Meanwhile, because our own artillery was firing continually, and this noise was added to the occasional thunks of our M1A1 120-mm tank rounds and the normal thunk, thunk, thunk three-round burst from the Bradley's 25-mm cannons, Ron and I could barely hear each other over the noise.
"Ron, this is a lousy place to do some future battle planning. Got a suggestion?" I shouted.
"Let's go back to my TAC. It's about five kilometers west of here, right in center sector. I'll drive in my HMMWV and meet you there."
"OK," I said, then went back and got in my waiting Blackhawk and flew the five kilometers to 1st AD TAC CP.
MEDINA RIDGE
First AD's battle at what they called "Medina Ridge" had been the biggest and, as it turned out, the fastest and most one-sided individual battle of the war.
By late morning, Ron had all three division ground brigades on line abreast. The 2nd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Monty Meigs (Monty's great-great-grandfather had been quartermaster general of the Union army for General Grant) had four battalions, but his 6/6 Infantry was still catching up, following their finish of the al-Busayyah fight. The day before, 1st AD had successfully fought off an artillery attack from out of XVIII Corps's sector in the north, and by a combination of artillery and attack helicopters had destroyed a brigade of the Adnan RGFC Division that the Iraqis had repositioned south to thicken their defense.
It was shortly after noon when the 2nd Brigade ran into a reinforced brigade of the Medina.
"The Republican Guards," Ron Griffith said later about 1st AD's battles, "were much more capable forces" than the ones opposite us initially, and the other Iraqi forces in the southern part of Kuwait were "better equipped, trained, fed, led, and disciplined. The battles that were fought out there in the desert were very large battles, and they were not with forces that were running. In fact, they were forces that continued to reinforce and tried with some determination to defend."
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Whitcomb's account of the fight gives a firsthand account of what happened (Whitcomb was commander of 2/70 Armor, consisting of three M1A1 companies and one Bradley company, and one of the three TFs in 2nd Brigade's fight).
"At 1140, brigade began moving forward. While intelligence had not pinpointed enemy locations, we expected the enemy to be twenty to forty kilometers out front.
"Within minutes, as BANDIT's [Company B's] lead platoon was crawling out of a small wadi, the tanks stopped suddenly and backed down to turret defilade. Almost immediately, both BANDIT and ASSASSIN [Company A] reported T-72s and BMPs to their direct front. We confirmed friendly positions and ranges (2,800-3,500 meters). The wadi provided excellent firing positions for the tanks and the task force commenced firing.
"It quickly became obvious that the Iraqis were totally outclassed by our soldiers and equipment. Fire commands were textbook, with only an occasional hint of excitement as a T-72 would explode in a ball of flame. The day had been very gray and overcast and visibility limited to perhaps 1,500 meters. The wind blew sand. Through the haze, one could see muzzle flashes as the enemy tanks attempted to return fire." Steve later told me that it looked to him as though "Hoffman devices"--the training device used to simulate enemy tank fire--"were going off." They were totally ineffective, and as the captured Iraqis would later confirm, they could see us shoot, and watch their comrades explode, but could not identify our vehicles by any means other than their general direction. Our tankers far exceeded their training ranges of 2,200 to 2,400 meters with precise but deadly shots, the longest being 3,650 meters.
"Soon, the horizon was a series of over seventy smoke plumes. In forty-five minutes, the task force's share of the annihilation of the 2nd Brigade of the Medina Tank Division, Republican Guards, would later be confirmed at 27 T-72 tanks, 8 BMPs, and 6 air defense command-and-control vehicles. . . . In those forty-five minutes, the brigade would destroy 55 T-72s, 6 T-55s, 35 armored personnel carriers, and 5 SA-13 antiaircraft weapons systems."
The enemy "had positioned themselves in an eight-kilometer-long 'fish-hook'-shaped line the day prior and had dug fighting positions for their tanks. They had tied their defense in with what good terrain they found and actually had set up an excellent reverse-slope defense. The enemy was there to fight and knew the importance to the rest of the Iraqi army of their ability to stop us.51
"During the fight, incoming artillery, around several hundred rounds, was received to the left rear of our flank unit, behind us and TF 4/70. The intent of the enemy had been to hit us and force us back into the artillery. . . . The brigade fire-support officer called for counter-battery fire, and within seconds of 'Shot,' the Iraqi guns fell silent. . . .
"In addition, A-10s and Apache attack helicopters, which had been requested earlier, arrived at about 1250 and were able to clean out enemy forces behind the front line of destroyed vehicles. Our soldiers were treated to an aerial display, as repeated runs by the A-10s and engagements by the Apaches' Hellfire missiles silenced any enemy activity. . . .
"It was truly an awesome sight as we passed the still-flaming hulks of the enemy. Explosions continued, even over two hours after the fight, as tank rounds cooked off inside the vehicles, shooting flames skyward. Prisoners were captured, wounded, some seriously, treated and evacuated, and quick examination of the area for intelligence value conducted."
The above account was not merely the story of one battalion, it speaks for the whole division. While Steve Whitcomb's tankers executed the direct-fire fight, the brigade commander, Monty Meigs, ensured maximum combat power forward and used his artillery in direct support and for counterfire. Ron Griffith at the division would see that Monty had all the firepower he could provide, and ensure that the division executed the counterfire, and simultaneously fight in greater depth with A-10s and division Apaches.
This was combined arms--AirLand Battle at division level--working in harmony at each echelon. General George Patton in World War II called it the "musician of Mars." We had the whole VII Corps combined-arms orchestra crashing down on the Iraqis.
This fight also was why Ron Griffith had had his attention drawn to the situation in front of him, rather than to the problem of finding room for 1st CAV. He needed to bring the full weight of the division to bear, just as he had done at the beginning of Medina Ridge and was continuing to do.
1ST AD TAC CP MEDINA RIDGE
The 1st AD TAC CP was not really a CP at all. To keep up with his fast-moving series of battles close and deep, Ron had been moving about the battle area in his HMMWV and a helicopter. While he was doing that, Brigadier General Jay Hendrix had been inside an almost continually moving G-3 M577, directing the close fight.
One M577, with Jay Hendrix inside. I was really pumped up and pleased with what 1st AD was doing in their sector. Clearly they were hitting the Medina hard and were hitting other Iraqi mech and armor units deep. The price of that was an inability to plan, let alone decide on a maneuver to allow 1st CAV to pass to the north. The sight of that lone M577 explained to me the difficulty we were having at the VII Corps TAC getting 1st AD on the radio. It also was a signal to me that getting the 1st CAV in the fight that day would be hard to do.
I met Ron behind the M577. The ramp was up (because of the threat of Iraqi artillery fire), but the ramp door was open. I could hear the crackle of reports over the 1st AD command radio net, as the three brigades attacked on line and the aviation attacked deep. The 2/1 Aviation that I had released from 2nd ACR had by now returned to 1st AD . . . just in time to take up the deep fight from 3/1, whose pilots were by now too fatigued to fly. The full division was committed.
Joining our huddle was Brigadier General Creighton Abrams (there to get the fire support right) and the 1st CAV G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gunlicks. Also there was the G-3 of the 1st AD, Lieutenant Colonel Tommie Straus.
The discussion went something like this:
"Ron," I said, "I want the 1st CAV to be able to attack east toward Objective Raleigh and destroy the Hammurabi. That means--as w
e talked about earlier--you need to make room in the north of your sector. I've got Jim Gunlicks here and I want you to get the graphics coordinated between you and 1st CAV. John is moving his division up now and will be ready to pass. I want it done prior to dark."
"Roger, I understand," Ron said. "But it would be a lot easier if we got a boundary adjustment in the north rather than for me to try to make my sector smaller right in the middle of our fight with the Medina. We'll give it our best shot."
"I understand about the boundary, but that will not happen. Get it done by dark. I want to envelop the Iraqis. First CAV is the northern force and the 1st INF is the southern force. Keep pressing your attack."
"WILCO."
I had asked a lot of Ron and the 1st AD. They were in a continuous series of battles stretching out about thirty kilometers in front of the division. His forward units were conducting mostly unplanned meeting engagements. We knew generally that the Iraqis were out there, but final locations were determined only when 1st AD troops slammed into them. That required the continuous focus of the division leadership in case forward brigades ran into an enemy force they could not handle, and they needed reinforcement from division. I had ordered Ron to continue that attack. I had also ordered him to make his sector smaller by slightly changing direction, and at the same time to pass 1st CAV to his north. It was a tough mission.
Though Ron was not enthusiastic about all this, that was irrelevant to me. Sometimes you do not get to choose your missions. You execute. So, as a loyal and skilled commander, and one who had his hands full at the moment, Ron had told me he would do it. Ron's WILCO cemented a lifelong friendship between us.
I left and returned to the TAC, which by now had displaced forward and was located just west of where the 2nd ACR had so soundly beaten the Iraqis. I was convinced that within four hours (more or less), Ron and 1st AD would pass 1st CAV through, and we'd have the remaining Iraqis in the bag by late morning the next day. At least in our sector.
1530 VII CORPS TAC CP
The TAC was set up in its usual configuration. The site was a bald, sandy hill (more like a knoll or rise in the desert of maybe fifty feet). Around the site were littered many Iraqi armored vehicles, some burning, some smoking, some just demolished from air attacks.
There also were Iraqi dead (I had not seen any when I was flying in). The next day, our VII Corps chaplain, Colonel Dan Davis--a Special Forces Vietnam veteran, and a troop chaplain if ever there was one--supervised the burial of twenty-eight Iraqi dead and sent the locations back through channels to ARCENT. As was the practice in theater, these would later be passed to the Red Cross.
When I got to the TAC, the first thing I wanted to do was get a quick SITREP on the Iraqi situation and see about the progress of the 1st INF. I also wanted to find out if Stan had found Tom Rhame and delivered the graphics.
Next I reviewed the double envelopment. I knew we could do it. Besides, it looked ever more certain that the final maneuver to finish off the RGFC was up to us. From the information I had received from 1st AD, it appeared that the Third Army two-corps maneuver to finish off the RGFC would not work. XVIII Corps was not going to get east fast enough to become the hammer to our anvil that the Third Corps plan envisioned.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi defense was crumbling. Most of their forces in our sector continued to be east of 1st and 3rd AD, right where I had aimed 1st CAV.
John Tilelli reported that 1st CAV was moving up in anticipation of attacking east. Good! His CAV squadron had an action against a bypassed Iraqi unit.
The Big Red One was continuing its attack to the east and would reach Highway 8 by dark. That was great news. On the other hand, there were a couple of things that I thought I'd have to keep an eye on: First, I noticed that their attack was beginning to take a slight turn to the northeast. With 3rd AD attacking due east, then slightly southeast, if 1st INF started to veer northeast, they would eventually run into each other. Second, we were having trouble keeping effective communications with their TAC. From where we were, the distance was causing us to lose line-of-sight FM comms, and we were relying more and more on TACSAT. On top of that, since Tom Rhame was forward in a tank, to be as close to the action as he could get, I no longer had direct voice comms with him. . . . This was, in fact, no big deal, as Tom knew what I wanted done, and if something wasn't clear, Stan was now at their TAC to explain it in person.
I knew the 1st AD situation, as I had just come from there.
The 3rd AD attack was relentless. They had moved farther and faster, and were picking up momentum. They were the Spearhead Division for sure!
Reports of their actions would tell me two things: First, their lead attacking units were telling us of actions around the 83 to 87 north/south grid line. That told us that the division was about to enter Kuwait, which was the 88 grid. By 1700, they were almost ten kilometers inside Kuwait, and closing in on the direction of attack of the 1st INF. The 3rd AD also continued to report that they were attacking and destroying T-72s and BMPs, as well as bunker complexes, but that the Iraqi resistance seemed less and less organized than it had been earlier in the day (these no longer seemed to be brigade actions, but more battalion- and even company-sized).
I was fired up about their success. Was there something I could do to capitalize on it? An option was to take advantage of their forward progress and attack them northeast in front of 1st AD toward the Hammurabi. . . . No, I concluded. Not yet. If we could not get the 1st CAV around to the north of 1st AD, then I would consider that option.
One thing at a time for now. Keep it simple. Everyone was tired: soldiers and leaders were falling asleep in turrets; planners were having short-term memory lapses; so was I. This was not the time to overcomplicate what we were trying to do.
As I've mentioned before, as soldiers and leaders get more tired, you have to "work hard" at simplifying, and must communicate in direct, unambiguous language--even get more dramatic in gesture and language to get people's attention.
Since success in the attack always opens up opportunities, you also have to try to reinforce success where you find it--to seize an opening presented by the initiative of one of your subordinate units.
Recognizing success ("exploitation") and totally finishing the enemy ("pursuit") were skills we had not practiced much in our Cold War training because we had always stressed fighting outnumbered against tough enemies in the Warsaw Pact. The last time the American army had been in an exploitation-and-pursuit had been after the Inchon landing behind the North Koreans in September 1950. Some of my early training and education had been conducted by veterans of both World War II and Korea, and somewhere in the back of my mind, the ability to recognize signs of exploitation-and-pursuit on the battlefield had stuck. I had seen them earlier in the day in the 1st INF. Though I hadn't yet seen them in the 1st and 3rd AD, which were still in hasty attacks and meeting engagements, I knew I soon would.
AT about 1700, Stan returned. Because Tom Rhame was forward in a tank, Stan had not been able to find him to deliver the order and brief him personally. He had been able to leave the order with the 1st INF TAC CP, however, so that was reassuring. But the lack of comms with Tom, the fact that we hadn't been able to get to him, and the fact that all of us were tired raised my concerns.
A little after 1700, Ron Griffith called.
"JAYHAWK 6, this is IRON 6," he said.
"JAYHAWK 6."
"My 3rd Brigade is in contact and we had some casualties. Cannot execute maneuver to get 1st CAV through in north. Believe it hazards my force to do that while we are in contact."
Damn, I thought. All that work racing around all day to personally tie this together, and now at the last minute we can't do it.
Chance. The unpredictable. It is part of war. My first emotion was anger that it was intervening to screw up our scheme of maneuver, but I let it pass. I had to adapt the plan to the circumstances. There is not much you can do about chance. And if in Ron's judgment they could not do it, then I had to c
onsider options, not act as though chance never happened.
"IRON 6, JAYHAWK 6, confirm you cannot execute maneuver for PEGASUS."
"Affirmative. We have contact in 3rd Brigade sector and deep, plus casualties, and cannot execute by dark."
"Wait," I said. I wanted a minute to consider this.
That radio call was the biggest personal tactical disappointment I had ever experienced in my army life, either in training or in war. We had the Iraqis on the run. The Hammurabi was within our reach, and the majority of that division (we still thought) was in our sector. With the double-envelopment maneuver, we would have completed the destruction of at least the heavy forces of the RGFC--our mission. Additionally, it is not often in training or in war that you have an opportunity to execute a double envelopment. It is like a grand-slam home run for the whole unit. The disappointment was not so much personal (though it was that) as it was for the entire VII Corps. If we could end this war with an envelopment of Iraqi forces, our troops would have that success to point to for the rest of their lives. It would have been not only mission accomplished, but rather mission accomplished with a bang at the end.