The thirteen ships procured under the 1981 MPF program are technically of three different types, though they fall into two classes for size and capacity comparison. The first five were Norwegian-owned Maersk-type Ro-Ro vessels. Three American-built Waterman-class Ro-Ro ships were converted, with five additional units of the AmSea/Braintree class purpose-built by General Dynamics, Quincy Shipbuilding Division. Conversion of the original eight ships involved splitting them, adding a large cargo section in the middle, a helicopter platform aft, and heavy lift cranes forward. Their general characteristics are summarized in the table below.
MPF Ship Class Characteristics
The ships were built to commercial standards, with comfortable accommodations for their small crews. This is important, because they may be deployed for months at remote sites around the world. Each ship has several vehicle/cargo decks, where everything from main battle tanks to cargo containers are stored. These can be rolled off the stern ramp onto a pier, or lifted out by deck cranes. Each MPF ship has a large stowage capacity for fuel and water, and equipment to distill up to 100,000 gallons /377,358 liters of freshwater per day. Finally, each MPSRON has an afloat commodore (usually a senior captain) and staff as the Navy command element.
The MPF conversions took several years to complete, and the ships a while longer to outfit and equip. Nevertheless, by 1986, they were ready for service. All thirteen were then leased back to the Navy to form three MPSRONs. To support the MPF program, a maintenance facility was established at Blount Island near Jacksonville, Florida. Every thirty months, each ship rotates through Blount Island for a few weeks. All of its equipment and supplies are off-loaded. Then everything is inspected and replaced as required; equipment and vehicles are cleaned and modified to the latest USMC standards. In this way, twelve out of thirteen MPF ships are always on station with their MPSRONs.
Each squadron is based a few days steaming time from its primary Area of Responsibility (AOR, the diplomatic euphemism for "trouble spot"). Their organizational structure looks like this:The maritime prepositioning ship PFC James Anderson, Jr., sits alongside at Blount Island near Jacksonville, Fla., prior to her return to Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two (MPSRON-2) at Diego Garcia Atoll in the Indian Ocean.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
MPF Ship/Squadron Organization
The Waterman-and AmSea-class ships have roughly the same stowage footprint, while the Maersk-class ships have somewhat less (mostly in the area of containerized cargo). Thus, MPSRON-2 has the five Maersk-class Ro-Ro vessels, while MPSRON-1 and -3 each have four of the other types. All vehicles are combat-loaded, fueled, and armed, ready to drive down the stern ramp, directly into battle if necessary.
Just how much stuff does a MPSRON carry? Well, a lot! The following matrix measures the typical loadout for all three MPSRONs. It should be noted that MAGTF equipment and supplies are evenly distributed across the ships of an MPSRON, so that loss or damage of one ship will not cripple the entire force:
Marine Brigade MAGTAF Personnel/Equipment Matrix
In addition to the equipment stowed on board, there are stocks of rations (lots of MREs!), clothing and individual equipment, fuel and lubricants, construction materials, ammunition, medical and dental supplies, and repair parts. All you need to add is personnel and aircraft. These are flown into a friendly airfield, then "marry up" with the shipborne equipment and supplies. More on this later.
Assume that a crisis has broken out somewhere in the AOR of an MPSRON, and the national command authorities decide to insert a Marine Brigade MAGTF to stabilize the situation. If a friendly host nation exists (the preferred option), then the MPSRON begins to steam for a port or anchorage where it can unload. If there is no friendly host nation, the next step is a "kick-in-the-door" operation by one of the MEU (SOC)/ARG teams, perhaps with the help of an Army unit like the alert brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. However they are secured, the keys to a successful MPF operation are a ten-thousand-foot/three-thousand-meter runway and a port facility or calm stretch of beach.
Approximately ninety hours prior to the start of unloading, a Navy team flies out to the MPF ships to help prepare the vehicles and unloading equipment. This includes installing batteries in vehicles and preparing cranes and lighterage. At the same time, ground troops and air units prepare for deployment. The 18,500 Marines deploy on Air Force C-5/17/141 transports, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) airliners, and commercial charter aircraft. The tactical aircraft self deploy with the help of Air Force tanker aircraft, while helicopters are partly disassembled for shipment on C-5/17/141 transports. All told, it takes about 250 airlift sorties to bring the entire force in, with several dozen additional daily sorties to support the operation once it gets going.
Just prior to the fly-in, the ships begin unloading. If a port is available, then the vehicles exit off the stern ramps, and their crews take possession and drive them to assembly areas (or right into combat if the situation is really urgent). Cargo containers are then off-loaded onto trailers or the docks, and the operation is completed. This scenario has been tested in exercises and real-world deployments, and refined down to a science. With a decent port facility, every vehicle can off-load in just eighteen hours, and all the cargo in three days. Following this, the ship remains in harbor only if local fuel and water supplies are not available, or to re-embark everything at the end of the operation.
Things get a little tougher if no port facility is available. To deal with this contingency, called an unload "in-stream," each MPSRON carries landing craft (LCM-8s) and lighterage (floating causeways and barges) to move vehicles and cargo ashore. The breakdown of each MPSRON's equipment is shown in the table below:
MPSRON Lighterage/Causeway Equipment
As you might imagine, unloading in-stream is slower than in a port facility. The LCM-8s move heavy vehicles and equipment like tanks and artillery, while the causeways move the rest of the MAGTF's supplies. Also, the stern ramp can be used to launch amphibious tractors like the AAV-7 or AAAV so that they can land under their own power. Under these conditions, it takes about three days to get the vehicles ashore, and at least two more days to unload cargo. Each MPF ship is equipped with supply conduits for water and fuel. These floating pipes allow the ships to stand up to four thousand yards/meters offshore and supply the needs of the MAGTF. This scenario is difficult and dangerous, as it forces the MPF ships to come close to shore and stay there for the better part of a week. Nevertheless, it may be the only option that puts a sizable entry force into a crisis area.
Since their inception, MPSRONs have been some of the busiest units in the Navy. In the 1990s, MPSRON-2 (based at Diego Garcia) has made three Persian Gulf deployments in response to Iraqi aggression. In 1990, MPSRON-2 delivered the first heavy units and equipment (the 7th MEB and 3rd MAW from California) during Operation Desert Shield. It also provided the first sustained logistical support for Army units flown into Saudi Arabia with almost no supplies or ammunition other than what they carried on their backs. These units drew from the stocks on the MPF ships, holding the line until follow-on forces and supplies began to arrive in late August 1990. MPSRON-2 deployed to Kuwait in 1994 and 1995, in response to threatening moves by Iraqi forces near Basra. These last two deployments took place less than ten months apart, demonstrating the value of a forward mobile base force like MPF. In addition, individual MPF ships deployed to support relief and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Somalia. By any standard of success, the MPF has vindicated those who originated the concept some fifteen years ago. At a minimal cost, the U.S. has reversed the downward spiral of crisis-response capability, without requiring permission from foreign governments to conduct operations. It has been quite a bargain.
As we move into the 21st century, the future of maritime prepositioning has never looked better. The Navy/Marine Corps MPF program is going strong and continues to be well funded by Congress. Meanwhile, both the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force have bought their own
fleets of prepositioning ships and are beginning to station them around the world. (Some of the Army MPF forces will share space at Diego Garcia and Guam with their Navy counterparts.) The Army vessels are larger and have a deeper draft than the Navy MPF ships, but they were built from the keel up for the job (they are Army-owned rather than leased, like the Navy ships), and have better vehicle handling facilities. Given the joint nature of military operations these Army and Navy days, it is likely these units will work together in future contingencies.
The future of the Navy MPF program is an open issue. Halfway through their projected thirty-year service life, the leased ships are in good shape, though it is time to consider eventual replacements. NAVSEA has proposed building a dozen new MPF ships to replace the existing force around 2015. Another option the Marines are evaluating is called Project Seabase, which would dispense with ships and build a huge floating base, which could move into a crisis area. With the stowage capacity of an entire MPSRON, it could operate and maintain all of the aircraft and helicopters assigned to the MAGTF. This Mobile Base concept originated with Admiral Bill Owens (the retired Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). He envisioned a series of linked platforms, like those used for oil drilling, that could handle aircraft up to the size of a C-130 Hercules, or even a C-17 Globemaster III. The base's propulsion system would move it at about eight knots, and it would anchor between twenty-five and fifty nm offshore. In this way, the deployed MAGTF would have no need for an airfield and port complex to unload. LCACs, V-22s, and other delivery systems would move units ashore, eliminating the need for an MEU (SOC) to make a forcible entry. The problem with this concept is that it would be terribly expensive, probably costing more than a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. A second generation of MPF ships will probably be the most economical way to sustain our forward-based equipment stocks. Whatever solution is chosen, there can be little doubt that this successful program will continue into the next century. MPF has provided exceptional value to the American taxpayer, and has been a major force in keeping the peace.
The Future: The LPD-17
This chapter has examined ships that represent an amphibious modernization program conceived over twenty years ago. This program was designed to replace the fleet of amphibious shipping constructed during the 1960s and early 1970s at the height of the Cold War. Despite all of the shipbuilding that we have described thus far, there is still a huge shortfall. This is the cargo footprint currently carried by forty-one ships of the LST-1179, LKA-113, LSD-36, and LPD-4 classes. These ships, whose average age ranged from twenty-three to twenty-six in 1995, are quickly reaching the end of their service lives. The Navy's answer is a new class of twelve ships, called the LPD-17 class, to replace all forty-one ships that will retire over the next ten years or so.
The LPD-17s will reflect everything the American shipbuilding industry has learned over the last three decades. These twelve ships (the amphibious "ships-of the-line" that General Krulak discussed in Chapter 2) will form the inshore leg of 21st century ARGs. They will have to be extraordinarily versatile to replace the fleet of older vessels that are going to the scrapyard. One measure of this is to compare the tonnage and manning of the old ships versus the new. The twelve LPD-17s, with a total crew of 5,200 and displacing just 300,000 tons, will replace forty-one ships with over 13,000 crew and displacing 525,000 tons. Quite a lot to expect from a ship which has not even had its final weapons suite decided. Let's look further.
The Navy views the design of LPD-17 in several ways. Recall the five footprints that I described earlier. The chart below summarizes these in comparison with the LPD-4 class they will replace:
LPD-17 vs. LPD-4
As the chart clearly shows, the LPD-17 class will have a significant edge in most of the key footprints that are of concern to the Navy and Marine Corps. Cargo is vastly improved, along with facilities for landing craft and aircraft. While there is a significant decrease in cargo space, this has been compensated for in the design of the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-class (LSD-41/49) landing dockships. The slight decrease in troop berthing has also been dealt with in the design of other amphibious ships. The 720 Marine berthing spaces provided will be among the most comfortable and spacious of any vessel ever built for the Navy.
About the year 2005, these new ships will take their place in the ARGs, becoming the standard transport for the seven MEU (SOC) units. The table below shows two notional ARG configurations we might expect to see:
Proposed 21st Century ARG Ship Mixes
As you can see, the commanders of an ARG and a MEU (SOC) will get roughly fifty aircraft spots and seven LCACs to support their operations. It should be noted that these two mixes represent minimum ARG capabilities. Other combinations are possible. The LPD-17 will be the inshore ship in the ARG, required to go further into harm's way than either the LHA/LHDs or the LSDs. In fact, the LPD-17s will regularly operate about 25 nm/45.7 km offshore, while other ships in the ARG (the LHAs/LHDs and LSDs) remain 50 to 200 nm/91.4 to 365.8 km out, since their maximum standoff from the target areas is determined by the speed of the LCAC (over 40 kt), and the new MV-22B (over 200 kt). The LPD-17's 25-nm/45.7-km standoff is dictated by the transit speed of the new AAAV. LPD-17 will be the primary platform for the AAAV, while providing facilities for other elements of the ARG and the MEU (SOC). For example, the LPD-17 will be the platform for the MEU (SOC) force of AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters as well as the embarked unit of UAVs. The LPD-17s will also be the lone wolf during "split ARG" operations; functioning as a mini-MEU (SOC), which General Krulak described in Chapter 2. The LPD-17 will become the utility infielder for the 'Gator Navy. Thus, if one of the ships in the ARG is going to get hit by an enemy attack, the LPD-17 will likely be the target.
The LPD-17 has therefore been designed to be the most defensible and survivable amphibious ship ever built. Structurally, the LPD-17 is going to be the world's toughest warship per ton. Even the long-ignored threat of mine warfare has been anticipated. In the LPD-17 design, NAVSEA has devoted over two hundred tons of structural stiffening to reduce damage from hull "whipping," when an underwater mine goes off nearby. Like Wasp-class LHDs, the LPD-17 will have a chemical/biological overpressure protection system, improved fire-zone protection, blast-resistant bulkheads, and fragmentation armor topside. The lessons in stealthy shaping gained from the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers have been applied to the LPD-17. When you study a drawing of the LPD-17, you see that the angles and curves resemble those on the DDG-51, and even the Lockheed F-117A Night Hawk stealth fighter. This is no coincidence; the principles of radar diffraction discussed in Fighter Wing apply to ships just as well as aircraft. Blankets and coatings of radar-absorbing material will be incorporated into the LPD-17, along with reduced acoustic and infrared signatures. NAVSEA claims that the LPD-17 will have only 1/100th the radar signature of the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-class (LSD-41/49) landing dock ships.
LPD-17 (Notional Configuration)
A notional top view of the LPD-17 multipurpose amphibious ship. JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA ALPHER
Another issue is active defensive measures. While the armament package of the LPD-17 class is still under study, likely weapons systems have been identified. Up forward, room is allocated for a sixteen-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS), like those on Spruance-class (DD-963) destroyers, Ticonderoga-class (CG-47) cruisers, and Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyers. While this would theoretically allow the LPD-17s to fire RIM-66 Standard SAMs and BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, the primary weapons system being considered for the VLS launcher is the new Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). Packaged into four-round launch canisters (for a total of forty-eight ESSM missiles), these will provide the LPD-17 with better anti-air and anti-missile defense than the existing RIM-7 Sea Sparrow. The LPD-17 will probably carry a pair of Ex-31 RAM launchers (each with twenty-one ready missiles) as well as a pair of 20mm CIWS for last-ditch defense against incoming "leaker" missiles and aircraft. Finall
y, there will probably be a pair of Mk 38 25mm Bushmaster cannon mounts, and mounts for four M2 .50 caliber machine guns to deal with small craft and swimmers (such as enemy frogmen). The LPD-17s will be the most heavily armed amphibious ships built since World War II. Backing up all this firepower will be a new "Cooperative Engagement Capability" (CEC). When the CEC system is retrofitted to all the ships in the fleet (aircraft carriers, escorts, amphibs, support ships, etc.), it will automatically coordinate the employment of every AAW weapon in a group of ships, right down to the level of point -defense systems like Sea Sparrow and RAM. Backing up the "shooting" defensive systems will be an AN/SLQ-32 (V3) electronic warfare system tied to six Mk 137 SRBOC decoy launchers and an active radar jammer. The LPD-17 will also carry four AN/SLQ-49 "Rubber Duck" decoy launchers, which release an inflatable radar decoy which mimics a ship's radar cross section. With an appropriate escort (such as a DDG-51), the LPD-17 will be very hard to hit and kill.
Program officials at NAVSEA like to call it the "253 ship," because its displacement is around 25,000 tons, and its cargo2 and cargo3 both run around 25,000 ft. The crew and embarked Marines will total around 1,200. The ship will hold a sizable fraction of the ARG's total vehicles, equipment, and supplies. Key features will include:* 1,190 permanent berthing spaces.