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Stilwell returned to Chungking on October 15 to find himself a target. Within hours of his arrival he was stunned by an explicit demand for his recall from the Generalissimo himself on the ground that he had “lost the confidence of the troops.” It was voiced through T. V. Soong acting as the Generalissimo’s interpreter in an interview with General Somervell who had just arrived. Soong had already told Somervell that Roosevelt had agreed to the recall and he had told Mountbatten on his way through Delhi that Stilwell’s relations with the Chinese troops were very bad and that his appointment as Deputy SAC would have “disastrous irrevocable repercussions.” The affair of Sun Li-jen, with whom Soong had been in correspondence, provided a basis. Somervell broke the news of the Generalissimo’s demand to Stilwell to whom it seemed definitive: “Here go 20 months of struggle.”
He knew the real reason for Chiang’s antagonism was annoyance at being pushed into action and goaded to reform. In one of his earlier summaries of frustration he had written, “I have told him the truth. I have brought all deficiencies to his notice. I have warned him about the condition of his army. I have demonstrated to him how these things can be corrected. All of this he ignores and shuts his eyes to the deplorable condition of his army which is a terrible indictment of him, his War Ministry and his General Staff.” This was exactly Stilwell’s crime. His constant reminders of the regime’s deficiencies caused Chiang to lose face, especially as they concerned his own sphere of military affairs. Stilwell’s presence itself had become the “terrible indictment.”
The sisters at once moved to the counteroffensive. Frenzied conferences ensued. Ho Ying-chin, pursuing his own interests, appeared in the astonishing role of Stilwell’s advocate. The reason for this was that Ho’s rival, Ch’en Ch’eng, who represented the forward group among the military, figured as an ally in T.V.’s plans. Since Ch’en Ch’eng was also Stilwell’s favorite and had always been his candidate to replace Ho, this aspect of T.V.’s scheme becomes something of a Chinese puzzle.
On the day of the crisis, Mountbatten arrived in Chungking to discover that his Deputy, the man most versed—however unhappily—in relations with China, was about to be snatched from under him. New to the theater and in need of collaborators, he was alarmed for his own sake and went at once to tell Stilwell, “If you want your job back, I’ll get it for you.” Stilwell had no doubts as to the reason. “He is burned up because he’ll have to work with a new man. Wants me to wait over and break him in.” Convinced himself that he was through, he doubted that Mountbatten could bring about a reversal and drew back from the doorway on his arrival saying, “You should not be seen shaking hands with me; it will be bad for you.” But Mountbatten was confident and sure-footed. Before going to meet the Generalissimo he sent word through Somervell that he could not proceed with plans for using the Chinese forces if the man who had commanded them for nearly two years was to be removed. However little Chiang wished to share in the campaign, to have his forces formally rejected would be an unacceptable loss of face.
He was now open to pressure. Somervell exerted all his tact and persuasions and May and Ella their various and evidently vigorous arguments. By evening they were able to tell Stilwell that the act could be undone if he would go to see Chiang and say that he had only one aim, the good of China, that if he had made mistakes they were from misunderstanding not intent, and that he was ready to cooperate fully. They argued persuasively that if this could be put over, his position would be much stronger than before; his “star was rising.” To avoid dismissal, Stilwell with rage in his heart swallowed the necessity. He “put on the act” and found the Generalissimo—trapped by the internal power struggle complicated by the intervention of Mountbatten—“doing his best to be conciliatory.” Reconciliation was effected and the crisis settled within 24 hours of its eruption. Visibly, if not in the recesses of the Generalissimo’s spirit, Stilwell’s position was reinforced, and the episode had undoubtedly ended, as he wrote, in a “terrific loss of face for Peanut.”
That Chiang should have let himself be caught in a situation that required him to back down after officially making the request to Somervell was the strangest aspect of the whole strange affair. He had clearly been persuaded by T.V., who had failed to count on Mountbatten’s reaction or on the strength of the influences his sisters were able to mobilize. In penalty Soong was ordered in effect to sweep the tombs of his ancestors and disappeared from the scenes of power for nearly a year. For Stilwell it had been a “nasty damn experience” that left him with “a dark brown taste” in his mouth and a “dark brown outlook” in his mind. He had no generosity left for the Generalissimo (he did not know until later of the role played by T.V.) and the simile that occurred to him was of a rattlesnake that had struck without rattling.
Mountbatten could now proceed to open official relations which he did by presenting Madame with a Cartier vanity case set with her initials in diamonds and by introducing himself to Chiang Kai-shek as a young and relatively inexperienced officer for such a high command who was ready to “lean on his vast experience for help and advice.” This line, he reported to Roosevelt, “went down very well with him,” and he had separately taken a similar approach to Madame with equal success. They had presented him in turn with the most charming carved Chinese jade seals for himself and his wife, enabling him to depart feeling he had made two real friends and “they were good enough to express the same views to me.” Now the “only difficulty” that remained was the line of communications and the airlift to China, and “if we can only get our logistics to come out right,” the future could be looked to with confidence. Roosevelt replied that he was “really thrilled over the fact that for the first time in two years I have confidence in the personality problems in the China and Burma fields—and you personally are largely responsible for this.”
A little tact, a Cartier compact, a gracious personality—harmony in Chungking at last.
* * *
*1 In his Third Biennial Report Marshall described it as “one of the most difficult of the war…at the end of the thinnest supply line of all.”
16
China’s Hour at Cairo November–December 1943
FOR A WHILE the harmony seemed real. The Generalissimo became astonishingly amiable and in conferences on the campaign was willing and cooperative. Somervell returned to Washington with an encouraging report and Mountbatten returned to India very satisfied; fooled, Stilwell thought, by Chinese politeness: “He thinks they will do everything.” Assent to his own demands by Chinese War Ministry officials was now ungrudging and even respectful. May and Ella promised to push through all his proposals and opened the exhilarating possibility of replacing Ho Ying-chin by Shang Chen. “May calls me Uncle Joe now”—the name by which he was generally known in the theater. (“Vinegar Joe” was used chiefly by the press.) The sisters wished him to speak for China at the coming inter-Allied conference at Cairo, the first at which China was to be present as a full partner. They wanted him “to put China right with the powers.”
This was the clue. The Chinese saw Cairo as their major opportunity for status as well as more tangible acquisitions; Stilwell was needed to underwrite their requirements by a convincing presentation of China’s military role in the defeat of Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to be “very friendly,” according to Ella, and so he proved when Stilwell went to confer with him on November 6. The meeting was “Reconciliation Day! Love Feast Day!” and “the rattlesnake was affable as hell.” He began by promising the long-sought 50,000 troops for fillers (if Stilwell supplied the gasoline to move them) and agreeing to feed them and even to supply extra rations. Was there anything else Stilwell wanted? No? “Well, then, I officially request you to make the report for China at Cairo.” Ella reported afterwards that Chiang was in a “jubilant” mood and “not only pleased but happy” over the talk with Stilwell which he considered to be “the most satisfactory we had ever had.”
Formal recognition of China as a g
reat power at the Foreign Ministers’ conference at Moscow in the last week of October was behind all the good cheer. At American insistence, against the stiff opposition of the Soviets, China had been included as a signatory of a Four-Power Declaration pledging united action after the war to establish “a general international organization…for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Chiang Kai-shek was thus at last the acknowledged equal of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, and his status was about to be made visible by his presence at Cairo. His affability extended to Stilwell because he needed him to carry the burden of military plans and logistics before the Combined Chiefs—a task for which the Chinese staff was not adequate.
A special Presidential envoy in the person of Major General Patrick J. Hurley, who was to play a role in Stilwell’s future, arrived in Chungking on November 7. His task was to complete the protocol—under negotiation ever since June—for Chiang’s meeting with the other heads of state. Since the Soviet Union was not a cobelligerent against Japan, there could be no four-power meeting. The hoped-for entry of the Soviets was a crucial if muffled problem, and it was a part of Hurley’s mission to ascertain China’s attitude toward that event. Chiang expressed willingness to cooperate with Russia but stipulated for dignity’s sake that Roosevelt must meet with him before meeting with Stalin. It was so arranged: after conferring with Chiang at Cairo, Roosevelt and Churchill would move on to meet with Stalin just outside his own borders at Tehran.
Hurley was a breezy Oklahoman who had risen from log-cabin origins via the law, overseas service in World War I and impressive talents as a wire-puller, to become Hoover’s Secretary of War. A tall, handsome man of flashy appearance with a pointed gray mustache and an important air, he inspired Colonel Barrett’s memorable if irreverent greeting in Chungking, “General, I see you have every campaign ribbon but Shay’s Rebellion.” The reasons for Roosevelt’s choice of Hurley as a diplomatic legman were probably mixed. A President usually has more than one object to accomplish with every appointment and, with next year’s election in mind, Hurley as a “tame Republican” might be useful. To Stilwell he appeared as “a breath of fresh air, a real American.” Coming from Delhi, Hurley told Stilwell that Mountbatten wanted to get rid of him because he, Mountbatten, was playing the Empire game and did not want risks but only “something that could be labelled a victory.” Hurley was full of praise for Stilwell’s efforts, told him he was regarded in the United States as the “Savior of China,” laid it on thick and “says he is in my corner.” Stilwell admitted enjoying his company because “the scarcity and unexpectedness of such an attitude is overwhelming.”
He was especially irritated at this time by the President who, he felt, gave away every opportunity to drive a bargain with Chiang Kai-shek for Chinese military performance. “FDR has undercut me again” he wrote when the President informed Chiang of the project to base long-range B-29 bombers in China, “so I can’t bargain on that.” He allowed himself on November 9 the term “Rubberlegs” in referring to the President, a horrid mockery of Roosevelt’s infirmity that appeared only once or twice again in the diary.
Elements of the 38th Division had by now advanced ahead of the Ledo Road to Shingbwiyang on the edge of the Hukawng valley. Without formal authorization, or certainty of support, or declared commitment to the offensive by the Combined Chiefs, Stilwell had launched a none-too-eager vanguard on the return to Burma. He conceived of it as a jerk to the sleeves of his allies that could not be ignored. Once committed to Burma, the Ledo force would draw in support after them and shame the British and Chungking into joining the campaign. The immediate objective was to occupy land for an airstrip. Thereafter, supplied by airdrop plus pack train and porters, the advance would cover the forward movement of the Road until it reached the Tarung River, takeoff line for the main thrust which was expected to begin about December 1. The overall plan called for a three-phase advance through the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys to Myitkyina, to be coordinated with a still uncertain British offensive farther south from Imphal across the Chindwin to Indaw. The opening move into the Hukawng was based on an erroneous estimate of NCAC Intelligence that no enemy would be encountered in the first phase except some scattered Burman conscripts. In fact Japanese jungle fighters, veterans of Singapore, had established bridgeheads across the Tarung in preparation for their own offensive into India.
In Chungking the Generalissimo’s promise of 50,000 replacements shrank the day afterwards, in the course of a conference between Stilwell and Ho Ying-chin, to 25,000 trained men and the rest recruits. “While we were talking the 25,000 became 20,000 and then, when pushed to state what units they were and when available, the 20,000 became 18 battalions which at full strength will be 14,000.” Ch’en Ch’eng, the “Man of Genius” as Stilwell sometimes called him, on whom he had placed such hopes, had now joined T. V. Soong in eclipse and was definitely retired from command of the Y-force. He had been replaced by Wei Li-huang, Commander of the First War Zone and known as “Hundred Victories Wei.” In Stilwell’s records as Military Attaché he had rated Wei as the ablest of the war zone commanders, known for a driving personality, but now he was doubtful. To cross the Salween into Burma, “the Y-force needs a pusher and I doubt if this is it.”
On the eve of his departure for Cairo the prognosis for an effective 30 divisions as reported by Dorn was bleak. The trouble was everywhere, in the elusive and pervasive absence of responsible agencies to deal with. Dorn recognized that the army could be made no better than its Government when he wrote in desperate jest, “The obvious remedy is to clear out the entire Chinese Government and start afresh.” Otherwise, assuming continued intention to utilize the Y-force, the only alternative was to insist on absolute American control of all training, command and distribution without reference to Chungking “except for their information only.” This was much the same conclusion Stilwell had reached in his plan to have himself appointed “Field Chief of Staff” with absolute authority. Dorn had worked out his proposal in concert with “serious-thinking” Chinese officers who were very worried about the trend of events and did not think effective reorganization could be accomplished without a “decided change” at the top. Beyond Chungking, they said, the Generalissimo’s control was shaky; Yunnan was virtually independent, Kweichow had been seething in rebellion for the past six months and a threatened outbreak in Szechwan had been settled after a three-day battle between provincial and Central Government troops only by the Government’s promise to remit taxes. In their view the Central Government “will be overthrown within six months after the war has been completed.”
On November 13 the ruler over this thin ice accepted the proposals Stilwell had drawn up for China to present at Cairo. They were divided into two parts, stating what the Generalissimo was prepared to do and what he expected his allies to do. In the first half he was committed to a program for bringing 90 divisions, in three groups of 30 each, to effective combat strength. The first group was to be ready for the field by January 1, the second group, reequipped after opening of the Road from India, by August 1944, and the third group by January 1945. Stilwell’s paper further committed China “to participate according to the agreed plan in the recapture of Burma” with combined attacks from Ledo and Yunnan. Following the opening of Burma, “an operation will be conducted to seize the Canton–Hong Kong area and open communication by sea.” The Generalissimo’s expectations were listed as an “all-out” Allied effort early in 1944 to reopen communications to China through Burma, using land, air and naval forces; American equipment of the 90 divisions; maintenance of the Fourteenth Air Force, the Chinese Air Force and the ATC at 10,000 tons a month; future operation of China-based long-range bombers; and finally Stilwell’s dream, a U.S. force of ten Infantry and three Armored divisions to be landed after the reopening of Canton for operations against central and north China, with American command of the Chinese-American forces engaged in this operation.
The program was a statement of the maximum. How ser
iously Stilwell believed in it, despite all he had learned of the physical, political and philosophical limitations of Chinese military performance, is impossible to say. Certainly he saw himself as the commander-designate of the Chinese-American ground force. Though deeply distrustful of Chiang’s intentions, he believed himself now in a strengthened position from which the goal seemed not impossible. He recorded the Generalissimo’s specific acceptance of a future American commander with his ever-confident “VICTORY!”
Relations with Peanut were “cozy as can be,” as each departed for Cairo.
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The site of the Conference was the handsome Mena House hotel on the edge of the desert in view of the pyramids. The gathering was the largest yet with “all the British and American officers of whom one had ever heard,” according to one awed participant,*1 plus the President and Prime Minister, attended by Hopkins and Anthony Eden and various ambassadors and civilian advisers. Stilwell recorded “a scramble for bathrooms.” The strategic purpose with regard to the war in Asia was to decide what degree of investment to make in China, in combination with the Pacific, as the approach to Japan. The apparent reconciliation of Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell revived the American concept of using Chinese troops, properly trained and led, once supplies could be got to them. Chiang’s burst of cooperativeness appeared to Marshall and his staff as evidence of willingness at last to join in action against the Japanese.