wings, to provide them with rapid-deployment capabilities.

  Finally, there is the vital area of combat search and rescue (CSAR). Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, the CSAR mission was the property of the USAF Special Operations Command (USAFSOCOM). Their promise was that when the time came, their force of MH-53J Pave Low helicopters would be there to scoop up any fliers unfortunate enough to be shot down over enemy territory. There was just one little problem with this promise: It was a lie. It is not an exaggeration to say that the command leadership of the U.S. Central Command Special Operations Command (SOCCENT) was fixated on supporting the various teams of special operations ground forces operating in Iraq and Kuwait and not on picking up flyers unfortunate enough to get themselves shot down. Therefore, SOCCENT laid down an almost impossible set of criteria to be fulfilled before a rescue would be attempted. Thus, an F-15E Strike Eagle crew shot down in western Iraq spent days on the ground, waiting for a rescue mission that SOCCENT would not authorize, and which never came. Eventually they were captured, and they and their fellow aircrews were howling mad at the “snake eaters” of the special operations world for breaking what they considered to be a special covenant that dated back to the days of the Korean War. For forty years, U.S. combat aircrews took it as a matter of faith that if they were shot down, survived the ejection, and were free in enemy territory, their fellow warriors would stop the war, move heaven and earth, and risk their own lives to get to them before the enemy did. When that didn’t happen, they felt betrayed. And they were right.

  Table 7—ACC Search and Rescue Aircraft Force

  Because ACC is committed to re-creating that original covenant, CSAR has been the only real area of growth in the ACC inventory. Since the end of the Gulf War, the USAF has stood up a number of combat SAR squadrons dedicated to the CSAR mission. These are equipped with the latest version of the HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopter, together with HC-130 Hercules aircraft to provide both in-flight refueling as well as command and control for the rescue forces. In addition, ACC has built a CSAR weapons school at Nellis AFB, to make sure that the art of CSAR is never again lost.

  The CSAR helicopter force is not limited to SAR operations. It is also used for exercise support, CSAR training, disaster relief, and even support during space shuttle launches. Nevertheless, the forces shown in Table 7 will always have one overriding imperative, to support the combat flyers of the USAF and their joint partners. First, last, and always!

  DEPLOYABILITY: THE ACC STYLE OF WAR

  So, you might ask, just how will ACC use their resources in future conflicts? Again, ACC’s mission is to “package” USAF units for USACOM to be fed out to unified command JTFs. That is a fancy way of saying that ACC headquarters tells their folks where to go and how to get there. It also places the responsibility on ACC to train their people not only to use the array of weapons and equipment in the inventory, but to deploy and work with other JTF component units from other U.S. services (the Navy, Army, etc.), or those of other coalition/host nations. These basic weapons training skills are accommodated within the standard training system of USAF schools and squadrons. Local bombing, gunnery, and air-to-air training ranges are used to keep basic skills honed. Currently, the USAF has some thirty-eight live-fire bombing and gunnery ranges, six electronically scored bombing ranges, five electronic combat ranges, 775 air-to-air training range zones, and ten instrumented air-to-air (ACMI/TACTS) ranges. But to teach the more sophisticated skills of joint warfare, something more is required. These are the various Flag exercises that the USAF runs around the world. They teach USAF personnel, as well as the personnel of other services and countries, how to fight the kind of war we saw during 1991 in the Persian Gulf. These include: • Red Flag—A series of five yearly composite force exercises run in the vast western training range complex north of Nellis AFB, Nevada. These are detailed war games run against simulated aggressor aircraft, ground threats, and target arrays, designed to teach units how to deploy and operate in a joint environment. Since its inception in 1975, air units from every U.S. military branch and twenty-one foreign air forces have participated in Red Flag.

  • Green Flag—Essentially a Red Flag with real-world electronic warfare capabilities being exercised. Extremely expensive to run, these take place once a year at Nellis AFB, Nevada.

  • Blue Flag—A large command post exercise designed to teach U.S. command staffs how to run theater-level deployment and combat operations.

  • Checkered Flag—A large theater-level combat training exercise run several times a year. These exercises include direct participation of coalition/ host nations. In 1994 alone, some twenty-one different nations from every continent in the world participated. These included such well known allies as Australia and Saudi Arabia, as well as some less well known participants such as Chile, Kenya, and Singapore.

  And there are several other Flag exercises, with narrower goals. Other exercises are used to train specific types of u
nits in particular scenarios. Some of the FY-1994 examples include:• Coronet Havoc—F-117As from the 49th Fighter Wing at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, rapidly deployed from their home base to a base in the Netherlands.

  • Bright Star—Aircraft from the 366th Wing at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, ran a composite intervention wing deployment/combat exercise with the Egyptian Air Force, and other allies, in Egypt. This included deploying fighters and tankers to Cairo West Airfield in Egypt, as well as bombers and tankers to the Azores.

  • Global Power—These demonstrations of bomber capability are usually run about eight times a year. For example, on the fourth anniversary of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in 1994, two B-52Hs from the 2nd Bombardment Wing at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, flew non-stop (with in-flight refueling) to Kuwait, where they delivered their conventional bomb load on a Kuwaiti training range, then continued around the world to their base. In another Global Power demonstration, B-1Bs from the 28th Bombardment Wing at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, also flew non-stop around the world (also with in-flight refueling support).