THE HOLLOW PEACE
I
The negotiations for peace, begun in the previous year; had beeninterrupted by the brilliant successes of Brasidas, and the factiousopposition of Cleon, and after their death the main obstacle to apacific understanding was removed. The high hopes conceived by theAthenians after the capture of the Spartans at Pylos had been damped bytheir disastrous defeat at Delium, and by the revolt of their allies inThrace; and, above all, they were anxious to recover Amphipolis. Stillmore depressed was the temper of the Spartans. They had entered on thewar in a spirit of sanguine confidence, expecting to make an end of theconflict by a single invasion of Attica; and now, after ten years offighting, their great rival remained almost untouched in the chiefsources of her power. Their coasts were exposed to continual ravage bythe Athenian fleets, and Pylos was still occupied by their bitterenemies, the Messenians, attracting all the discontented elements inSparta, and keeping the Helots in a continual ferment. And finally ahundred and twenty of their noblest citizens were immured in thedungeons of Athens, and they were ready to make great sacrifices toprocure their release.
Accordingly, in the winter after the battle of Amphipolis, negotiationswere resumed, and early in the following spring a treaty of peace wasconcluded between Athens and Sparta, on the understanding that allplaces taken by force of arms should be restored, and all prisoners setat liberty. Such was the Peace of Nicias, named after its chiefpromoter, the former rival of Cleon, and now the leading politician atAthens. It was really a private agreement between Athens and Sparta,for the most important of the Spartan allies, who thought that theirinterests were neglected, refused to sign the treaty. Alarmed by this,the Spartans immediately concluded a second treaty with Athens, bindingboth sides to mutual aid and defence, in case their territories wereattacked. The prisoners taken at Sphacteria were now restored, butowing to the bungling of Nicias, the Athenians failed to regainAmphipolis.
II
Six years elapsed after the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias, beforewar was again openly declared; but it was a peace only in name, and wasbroken by many acts of hostility on both sides. During this period theprincipal states of Greece were involved in a network of politicalintrigue, treaty following treaty, and alliance succeeding to alliance,for the most part with no result. To this statement, there is, however,one important exception. A year after the signing of the second treatybetween Athens and Sparta, a coalition was formed, including Athens,Elis, and Mantinea, under the leadership of Argos; and in mentioningthis event we have to usher on to the stage one of the mostextraordinary characters in history. This was Alcibiades, a youngAthenian noble, endowed with every advantage of mind, person, andfortune, whose fatal gifts, and lawless ambition, made him the evilgenius of his country. His high birth, his wealth, his wit, and hiswonderful beauty, attracted to him a host of flatterers, who fed hisvanity with soft adulation, and led him to believe that nothing was toogreat for such powers as his. Like most of the brilliant young men ofhis day, he attached himself for a time to the philosopher Socrates,for whom he seems to have felt a warm admiration. But his connexionwith that great teacher and thinker, though it served to sharpen hisunderstanding, could not eradicate the effects of evil habit andexample. His wilful, selfish, and despotic temper soon broke loose fromthat salutary restraint, and henceforth we find him pursuing a courseof action which brought ruin on his people, and on himself a traitor'sdeath and a dishonoured name.
Much irritation had been caused among the Athenians by the shifting andtreacherous conduct of the Spartans, who had failed to redeem theirsworn pledges, and had excited great suspicion at Athens by repeatedintrigues with Argos, and with their own offended allies of thePeloponnesian League. Alcibiades had a private grudge against theSpartans, to whom he had made overtures of friendship and service atthe time when the treaty was under discussion, only to be set aside asa profligate and frivolous youth, unfit to meddle with serious mattersof state. He now placed himself at the head of the party hostile toSparta, and it was not long before he had an opportunity of revengingthe insult to his pride. He used all his influence to promote analliance with Argos, the ancient enemy and rival of Sparta inPeloponnesus; and when envoys arrived from Sparta to remonstrateagainst this proceeding, and reassure the Athenians as to theirintentions, he contrived by a masterpiece of low cunning to cover themwith shame and contempt. When the envoys were introduced to the senatethey declared that they had come with full powers to settle alldifferences, and Alcibiades feared that if they made the same statementto the general assembly of the citizens, they might induce theAthenians to renounce their alliance with Argos. So, after the senatehad risen, he took the envoys aside, and with an air of great candourand friendliness warned them that they must conceal the extent of theirpowers when they appeared before the popular assembly. "You do notunderstand," he said, "how to deal with the mob of Athens; if you showyour hand, they will force you into extravagant concessions. Leave thematter to me, and everything will turn out as you wish."
The simple Spartans fell into the snare. They were not at all startledby the proposal that they should eat their own words, for in dishonestythey were not behind Alcibiades himself, though they were no match forhim in cunning. Being brought before the people, and asked whether theyhad come with full powers, they answered bluntly "No!" Great was theamazement at this flat contradiction of the avowal which they had madebefore the senate, and Alcibiades, giving voice to the generalindignation, overwhelmed the astonished envoys with a torrent ofinvective and abuse. The Spartans were dumb-foundered by his perfidy,and looked helplessly at Nicias, the staunch friend and supporter ofSparta, whom they had forsaken for this shameless young reprobate.Nicias, who of course knew nothing of the trick, was utterly confoundedby the double-dealing of the envoys, and could do nothing to relievetheir embarrassment. The result was that the envoys were abruptlydismissed, and after a fruitless mission of Nicias to Sparta, whichonly served to lower his own reputation, the Athenians entered heartand soul into the Argive alliance.
III
We have seen how much the credit of Sparta had been injured in the eyesof Greece by the capture of her chosen warriors at Pylos, and by hersubsequent behaviour during the negotiations which led to the peace ofNicias. Spartan valour was seen to be not above reproach, and thePeloponnesian allies had still better reason to complain of thehollowness of Spartan faith. The high reverence which had long beenattached to the name of Sparta had given place to something likecontempt, and the Eleans, who had an old grudge against her, tookadvantage of this feeling to exclude her citizens from taking publicpart in the Olympic festival, which was celebrated with great pomp andsplendour in the second year of the peace. And the degradation of theproud Dorian city seemed to be complete, when a Spartan named Lichas,who had entered for the chariot-race under another name, was drivenwith blows from the racecourse. So deep was the abasement to which thegreat name of Sparta had now sunk.
The Spartans saw that a vigorous effort must be made, if they wouldrecover their lost ascendancy; and two years later the opportunityoccurred for which they were waiting. On the northern side of theArgolic peninsula lies the ancient city of Epidaurus, famous for itsrich vineyards, and its great temple of Asclepius, [Footnote:Aesculapius.] the god of healing. For some time past, the Epidaurians,who were in alliance with Sparta, had been involved in a dispute,arising out of some obscure question of ritual, with Argos; and theywere now in sore straits, being hard pressed by the whole weight of theArgive power, backed by the new confederacy. This was the pretextneeded by the Spartans, and mustering their whole forces they marched,under the command of their king Agis, against Argos.
The Argives had received notice of the advance of Agis, and theyimmediately marched out to meet him, wishing to engage the Spartansbefore they had united with their allies from Corinth, Boeotia, andelsewhere, who were assembling in great force at Phlius. The two armiesconfronted each other for a moment at Methydrium, in Arcadia; but Agissucceeded in avoiding an engagement, and b
reaking up his camp undercover of darkness pushed on to Phlius. Thereupon the Argives, who wereaccompanied by their allies from Mantinea and Elis, returned in hasteto Argos, and then, marching northwards, took up their position atNemea, which commanded the ordinary route from Phlius to the Argiveterritory. But they were again outmanoeuvred by the skilfuldispositions of Agis. Avoiding the road by Nemea, which led through anarrow and dangerous pass, he led his Spartans over the mountains anddescended into the plain which surrounds the city of Argos. Onecontingent of his allies had orders to proceed in the same direction byanother mountain-path, while the Boeotians, who numbered no less thanten thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry, were directed to takethe high road by Nemea; for Agis expected that by threatening thecultivated lands around Argos he would draw the Argives from theirposition, and bring them down in haste to the defence of their estates.
The plan was completely successful. As soon as the Argives learnt thatAgis was ravaging their fields they set out with all speed towardsArgos, and finding Agis engaged in the work of pillage, they drew uptheir forces, and offered battle. Their situation was in the highestdegree perilous. In front of them, cutting them off from the city ofArgos, was the flower of the Spartan army, reinforced by the troops ofTegea and Arcadia; on their right flank the mountain slopes swarmedwith the infantry of Corinth and Phlius; and in the rear their retreatwas cut off by the thronging masses of Boeotians, who were now pouringalong the road from Nemea. They were fairly cut off, and seemeddelivered over to destruction; nevertheless, such was the presumptuousconfidence which possessed them, that they awaited eagerly the signalfor battle, crying out that they had caught the Spartans in a trap.
Fortunately for them there were two men among their leaders who took awiser view of the position; one of these was Alciphron, an official whorepresented the interests of Sparta at Argos, [Footnote: The Greek wordis _Proxenos_,--a sort of consul.] and the other was Thrasyllus, one ofthe five generals. These two men entered into a parley with Agis, andby promising to satisfy the demands of Sparta induced him to grant atruce. Agis then drew off his forces, and returned by way of Nemea toSparta; and the allies, much against their will, were compelled tofollow his example. Loud were the murmurs among the confederates, andeven among the Spartan soldiers, against Agis, who had thrown away thisgolden opportunity of humbling the pride of Argos, and broughtdishonour on one of the finest armies that had ever been led into thefield by a Grecian general. Strange to say, the Argives were not lessindignant against the two men who had saved them from overwhelmingdisaster; and Thrasyllus, the general, narrowly escaped being stoned todeath.
IV
The Argives thought themselves bound to abide by the conditions of thetruce, though made without their consent; but shortly after the retreatof Agis, an Athenian force of a thousand hoplites and three hundredcavalry arrived at Argos, and Alcibiades, who was present in thecharacter of ambassador, strongly urged the renewal of the campaign.His proposal was warmly supported by the Mantineans and Eleans, andthey and the Athenians marched forthwith against Orchomenus in Arcadia,which was in alliance with Sparta; and the Argives, who had wavered atfirst, soon afterwards joined them. Orchomenus was gained over withlittle trouble, and then the Eleans were eager to proceed againstLepreum, a town in their alliance which had gone over to Sparta. Butthe Argives, Athenians, and Mantineans, insisted on attacking Tegea,where there was a party opposed to Sparta, by whose means they hoped tobring this powerful city, the ancient rival of Mantinea, to their side.Thereupon the Eleans abandoned the expedition, and went home in a rage,but the rest of the allies took up their quarters at Mantinea, andprepared to make an attack on Tegea.
The Spartans were in high anger against Agis for his unsoldier-likeconduct in the recent campaign, and when they heard of the capitulationof Orchomenus their resentment rose to such a pitch that it wasproposed to inflict on him a heavy fine, and raze his house to theground. At his earnest entreaty they consented to reserve the sentence,and give him an opportunity of wiping out the stain on his honour; butas a mark of diminished confidence they appointed ten commissioners,without whose consent he was not allowed to lead an army out of thecity.
They had just come to this decision when an urgent message arrived fromTegea, bidding them to bring help with all speed, or the town would belost. The imminent peril startled the Spartans from their wontedapathy, and they set out at once in full force to the relief of Tegea.On reaching the borders of Arcadia they sent back the elder and youngermen, amounting to a sixth part of the army, to serve as a garrison inSparta; and at the same time couriers were despatched to summon theirallies in Arcadia and central Greece. The Arcadians arrived in time totake part in the battle, but the Boeotians, Corinthians, and others,though they hastened to obey the order, were delayed by a long anddifficult march, through the hostile territory of Argos.
Passing by Tegea, Agis entered the district of Mantinea, and havingpitched his camp began to lay waste the country. Informed of hisapproach, the Argives and their allies marched out to meet him, andchoosing a position on the slope of a hill, defended in front by ruggedand broken ground, they drew up in order of battle. The Spartans,incited, doubtless, by the example of their king, who was eager toredeem his reputation, rushed impetuously to the assault; and they werealready within a stone's-throw of the enemy when a Spartan veterancried out to Agis: "Heal not ill with ill!" His meaning was that inArgos Agis had been too cold, and now he was too hot. Agis heard thewarning voice, and his own good sense must have shown him how rashly hewas acting; accordingly, at the very moment of encounter, he gave theword to retreat, and fell back to the neighbourhood of Tegea. At thisplace there was a copious head of water, which, when properlyregulated, served to irrigate the fields of Tegea and Mantinea. Thedisposal of the water-supply was a constant source of dispute betweenthe two rival cities; and Agis now prepared to turn the whole volume ofthe fountain towards Mantinea, expecting that the Mantineans, when theysaw their fields threatened with inundation, would come down into theplain to hinder the mischief.
The Argives and their allies were dumb-foundered by the suddendisappearance of the Spartans; and when they had recovered from theirastonishment, they waited impatiently for the order to pursue therunaways. As no such order was given, cries of "Treason!" arose in theranks, and the generals were openly accused of having sold themselvesto the enemy. The Spartans, it was asserted, had been allowed toescape, when they were fairly caught under the walls of Argos; and nowthe confederates had been betrayed a second time by their officers.Amid the general clamour the Argive commanders stood for a momentconfounded and amazed; then recovering themselves they gave the word toadvance, and led their forces down into the plain. Here they passed thenight in the open field, and early next morning they stood to theirarms, and prepared for an immediate attack.
Agis was not aware that the Argive generals had taken up a newposition, and thinking that the confederates were still stationed onthe hill, he gave up his scheme of diverting the water, and directedhis march towards the place where he had first encamped. As theyproceeded thus in marching order, and quite unprepared for any hostilemovement, the Spartans suddenly found themselves face to face with thewhole Argive army, drawn up in order of battle. For one instant itseemed as if a panic were about to spread through the Spartan ranks;then their wonderful discipline prevailed, and with all promptitude,but without flurry or confusion, the necessary orders were passed fromthe King to the commanders of divisions, from these again to thecolonels, from the colonels to the captains, and from the captains downto the sergeants, [Footnote: I have thought it best to give the Englishtitles, which of course have only a general correspondence with theGreek Polemarch, Lochagus, etc.] who in their turn had to see that therequired movement was executed by the men under their command: for suchwas the regular gradation of authority and responsibility in theSpartan army. Thanks to this perfect organization, in a very fewminutes every man was in his place and ready for battle.
On the left wing of the Spartan army we
re posted the Sciritae, hardymountaineers from southern Arcadia; next to them stood the enfranchisedHelots, who had served under Brasidas in Thrace, and others of the samerace who had received the Spartan citizenship in reward for publicservice; then came the main body of the Spartans themselves, and afterthem the rest of the Arcadian allies; while the right wing was assignedby immemorial privilege to the Tegeans, with whom were a few pickedSpartans. The cavalry, never a very strong part of the Spartan army,were posted on either flank.
On the other side the Mantineans held the place of honour on the rightwing, because the engagement was fought in their territory; next inorder were the Arcadian allies of Argos, and after them, more towardsthe centre, stood a picked troop of a thousand Argives, trained andequipped at the public expense; then followed the main body of theArgive troops, with the rest of their allies, the Athenians occupyingthe extreme left. As to the numbers engaged, nothing certain is known.
Some time was lost by the Argive army in delivering the customaryharangues addressed by the generals of the several contingents to theirmen, and this enabled the Spartans to steady their ranks before thefighting began. They, on their side, men of war from their youth, hadno need of set speeches to remind them of their duty; but pithy wordsof exhortation passed from man to man, and high and clear rose theirnational war-songs, thrilling them with the memories of their heroicpast. Then the signal was given on both sides to charge, and theArgives and their allies rushed impetuously to the onset, while theSpartans advanced to meet them with even and deliberate pace, timed tothe music of numerous pipers, who were stationed at regular intervalsin their ranks.
The regular equipment of the Greek infantry soldier consisted, besideshis helmet and body-armour, of shield and lance, and in advancing tobattle he had always a tendency to diverge towards the right, from anatural wish to keep his shielded side towards the enemy. Thisdivergence from the forward direction was begun by the man posted onthe extreme right; his comrade on the left followed his example, andthe deflection was continued along the whole line. The consequence wasthat when two armies came into action, the left wing on either side wasgreatly outflanked by the opponents' right; and the battle of Mantineaaffords no exception to this rule, for not even Spartan discipline wasable to counteract the overpowering instinct of self-preservation.Seeing that his left wing was on the point of being outflanked by theMantineans, Agis signalled to the Sciritae and Brasideans to draw offin a lateral direction towards the left, in order to present an equalline to the right wing of the enemy. The order was executed, and tofill up the gap thus produced on the left of his own centre, Agisordered the Spartan officers commanding on his right wing to bring uptheir men and occupy the vacant space. They, however, flatly refused toobey the order, and consequently the Sciritae and Brasideans wereassailed in front and on both flanks by overwhelming numbers, anddriven back with great loss to their camp.
So completely were the Spartans out-manoeuvred and worsted in tactics,through the blunders of their general, and the cowardice of hissubordinates. But in this terrible crisis they showed what nativevalour, aided by life-long discipline, can do. Leaving a victoriousenemy in their rear, they advanced without flinching against theopposing centre, where the main body of the Argives were posted, withthe troops of Orneae and Cleonaea supporting them on the left. Then itwas seen that neither the courage of the Spartans, nor the terror oftheir name, had diminished with the lapse of time; for when theconfederate troops found themselves face to face with the renownedwarrior of the Eurotas, they turned and fled, almost without striking ablow, and trampling their comrades under foot, in their haste to avoidthe thrust of the Spartan lances. The Athenians on the left wing werenow in great danger; for the charge of the troops of Agis had cut themoff from the centre, and they were attacked on the other flank by theTegeans and Spartans. They were saved from immediate destruction by theexertions of their own cavalry, and presently found themselves atliberty to retire from the field; for Agis, having completed the routof the main body, called off his men, and went to the relief of his ownleft. The Mantineans and the Argive Thousand made no effort to retrievethe fortunes of the day, but gave way before the first onset of theSpartans, and joined the flight of their comrades. The Mantineanssuffered severely in their retreat, but of the Argives only a few wereslain.
Such was the battle of Mantinea, which completely restored the militaryfame of the Spartans, and blotted out the reproach of cowardice andsloth which for some years past had rested on their name.
VI
One incident remains to be recorded, before we proceed to the crowningcatastrophe of our great historical drama. The Athenians, it should beobserved, were still nominally at peace with Sparta, and if they hadbeen wise they would have taken the opportunity of this respite fromhostilities to recover Amphipolis, and consolidate their empire inThrace. Instead of this, they looked around for fresh conquests, andfixed their eyes on the little island of Melos, belonging to the Cycladgroup, which had been colonized in very early times from Sparta.
The Melians had not joined the Confederacy of Delos, and they mighttherefore be reproached for sharing the protection of Athens withoutmaking any return. Beyond this the Athenians had no ground of complaintagainst them, for they had taken no part in the Peloponnesian War, buthad remained quietly at home, occupied with their own affairs. ButAthens claimed the haughty title of mistress of the sea, and pretendedto regard the neutrality of one insignificant island as an opendefiance of her power. Ten years before an Athenian fleet had been sentunder Nicias to reduce the refractory Melians to subjection; but theattempt was unsuccessful, and Nicias withdrew, after having ravaged theoutlying districts. Being now more at leisure, the Athenians resolved,in the mere wantonness of power, that Melos should only be suffered toexist as a dependency of Athens, and thirty triremes sailed from theharbour of Peiraeus to carry out the arbitrary decree.
On their arrival at Melos the Athenian admirals sent envoys into thetown, to summon the inhabitants to surrender. The envoys were invitedto a private conference with the chief men of the island; and betweenthe representatives of Athens and the Melian nobles there ensued anextraordinary dialogue, which is given at great length by thehistorian, and is commonly known as the Melian Debate. We cannotsuppose that the arguments here placed by Thucydides in the mouth ofthe Athenian speaker were really uttered as set down by that writer.Such a paradox of iniquity, such a shameless insult to the generalconscience of humanity, might have been employed by Plato, in exposingthe vicious teaching of the Sophists, or by Aristophanes in the fullriot of his satire: but the total abnegation of principle here impliedcould never have been openly avowed by a responsible agent, speakingfor the most polished community in Greece. Even the worst criminalsseek to give some specious colour to their villainy; and the condemnedfelon, who will face death without a tremor, shudders at the cry ofexecration which greets his appearance at the scaffold. So hard it is,even for the most depraved, to stifle the last embers of the moralsense. We cannot suppose, then, that an educated Athenian of the fifthcentury would publicly have claimed for his state the right of rapineand murder. For this is the line of argument pursued by therepresentative of Athens in the Melian Debate. The substance of what hesays may briefly be stated as follows "You are weak--we are strong;Melos is a paltry island, Athens is queen of the Aegaean, and theexistence of an independent city in these waters is an insult to herempire. Let us waste no time in discussions about abstract law andright. For the mighty there is but one law--to get what they can, andto keep it; and the weak have no rights, except by the sufferance ofthe strong. This rule of conduct we know to be universal among men, andwe believe that the gods themselves are governed by it. [1] To sum upthe whole case in one word: you must yield or perish."
[1] Desire of power, on earth a vicious weed, Yet sprung from high, is of celestial seed; In God 'tis glory; and when men aspire, 'Tis but a spark too much of heavenly fire.--DRYDEN.
It was in vain that the unhappy Melians tried to argue the questionfrom
a higher standpoint; in vain they warned the Athenians that theythemselves might one day stand before the bar of justice, and plead fortheir existence. They were brought back relentlessly to the grimalternative-submission, or extermination. At length this strangecontroversy came to an end, and after one final hint, of fearfulsignificance, the Athenian envoys withdrew, leaving the Melians toconsider their answer. The brave islanders were not long in coming totheir decision: they would not, they said, consent to enslave a citywhich had maintained its liberty for seven hundred years; they puttheir trust in divine justice, and in their kinsmen the Spartans, andwere resolved to resist to the last.
On receiving this answer the Athenian commanders at once laid siege toMelos, and the doomed city was soon closely blockaded by sea and land.The Melians made a gallant defence, and twice succeeded in breakingthrough the lines of the besiegers, and conveying supplies into thetown. But presently reinforcements arrived from Athens, and the Melianswere confined within their walls. All hope of succour from Sparta hadvanished, food began to fail, and treason was at work among thegarrison. Thus driven to extremity, the Melians surrendered atdiscretion. Then the Athenians showed that their threats had not beenidly uttered. All the men of military age in Melos were put to death,the women and children were sold into slavery, and the land wasdistributed among Athenian settlers.
In the fifth year of the war, after the capitulation of Mytilene, athousand of the inhabitants had been butchered in cold blood; and thissentence, which seems so cruel to us, was regarded by the Athenians asan act of mercy. Six years later, the decree which had originally beenpassed against Mytilene, was actually executed on Scione, which hadrevolted at the instigation of Brasidas. In this act of savageretribution, Athens still remained within the limits of Greekinternational law, which placed the inhabitants of a revolted city atthe mercy of their conquerors. But the case of Melos was different, forthat island had never been included in the Athenian alliance, and theMelians had done nothing to provoke an attack. Thus the three names,Mytilene, Scione, and Melos, mark an ascending scale of barbarity,culminating in a massacre which, even in the eyes of Greeks, was anatrocious crime. Athens had now offended beyond forgiveness, givingcolour to the accusations of her worst enemies, and heaping upvengeance for the days to come.
THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY
I
The Peloponnesian War may be conveniently divided into four chiefperiods. The first of these periods lasted for ten years, down to thepeace of Nicias. The second extends from the peace of Nicias to themassacre of Melos. In the third, the scene of war was shifted fromGreece to Sicily, and it was there that the Athenian power reallyreceived its death-blow. The fourth and final period begins after theoverthrow of the Athenians at Syracuse, and ends, nine yearsafterwards, with their final defeat at Aegospotami, and the downfall ofthe Athenian empire.
It is the third of these periods which will occupy our attention forthe remainder of the present volume, and as the momentous events whichwe have to relate occurred entirely in Sicily, it is necessary to saysomething of the previous history of that great island. The connexionof the Greeks with Sicily begins in the latter half of the eighthcentury before Christ, when settlers from Chalcis in Euboea founded thecity of Naxos on the north-eastern coast, under the shadow of Aetna.Naxos in its turn sent out colonists, who built the cities of Leontiniand Catana, the former on an inland site, commanding the great plainwhich extends southwards from Aetna, the latter on the coast, in a linewith the centre of the same plain. These were Ionic colonies, and wemay close the list with the name of Messene [Footnote: Originallycalled Zancle.] founded twenty years later on the Sicilian side of thestrait which bears its name.
We have now to enumerate the principal Dorian cities. First among thesein time, and by far the first in importance, was Syracuse, founded fromCorinth a year after the settlement of Naxos. Between Syracuse and themother-city there was a close and intimate tie of friendship, whichremained unbroken throughout the course of Greek history. The originalcity was built on the island of Ortygia, but a new town afterwardsarose on the low-lying coast of the mainland, and spread northwardstill it covered the eastern part of the neighbouring heights. Ortygiawas then converted into a peninsula by the construction of a causeway,connecting the new city with the old. Under the despotism of Gelo, whomade himself master of the city in the early part of the fifth century,[Footnote: 485 B.C.] Syracuse rose to great power and splendour, andher territory extended over a great part of eastern Sicily. Gelo gainedimmortal renown by defeating a mighty host of Carthaginians, whoinvaded Sicily at the time when the confederate cities of old Greecewere fighting for their existence against Xerxes and his great armada.After his death the power passed to his brother Hiero, whose victoriesin the Olympian and Pythian Games are commemorated in the Odes ofPindar. Hiero reigned for twelve years, and was succeeded by hisbrother Thrasybulus; but a year later the despotism was overthrown, andthe government returned to a democracy.
A bare mention must suffice for Gela, founded from Rhodes and Cretenearly half a century after Syracuse, and the more famous Agrigentum, acolony from Gela, and next to Syracuse the greatest city in Sicily.These played no part in the struggle with Athens; but Selinus andCamarina, the two remaining Dorian cities of southern Sicily, willoccupy an important place in the following narrative.
Thus the whole coast districts on southern and eastern Sicily were heldby opulent and flourishing Greek cities. On the north was Himera, anIonic colony, and the scene of Gelo's great victory over Carthage;while the western and north-western district was divided between thePhoenicians and the Elymi, a people of unknown origin, whose chiefseats were at Eryx and Egesta. The inland parts were held, in the west,by the Sicans, who are believed to have come from Spain, and in theeast by the Sicels, a people of Latin race, who gave their name to theisland.
II
Since the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War, Athens had beenmeddling in the affairs of Sicily, under pretence of aiding the Ioniancities, who dreaded the encroaching ambition of Syracuse. That thesefears were not unfounded was proved when, a few years afterwards, theSyracusans expelled the commons of Leontini, and took possession oftheir territory. The Leontine exiles sought refuge at Athens, but theirappeal for help remained for a time unanswered, as the Athenians werethen fully occupied in Greece. But six years after the conclusion ofthe Peace of Nicias, an appeal came to Athens from a remote corner ofSicily, which stimulated the Leontine exiles to fresh efforts, and ledto most important results.
Between the Greeks of Selinus and the Elymians of Egesta there was along-standing quarrel, and in a war which had recently broken out theEgestaeans were reduced to severe straits by the combined forces ofSelinus and Syracuse. In their distress they turned to Athens for help,and envoys were sent to plead their cause before the Athenian assembly.In aiding Egesta, argued the envoys, Athens would be serving her owninterests; for if the Syracusans were not speedily checked in theiraggressions, they would soon make themselves masters of the whole ofSicily, and in that case they could bring such an accession of strengthto the enemies of Athens in Greece as to make them irresistible. Theyhad good reason, therefore, to take sides against the enemies ofEgesta, and the more so as the Egestaeans promised to defray all theexpenses of the war.
The Athenians generally were inclined to take up the quarrel of Egesta,but as a measure of precaution it was decided to send agents of theirown to make an inspection on the spot, and see whether the Egestaeanswere as wealthy as they pretended. On their return to Athens these menreported that Egesta was possessed of fabulous riches. At every housewhere they had been entertained, the tables and the sideboards had beenone blaze of gold and silver plate. The fact was that the Egestaeanshad collected all the gold and silver vessels in the town, and othersborrowed from the neighbouring cities, and by passing them on fromhouse to house, wherever these important guests were invited, hadcontrived to make a great display. As an earnest of all this wealth,the Athenian commissioners brought back with them sixty talents o
fsilver.
The smallness of this sum ought to have been sufficient to arouse thesuspicions of the Athenians; but they were willing to be deceived, andthey gave ready credence to reports of their commissioners. Voting infull assembly, they passed a decree that sixty ships should be sent toSicily, under the command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. Thefleet was first to be employed in helping Egesta, and when that contesthad been brought to a successful issue the Leontines were to berestored to their homes; finally, the generals were empowered to act asmight seem best in the interests of Athens. The real purpose of theenterprise is indicated in the last clause. Vague plans of conquestwere floating before the minds of the Athenians, and at a time whentheir whole energies should have been employed to repair the breachesin their empire, they dreamed of founding a new dominion in the west.
Five days later the assembly met again to vote supplies and discuss anyfurther details which remained to be settled. But Nicias determined totake the opportunity of reopening the whole question, wishing, ifpossible, to divert his countrymen from their purpose, and put an endto the expedition altogether. It was folly, he argued, to take up thecause of needy foreigners, and drain the resources of Athens for adistant and hazardous enterprise, when their subjects in Thrace werestill in open revolt, and their enemies in Greece were on the watch totake them at a disadvantage. If they trusted in the treaty with Sparta,they would soon find how infirm was the ground of their confidence.That treaty had been forced upon the Spartans by their misfortunes, andthey would be only too glad to repudiate it, which they could easilydo, as many of the conditions were still under dispute. Moreover, themost powerful cities of the Peloponnesian League had refused to signthe treaty, and were ready, at the first hint from Sparta, to renew thewar. Athens was beset with perils, which were enough to tax herstrength to the utmost: and yet they talked of sailing to Sicily, andraising up a new host of enemies against her! Even if the expeditionsucceeded, they could never keep their hold on that vast and populousisland, while, if it failed, they would be utterly ruined. As to thesupposed danger from the ambition of Syracuse, that was mere idle talk.The schemes of conquest, with which the Egestaeans had tried to alarmthe Athenians, would keep the Syracusans busy at home, and prevent themfrom meddling in the affairs of Greece. "Leave the Greeks of Sicilyalone," said Nicias with true prophetic insight; "and they will nottrouble you. Do not disturb the prestige which belongs to a distant andunfamiliar power. If they once learn to know you, they may learn todespise you."
Then fixing his eyes on Alcibiades, who was sitting surrounded by hisown partisans, young profligates like himself, Nicias concluded thus:"There is another danger against which I would warn you, men ofAthens--the danger of being led astray by the wild eloquence ofunscrupulous politicians, who seek to dazzle you with visions of newempire, that they may rise to high command, and restore their ownshattered fortunes. Yes, Athens is to pour out her blood and treasure,to provide young spendthrifts with the means of filling theirracing-stables! Against the mad counsels of these desperate men Iinvoke the mature prudence of the elder members of this assembly, andcall upon them to show by a unanimous vote that neither flattery nortaunts can induce them to sacrifice the true interests of Athens."
It must have been a severe ordeal for the young Alcibiades to sit andlisten to this keen and bitter invective, which set in a glaring lightthe worst features in his character--his selfish ambition, hisshameless life, his total want of principle, his vulgar ostentation.The last quality, so alien from the best traditions of Atheniancharacter, had been conspicuously displayed only a few weeks before atthe Olympic festival, where he had entered seven four-horsed cars forthe chariot-race, and won the first, second, and fourth prizes. Everyword of Nicias went home, galling him in his sorest point--hisoutrageous vanity; and hardly had the elder statesman concluded hisspeech, when he sprang to his feet, and burst without preface into awild harangue, which is a remarkable piece of self-revelation,disclosing with perfect candour the inner motives of the man on whom,more than on any other, the future of Athens depended. He began bydefending his barbaric extravagance, recently displayed at Olympia,which, as he pretended to believe, had covered his native city withglory, and spread the fame of Athenian wealth and power from one end ofGreece to another. The lavish outlay, and haughty demeanour, whichwould be justly blamed in a common man, were right and proper in him,one of the elect spirits of the time, inspired with great aims, andtreading the summits of public life. He had already shown what he coulddo in the highest regions of diplomacy, by raising a great coalition inPeloponnesus, which had faced the whole might of Sparta in the field,and struck terror into the enemies of Athens.
After this impudent defence of his own pernicious policy, which had ledto the crushing defeat at Mantinea, and thus enabled the Spartans torestore their damaged reputation, Alcibiades proceeded to deal with thequestion of the day, and exerted all his sophistry to confirm theAthenians in their design of invading Sicily. That island, he asserted,was inhabited by a mixed population with no settled homes, and nocommon patriotic sentiment; and among these motley elements they wouldfind plenty of adherents. The Siceliots [Footnote: Greeks of Sicily.]were poorly armed, ill-furnished with heavy infantry, and in constantdanger from the hostile Sicels. The risk of attack from thePeloponnesians would not be increased by sending part of the Athenianfleet to Sicily: for Attica was in any case always exposed to invasion,and a sufficient force of ships would be left at home to keep commandof the sea.
"We have no excuse, then," said Alcibiades in conclusion, "for breakingour word to the Egestaeans, and drawing back from this enterprise. Bothhonour and policy are pointing the way to Sicily. An empire like oursis an ever-expanding circle, which lives by growing, and cannot standstill. It is only by getting more, and always more, that we can keepwhat we have. And let not Nicias succeed in his attempt to set the oldagainst the young, neither let us believe, like him, that the stabilityof a state consists in stagnation. It is only by a hearty co-operationof all ages and classes that any state can prosper, and a communitywhich finds no outlet for its energies abroad is soon worn out bydiscord and faction at home. Above all is this true of us Athenians, towhom ceaseless toil and endeavour is the very element in which we live."
The advice of Alcibiades, thus tendered in the garb of politicalwisdom, was of fatal and ruinous tendency, and in direct opposition tothe oft-repeated warnings of Pericles. But his speech was exactlysuited to the temper of his audience, and most of those who followedhim spoke to the same effect, and when the Egestaeans and Leontinesrenewed their entreaties it became evident that the original motionwould be confirmed by a large majority. Nicias, however, resolved tomake one more effort, and he came forward to speak again, hoping by anew device to check the torrent of popular enthusiasm. Affecting toregard the matter as settled, he entered into an estimate of the forcerequired for the proposed expedition, prefaced by an alarming pictureof the wealth and power of the Sicilian Greeks. To act with effectagainst such an enemy, they must send, not only an overwhelming navalforce, but a numerous body of troops, both cavalry and infantry, and afleet laden with supplies for many months. They must proceed, in fact,as if they were founding a great city on a hostile soil. On no othercondition, added Nicias, would he undertake the command. Nicias hadintended, by exaggerating the difficulties of the undertaking, to dampthe ardour of the Athenians; but to his utter dismay, these timidcounsels were greeted with a great shout of applause. It was supposedthat he had changed his opinion, and even the elder men began to thinkthat so prudent a leader, backed by such an armament, could not fail ofsuccess. A great wave of excitement swept over the assembly, and thefew who still doubted were cowed into silence. When the tumult hadsubsided, a certain Demostratus, [Footnote: The name is given byPlutarch.] who had spoken strongly in favour of the expedition,addressing Nicias in the name of the assembly, asked him to stateplainly what force he required. Thus driven into a corner, Niciasanswered, with great reluctance, that the number of triremes must benot less than o
ne hundred, with five thousand heavy-armed infantry, andslingers and bow-men in proportion. This enormous estimate was carriedwithout demur, and by the same vote full powers were conferred on thegenerals to fix the scale of the armament as they might think best forthe interests of Athens.
Thus, by a strange freak of fortune, the Athenians, at the mostmomentous crisis of their history, were urged along the road to ruin bythe most opposite qualities in their leaders, the cold caution ofNicias, and the wild energy of Alcibiades.
III
During the whole of the following spring [Footnote: B.C. 415.]preparations for the invasion of Sicily were actively pushed on, andthe whole city was in a bustle and stir of excitement. Athens hadrecently recovered from the ravages of the plague, and six years ofpeace had recruited her resources, both in men and money. Since thefirst outbreak of the war a new generation had grown up, and theseyoung and untried spirits joined, with all the fire of youth, in anenterprise which promised them a boundless field of adventure. Otherswere attracted by the baser motive of gain, or by mere curiosity, andthe love of travel. No thought of danger or hardship, no hint ofpossible failure, clouded the brilliant prospect; it was a gay holidayexcursion, and at the same time a grand scheme of conquest, offeringfame to the ambitious, wealth to the needy, and pleasant recreation toall. Thousands flocked eagerly to enter their names for the service,and the only trouble of the recruiting officers was in choosing thestoutest and the best.
The great armament was on the eve of departure, and all hearts werefull of joyful anticipation, when an event occurred which suddenlychilled this happy mood, and cast a shadow of evil augury on the wholeundertaking. The Athenians of that age, like their descendants nearlyfive centuries later, [Footnote: See Acts xvii. 22.] were "moregod-fearing than other men." They worshipped a multitude of divinities,and their city was thronged with the temples and statues of heroes andgods. Conspicuous among the objects of popular adoration was the godHermes, who is exhibited by ancient poets and artists as a gracious andlovely youth, the special patron of eloquence and wit, the guardianspirit of travellers and merchants, and the giver of good luck. Afamiliar feature in the streets and public places of Athens was thebust of Hermes, surmounting a quadrangular stone pillar. Many hundredsof these pillars, which were called Hermae, were scattered about overthe whole city, standing before the doors of houses and temples, atcross-ways and places of public resort. Wherever he went, whatever hedid, the Athenian felt himself to be in the presence of this genial andfriendly power, who attended him, with more than human sympathy, in allhis ways.
If such were the feelings of the Athenians towards their favouritedeity, what must have been their horror when they awoke one morning tofind that all the busts of Hermes, with one or two exceptions, wereshattered and mutilated beyond all recognition. The whole populationwas thunderstruck, and wild rumours ran from mouth to mouth concerningthe perpetrators and the motive of this shocking outrage. It wasevident that many hands must have been employed on the work ofdestruction, and those who had so foully insulted the most hallowedaffections of their fellow-citizens were believed to be capable of anyenormity. It was loudly asserted that a black conspiracy was hatchingagainst the liberties of the people, and that the worst days of thetyranny were about to be revived. For in those days religion andpolitics were associated with a closeness of intimacy unknown in modernEurope, and sacrilege might well be regarded as a prelude to treason.Active measures were at once taken to bring the offenders to justice,and great rewards were offered to anyone, whether citizen, slave, orresident foreigner, who gave information concerning this or any similarcrime. At first nothing was disclosed as to the mutilation of theHermae, but other recent acts of profanation were brought to light, andamong these was mentioned a derisive parody of the great EleusinianMysteries, alleged to have been performed in the house of Alcibiades,and elsewhere. The enemies of Alcibiades, who were both numerous andpowerful, eagerly seized this handle against him; but when the matterwas debated in the public assembly, it became evident that, if he werebrought to trial at once, his present popularity, as chief promoter ofthe Sicilian expedition, would ensure his acquittal. Seeing, therefore,that their attack had been premature, those who had led the outcryagainst him now drew back, reserving themselves for a more favourableoccasion. Being known as the bitter opponents of Alcibiades, they couldnot, without exciting grave suspicions, propose the adjournment of histrial; but other speakers, prompted by them, urged on grounds of publicexpediency that the charges against him should be held in suspense, soas not to delay the departure of the fleet. Alcibiades saw plainly thatthis manoeuvre was contrived to get him out of the way, to remove hisadherents from Athens, and leave his enemies free to pursue theirmachinations during his absence. But it was in vain that he exposed themalicious motives of the last speakers, and pleaded earnestly for animmediate trial. The Athenians were still possessed by their daringscheme of conquest, and they decreed that Alcibiades should keep hiscommand, and sail at once to Sicily.
IV
At last the great day arrived, and in the first light of a mid-summerdawn, a vast multitude was seen pouring along the broad highway whichled, between the Long Walls, from Athens to Peiraeus. The Upper Citywas almost deserted by its inhabitants, for there was hardly oneAthenian who had not some cherished comrade, or some near relation,enrolled for service in Sicily, and the crowd was swelled by thousandsof strangers, who came as spectators of that memorable scene. Littlenow appeared of that sanguine and joyous temper which had prevailedamong the Athenians when they first voted for the expedition. Theirfeelings had lately been fearfully harrowed by the mutilation of theHermae, and now that the moment of parting was at hand, all the perilsand uncertainties of their grand enterprise rose up vividly beforethem. They were restored, however, to some degree of cheerfulness, whenthey reached the harbour of Peiraeus, and saw the magnificent fleetriding at anchor. Nearly all the vessels lying in the bay wereAthenian; for the main body of the allies, and the commissariat ships,had been ordered to muster at Corcyra. The triremes furnished by Athensnumbered a hundred, of which sixty were fully equipped as war-galleys,while forty were employed as transports. These numbers had beenequalled more than once before during the war; but in efficiency, insplendour of appearance, and in the quality of the crews, this was byfar the finest fleet that ever sailed from Peiraeus. Only the barehulls of the ships were provided by the state, and each vessel wasassigned to some wealthy citizen, who defrayed all the expense offitting her for active service. Sometimes the cost of equipping a shipwas divided between two or more citizens, and at ordinary times thisform of taxation must have been felt by the rich as a heavy burden. Butsuch was the popularity of the Sicilian expedition that the wealthyAthenians who were charged with this duty went far beyond what wasrequired of them, each striving to surpass the others by the superiorbeauty and speed of his own ship. The crews were all composed of pickedmen, attracted by the double rate of pay which was furnished from thestate exchequer; and in addition to this, the trierarchs [Footnote:Citizens charged with the duty of equipping a trireme.] paid specialpremiums to the petty officers and to the highest class of rowers. Thesame spirit of emulation extended to the whole body of Atheniansenrolled in the army and fleet; every man felt that whatever he spenton his own personal equipment was spent for the honour and glory ofAthens. And the effect produced on the public mind in Greece was, infact, prodigious: after all the ravages of the plague, and ten years ofexhausting warfare, Athens, it seemed, was stronger than ever, and inthe mere exuberance of energy was making this imposing display ofwealth and power. As to the ostensible object of the expedition--theconquest of Sicily--few doubted that it must follow as a matter ofcourse.
The last farewell had been spoken, the troops were all embarked, andthe rowers sat ready at their oars. The trumpet sounded, commandingsilence, and the voice of the herald was heard, repeating a solemnprayer, which was taken up by the whole multitude on sea and on shore,while the captains and soldiers poured libations of wine from gobletso
f silver and gold. When this act of worship was ended, the crewsraised the paean, and at a given signal the whole fleet was set inmotion, and passed, in single file, out of the harbour. On reaching theopen water, they quitted this order, and engaged in a friendly contestof speed as far as Aegina. Then the crews settled down to their work,and the great armament swept on, high in heart and hope, to join theallied contingents, and commissariat fleet, now assembled at Corcyra.
As yet only general rumours of the intended invasion had reachedSyracuse, and few of the citizens were aware of the imminent peril inwhich they stood. Among those who were better informed was Hermocrates,a Syracusan of high rank, who for many years had been the guidingspirit in Sicilian politics. Speaking at a public assembly, about thetime when the Athenian fleet sailed from Peiraeus, he urged thenecessity of taking prompt measures for placing the city in a thoroughstate of defence. He had no fear, he said, of the ultimate triumph ofSyracuse in the approaching struggle: only let them be on their guard,and not underrate the power of the enemy whom they would have to face.The words of Hermocrates, who enjoyed a high reputation for valour,patriotism, and sagacity, were not without their effect, and it wasresolved that the generals should at once set about organizing themilitary resources of Syracuse, and providing all things necessary forthe public safety. Some steps in this direction they had already taken;and tidings soon arrived at Syracuse which caused them to redoubletheir exertions.
For in the meantime the Athenians had reached Corcyra, where they helda final review of all their forces. The total number of the triremeswas a hundred and thirty-four, and with these sailed a vast fleet ofmerchant ships, and smaller craft, laden with stores of all kinds, andcarrying a whole army of bakers, masons, and carpenters, with the toolsof their crafts, and all the engines required for a siege. Besidesthese, there was a great number of other vessels, small and great,fitted out by private speculators for purposes of trade. The militaryforce was on a corresponding scale, comprising five thousand, onehundred hoplites, of whom fifteen hundred were full Athenian citizens,four hundred and eighty archers, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes,and a hundred and twenty exiles from Megara, equipped as light-armedtroops. The force of cavalry was but small, being conveyed in a singletransport.
The whole armament now weighed anchor from Corcyra and sailed in threedivisions, each commanded by one of the generals, to the opposite coastof Italy. On arriving at Rhegium, an Ionic city on the Italian side ofthe strait, they received permission to beach their ships, and form acamp outside the walls; and here they waited for the return of threefast-sailing triremes, which had been sent forward from Corcyrato carrythe news of their approach to Egesta, and claim the promised subsidy,and at the same time to sound the temper of the Greek cities in Sicily.Before long the ships came back with their report, and the Atheniansnow learned to their great chagrin that all the fabled wealth of Egestahad dwindled to the paltry sum of thirty talents.
The three generals now held a council of war, to decide on a plan ofcampaign. It was evident that no help was to be obtained from Egesta,and the attitude of the Rhegini, who declined to enter their alliance,boded ill for the success of the expedition. As their prospects were sodiscouraging, Nicias proposed to confine their operations within thenarrowest limits, to patch up a peace between Selinus and Egesta, toaid the Leontines, if it could be done without risk or expense, andafter making a display of the Athenian power, to sail home to Athens.Alcibiades protested strongly against such a course, as disgraceful toAthens, and unworthy of the splendid armament entrusted to theircommand. Let them try first what could be effected by negotiation withthe Greek cities and native tribes of Sicily, and after gaining as manyallies as possible in the island, let them proceed to the attack ofSelinus and Syracuse. Lamachus, on the other hand, a plain, downrightsoldier, was for sailing straight to Syracuse, and striking immediatelyat the heart of Sicily. The city, he argued, would be found unprepared,and if they acted at once, in the first terror of their presence, theywere certain of victory; but if they waited, their men would loseheart, the efficiency of the fleet would be impaired, and theSyracusans would gather strength and courage from the delay.
How true was the forecast of Lamachus was proved by the event; but hisbold plan was distasteful alike to the timid temper of Nicias, and tothe tortuous, intriguing spirit of Alcibiades. Finding, therefore, thathe had no hope of convincing his colleagues, he voted for the middlecourse, and accordingly the plan of Alcibiades, unquestionably theworst of the three, was adopted.
In pursuance of this fatal policy Alcibiades crossed over to Messene,and tried to win over that city to the side of Athens. Meeting with nosuccess, he returned to Rhegium, and immediately afterwards he and oneof his colleagues sailed with a force of sixty triremes to Naxos. Herethe Athenians found a hearty welcome, but at Catana, which was thenunder the influence of Syracuse, their overtures were rejected, so theycontinued their voyage southwards, and made their camp for the night atthe mouth of the river Terias. Starting early next day, they proceededalong the coast, and, crossing the bay of Thapsus, came in sight, forthe first time, of their great enemy, Syracuse. The main body of thefleet remained in the offing, but ten triremes were sent forward toreconnoitre the Great Harbour, and get a nearer view of thefortifications. When the little squadron came within hearing of thewalls, a herald proclaimed in a loud voice that any of the Leontinesnow present in Syracuse should leave the city without fear, and comeover to their faithful kinsmen and allies, the Athenians. After thisfutile demonstration, better calculated; to excite laughter thanterror, the reconnoitring triremes withdrew, and the whole fleet sailedback in the direction of Rhegium. On their return voyage the Athenianssucceeded, by a lucky accident, in gaining the adherence of Catana,which henceforth became the head-quarters of the whole armament. Soonafter they had effected this important change of station the Salaminianstate trireme arrived with momentous news from Athens. We have seenwhat a panic of superstitious fear had been caused among the Atheniansby the mutilation of the Hermae. Arrested for the moment by theall-absorbing interest of the Sicilian expedition, the excitement brokeout with renewed violence after the departure of the fleet. The enemiesof Alcibiades saw that the time was now ripe for bringing up againsthim the charge of violating the mysteries, and pressing for a judgment.A formal indictment was laid before the senate, and it was decided thathe should come home and stand his trial. But it was necessary toproceed with caution, for Alcibiades was popular with the troopsserving in Sicily; and it was possible that, if any violence wereattempted against his person, they might break out into mutiny.Accordingly the captain of the Salaminian trireme was instructed totreat him with all respect, and allow him to return to Athens in hisown vessel. On receiving the summons Alcibiades affected to obey, andset sail from Catana, with the state trireme in attendance. The twoships remained in company as far as Thurii, a Greek town of southernItaly, but there the great criminal disappeared, and after searchingfor him in vain the officers of the Salaminia were obliged to return toAthens without him. When the news of his flight was brought to Athens,he was arraigned in his absence, and condemned to death. But if hisenemies supposed that they had heard the last of Alcibiades, they soonlearnt how deeply they were mistaken.
V
The conduct of the campaign in Sicily was thus left in the feeble handsof Nicias; for though Lamachus nominally held an equal command, hispoverty and political insignificance prevented him from holding theposition to which his military talents entitled him. The few remainingweeks of summer were frittered away in trivial operations on thewestern coasts of the island, and then the Athenians withdrew intowinter quarters at Catana. The predictions of Lamachus now began to befulfilled: seeing that Nicias, with the vast force at his disposal,attempted nothing against them, the Syracusans began to despise theirenemy, and thought of taking the offensive. Horsemen from Syracuse roderepeatedly up to the Athenian outposts at Catana, and tauntinglyinquired if the Athenians had come to found a colony in Sicily. At lasteven Nicias felt that some
display of activity was necessary to savehimself from contempt. He had learnt from certain Syracusan exiles thatthere was a convenient place for landing troops, on the low-lying shorewhere the river Anapus flows into the Great Harbour. Here he determinedto make a sudden descent, and in order to avoid disembarking in theface of an enemy, he contrived a stratagem to remove the wholeSyracusan force out of reach. A citizen of Catana, who was attached tothe Athenian interest, was sent with a message to the Syracusangenerals, which held out a tempting prospect of gaining an easy anddecisive advantage over the Athenian army. Professing to come from thepartisans of Syracuse still remaining in Catana, he promised on theirbehalf that if the Syracusans made a sudden assault on the Atheniancamp, their friends in Catana would simultaneously fall upon theAthenian troops, who were in the habit of deserting their quarters andstraggling about the town, and set fire to their ships.
This plausible story found ready credence with the Syracusan generals,and they named a day on which they promised to appear in full forcebefore the walls of Catana. When the time appointed drew near, theymarched out with the whole Syracusan army, leaving the city to begarrisoned by their allies, and took up a position within easy reach ofCatana. Thereupon Nicias, who was fully informed of their movements,embarked his troops by night, sailed down the coast past Syracuse, andentering the Great Harbour, came to land near the outlying suburb ofPolichne, where stood the great temple of the Olympian Zeus. Here heplanted a breastwork of palisades to defend his ships, and drew up hisarmy on ground which offered many obstacles to the advance of theSyracusan cavalry. Then, having broken down the bridge over the Anapus,he waited for the enemy to appear.
Meanwhile the Syracusan generals had marched upon Catana, and findingthat they had been duped, returned with all speed to the defence oftheir own city. After a long and fatiguing march, they came in view ofthe Athenian position, and drew up their forces for battle. But Niciasdeclined the challenge, and the day being now far advanced, they fellback and encamped for the night in the open field.
Next morning Nicias, acting with unusual vigour, drew up his army intwo equal divisions, and leaving one half to defend the camp, and actas a reserve, with the other he advanced rapidly upon the enemy. TheSyracusans, who had perhaps reckoned too much on the known indolence ofNicias, were taken by surprise. Their discipline was lax, and many ofthem had left their posts, and gone off into the town. Nevertheless,they met the attack with firmness: those who were on the spot hastenedto assume their weapons, which they had laid aside, while thestragglers came running back, and took their stand wherever they saw agap in the ranks. After some preliminary skirmishing between thelight-armed troops, the heavy masses of the hoplites came to closequarters, and a fierce hand to hand struggle ensued. While the issuewas still uncertain, a violent thunderstorm broke over the contendingarmies, and struck terror into the Syracusans, who regarded it as anomen of defeat. But the seasoned soldiers of Nicias saw nothing unusualin an autumn tempest, and perceiving the enemy to waver, they pressedtheir attack, and broke through the opposing lines. The whole Syracusanarmy now fell back upon Syracuse, but they retired without haste ordisorder, and their retreat was covered by a numerous and efficientbody of cavalry, so that their total loss amounted only to two hundredand sixty.
The victory thus remained with the Athenians; but the moral advantagewas entirely on the side of the Syracusans. With an army composed ofraw recruits, they had met the flower of the Athenian forces, trainedby years of warfare, and led by experienced generals, in fair fight,and though attacked at a disadvantage, they had fought with spirit, andretreated with coolness and deliberation. They had good reason to besatisfied with the result of their first encounter with the invader,and they might well share the high and confident hopes expressed bytheir most eminent citizen, Hermocrates. Speaking at a generalassembly, immediately after the battle, the great patriot congratulatedhis countrymen on the courage which they had displayed, and at the sametime pointed out the necessity of improving their discipline andmilitary organization. One important reform should be made at once; thenumber of the generals, which had hitherto been fifteen, should begreatly reduced, and those appointed to the supreme command should begiven absolute power, so that they might act with secrecy and despatch.Further, let the whole adult male population be placed under arms, andkept in constant drill all through the winter. If these measures werevigorously carried out, they might successfully defy the Athenians todo their worst.
Acting on this advice, the Syracusans deposed the existing generals,and chose Hermocrates, with three others, to fill their place. Thereform of the army was at once taken in hand, and ambassadors were sentto Corinth and Sparta to ask for aid. Corinth, as the mother-city ofSyracuse, might well respond to the call, and it was hoped that theSpartans would be induced to declare open war on Athens, so as tocompel the Athenians to withdraw their forces from Sicily, or at leastprevent them from sending reinforcements.
Various defensive works were undertaken by the Syracusans during thewinter. The most important of these was a new wall, extending from thenorthern sea to the Great Harbour, and taking in a wide space ofground, outside the old line of wall, to the west of the city. By thusincreasing the area of Syracuse, they made it much more difficult forNicias to draw his line of blockade, when the siege began in thefollowing spring. They also constructed a fort, with a permanentgarrison, to guard the temple of Zeus in the suburb of Polichne, anddrove piles into the sea at all the landing-places of the Great Harbour.
Soon after the battle Nicias shifted his winter quarters to Naxos, andlearning this the Syracusans marched in full force to Catana, laidwaste the territory, and burnt the deserted huts of the Athenians. Theinsult was tamely endured, and shortly afterwards the ever-activeHermocrates had an opportunity of thwarting the Athenian intriguesamong the Greek cities of Sicily. The scene of this diplomaticencounter was Camarina, a Dorian city which had hitherto waveredbetween its hatred of Syracuse and its fear of Athens. Early in thewinter Athenian envoys appeared at Camarina with overtures of alliance,and Hermocrates was sent to represent the interests of Syracuse.Speaking first in the debate, Hermocrates set himself to unmask thedesigns of the Athenians, who, under the thin pretence of helping theIonic cities of Sicily, had come (he said) to make a conquest of thewhole island. The Ionians of Greece had long groaned under their yoke,and the same fate was in store for the Ionians of Sicily, if theyallowed themselves to be beguiled by specious lies. The plea offriendship and goodwill might pass with the degenerate Greeks of Asiaand the Aegaean, born to be cajoled and enslaved; but the Camariaeanswere of the stout Dorian race, the hereditary foes of tyranny, too wiseand too brave to lend themselves as tools to a bare-faced scheme ofaggression. If not, let them beware: Syracuse was fighting in arighteous cause, and must prevail in the end; help was coming fromPeloponnesus, and if the Camariaeans stood aloof, the day would comewhen they would regret their disloyalty.
There can be no doubt that Hermocrates was right in his view of themotive which brought the Athenians to Sicily, and the arguments ofEuphemus, the advocate for Athens, who strove to confute him, will notbear examination. But the people of Camarina were in a difficultposition; their city had suffered many things in the past at the handsof Syracuse, and they had reason to fear that her oppressions might berenewed, if she emerged triumphant from the present struggle. On theother hand, if the Athenians were victorious, they might forfeit theirindependence altogether. In this dilemma they determined to play awaiting game, and when the time came for action, to throw their weighton the winning side. For the present they answered that they chose toremain neutral.
The debate at Camarina, though interesting and instructive from thelight which it throws on the passions and motives of the combatants,had little influence on the final issue of the war. But about the sametime a scene was being enacted in another part of the Greek world,which led to most momentous consequences. Early in the winter theSyracusan envoys arrived at Corinth, and made an earnest appeal forhelp. The Corinthians were war
mly attached to their famous colony,which had never wavered in its allegiance to the mother-city, andmoreover they were the implacable enemies of Athens. They thereforetook up the cause of Syracuse with enthusiasm, and they sent the envoyson to Sparta, accompanied by delegates of their own, to urge theimmediate resumption of hostilities against Athens, and the sending ofprompt aid to Sicily.
At Sparta they found an able and unscrupulous ally, the very last whomthey had expected to meet there. This was the outlaw Alcibiades, who,after eluding the vigilance of the Athenian officers at Thurii, hadcrossed over in a merchant ship to Cyllene, the port of Elis. Whilestaying there, he received an invitation from the Lacedaemonians toproceed to Sparta, and made his way thither, having first stipulatedfor a safe-conduct; for he dreaded the vengeance of the Spartans, towhom he had done much mischief by raising the coalition which led tothe battle of Mantinea. So there he was, the guest of his old enemies,burning with all an exile's hatred, and ready to strike some deadlyblow against the city which had cast him out.
At first the Spartans gave but a cool and qualified response to theapplication of the envoys from Corinth. They were prepared to lendmoral support to the Syracusans, by sending an embassy to encouragethem in their resistance, but of more substantial aid they said littleor nothing. Now was the time for Alcibiades to play his part. He knew,far better than any of his hearers, all the vulnerable points ofAthens, and had no scruple in using his knowledge for her ruin. Havingobtained permission from the magistrates, he rose to address theSpartan assembly; and his speech is given at full length by thehistorian, who was himself an exile at the time, and may possibly havebeen present [Footnote: The suggestion is made by Grote.] on thisimportant occasion.
The Spartans might smile when they heard this accomplished traitorprofessing friendship towards themselves, and zeal for their service;they might be disgusted at the flippant sophistries by which he stroveto defend his unexampled villainy. But far different feelings must havebeen awakened, when he went on to unfold the gigantic scheme ofconquest, to which, as he pretended, the invasion of Sicily was no morethan a prelude. According to this statement, the Athenians intended,after subjugating the Greeks of Sicily, to turn their arms against theItalian Greeks, and finally to attack Carthage. If all these designswere successful, they would build a great number of new ships, takingtheir materials from the forests of Italy, raise a vast military force,both of Greeks and barbarians, and then return, backed by the wholepower of the West, and draw a ring of war round Peloponnesus. With suchresources they would be irresistible, and all Greece must inevitablyfall under their sway.
"Such," continued Alcibiades, "is the secret history of the Sicilianexpedition, which you have heard from the mouth of him who knows itbest. Remember, then, that the issue before you concerns not Syracuseonly, but Sparta also: for if Syracuse falls--and fall she must, ifleft without support--all Sicily will be under the heel of Athens; thenwill come the turn of Italy, and after that you will soon have theenemy at your own doors. Now learn what you must do, if you would avertall the evils which I have foretold. You must send a fleet to Sicily atonce, with hoplites who can row the ships themselves, and serve in thearmy as soon as they land, and with them a Spartan commander, toorganize the fighting men of Sicily, and compel those who are hangingback to do their duty. Such a man will be a host in himself, and willinfuse new life and energy into the defence. Further, you mustestablish a fortified camp at Decelea, a position which commands thewhole territory of Attica; for by so doing you will reduce Athens to astate of siege, and compel the whole male population to serve ongarrison duty; you will deprive the Athenians of their revenues fromthe silver-mines at Laurium, and you will put new heart into the citiessubject to Athens, and encourage them to withhold their tribute. Letthese measures be carried out with promptitude and vigour, and you willsoon reap your reward, in the humiliation of Athens, and the honour andgratitude of all Greece."
At these words of Alcibiades the sluggish Spartans took fire, andrecognizing the importance of his advice they determined to follow thecourse which he had indicated. Gylippus, a Spartan of high rank,received orders to proceed at once to Syracuse, and assume the controlof the war, and the Corinthians were directed to provide ships for theconveyance of troops. But after this brief display of energy theSpartans relapsed into their wonted torpor. Many months elapsed beforeGylippus was able to embark for Sicily, and meanwhile important eventshad been occurring at the seat of war. We return, therefore, to thehead-quarters of Nicias, which had once more been removed from Naxos toCatana.
VI
For the next year and a half [Footnote: Spring 414--autumn 413 B.C.]the scene of our narrative lies almost entirely in the immediateneighbourhood of Syracuse, so that it now becomes necessary to describein some detail the site of that city, and the character of the adjacentcountry. Mention has already been made of the island of Ortygia, thesite of the original colony, connected with the mainland of Sicily by abridge or causeway. At the southern extremity of Ortygia there is anarrow strip of land, pointing like a finger towards the rockypeninsula of Plemmyrium; and between these two points lies the entranceto a spacious bay, already alluded to under the name of the GreatHarbour. At the western end of the bay there is a long stretch of low,marshy ground, intersected by the little rivers Cyana and Anapus, andinfested with fever during the heats of summer. On a rising ground,south of the Anapus, stood the suburb of Polichne, with its greattemple, sacred to the Olympian Zeus. A little to the north of Ortygiathe coast rises abruptly in a bold line of cliffs, facing eastwards,and forming the base of a triangular plateau, which slopes upwards fromthe sea, and gradually grows narrower until it ends in a point, calledthe hill of Euryelus. This plateau, which bore the name of Epipolae, isguarded on all its three sides by rocky precipices, only to be ascendedat two or three places. Its eastern end, called Acheadina, from thewild pear-trees which once flourished there, was occupied by a newcity, now included with Ortygia in the same wall of defence. Here weresituated the famous stone-quarries, which afterwards acquired so tragican interest from the sufferings of the captive Athenians; andsouthwards from this district the ground shelves gently to the shoresof the Little Harbour, a sheltered inlet at the northern end of Ortygia.
At the opening of spring the operations against Syracuse began in goodearnest. The first object of Nicias was to obtain possession of theheights of Epipolae, for since the construction of the new Syracusanwall it had become impossible for him to draw his line of blockade fromthe side of the Great Harbour. His preparations were already faradvanced, when the Syracusan generals resolved to anticipate him, byoccupying all the approaches to Epipolae. With this intention theyissued an order for a full muster of troops in a meadow by the Anapus,and after a general review and inspection of arms they appointed apicked body of six hundred hoplites to guard the heights of Epipolae,and hold themselves ready for any other pressing service. But theprecaution was taken too late. On the night before the review Niciasset sail with his whole army from Catana, and landed at a place calledLeon, not more than six or seven furlongs from the northern side ofEpipolae. The fleet then took up its station in the sheltered waterbehind the peninsula of Thapsus, while the land forces, advancing at arun, crossed the level ground, and then, breasting the ascent, gainedthe summit of Euryelus.
News of their approach presently reached the Syracusans, who were stillmustered by the Anapus, and breaking off the review, they marched inhaste towards Epipolae, hoping still to dislodge the Athenians fromtheir position. But in their rapid advance over a distance of nearlythree miles their ranks became disordered, and their attack was sostraggling and ineffectual that they were easily repulsed, and drivenback with considerable loss into the town. On the following day Niciasled his troops down the slope, and offered battle before the walls ofSyracuse; but the challenge was declined, and the Syracusans remainedwithin their defences, leaving the Athenians in undisputed possessionof Epipolae.
After this important success the Athenian generals prepared at once to
form the siege of Syracuse. They first constructed a fort at a placecalled Labdalum, on the northern verge of Epipolae, and near itswestern extremity, to serve as a safe depositary for their baggage andmoney. Then, taking up a position near the centre of Epipolae, theybuilt a circular wall, covering a considerable space of ground, anddefended on the side towards the city by an outer breastwork, athousand feet long. This enclosure, which was called the Circle, wasintended as a shelter for the men employed on construction of theblockading wall, which started from either side of the Circle, and wasto be carried north and south until it reached the sea. The work maderapid progress, and greatly alarmed the Syracusans, who saw themselvesin danger of being cut off from all hope of succour on the land side.Dismayed by this prospect, they resolved to make one more effort todrive the Athenians from their position, and marching out in fullforce, offered battle. Advancing in haste and disorder, they wouldcertainly have suffered a crushing defeat, but for the prudent cautionof their generals, who were so much impressed by the superiordiscipline of the Athenians, that they gave the order to retire, andled their troops back into the city, leaving only a detachment of horseto skirmish with the besiegers. But the Athenians had now an efficientforce of cavalry, which had been raised by successive reinforcements tothe number of six hundred and fifty men; and these, backed by a smallforce of infantry, soon drove the horsemen of Syracuse from the field.
The Athenians then completed the building of their Circle, and began tolay the materials for the northern line of wall. By the advice ofHermocrates the Syracusans made no further attempt to attack them infull force, but began to build a counterwall, running out from the cityin a direction south of the Athenian Circle, so as to cross the line tobe followed by the wall of blockade, and prevent it from reaching theGreat Harbour. The work proceeded without interruption, for theAthenians were engaged in their building operations north of theCircle, and did not choose to divide their forces. When it wascompleted, this counterwork consisted of a solid stone wall, crownedwith wooden towers, and defended in front by a palisade. The blockadeof Syracuse was thus rendered impossible, as long as the defenderscould keep possession of their counterwall. But unfortunately theguards left in charge of the new wail soon began to neglect their duty,and erected tents in the shade, where they passed the hot hours of theafternoon, while some even left their posts, and went off to refreshthemselves in the city. The Athenian generals did not fail to takeadvantage of this negligence. Watching their opportunity, when most ofthe Syracusan guards were reposing under the shelter of the tents, theysent a chosen troop of some three hundred men to make a sudden assaulton the counterwall. Then, having divided the main body of the Athenianarmy between them, they disposed their forces so as to prevent anyrescue from the town. One division was drawn up before the principalgate in the new Syracusan wall, while the other proceeded to apostern-gate, at the point where the counterwall started from the city.The combined movement was completely successful; the three hundredcarried the stockade and cross-wall by storm, and compelled thedefenders to take refuge within the ramparts of Syracuse. The wholeAthenian army then marched up to the counterwall and stockade, whichthey speedily demolished, carrying off the materials for their own use.
Wishing to prevent any second attempt on the part of the Syracusans tocut them off from the southern slope of Epipolae, the Athenian generalsnow fortified that part of the cliff which looks towards the GreatHarbour. By occupying this point they obtained a new centre, commandingthe space between the Circle and the southern edge of the cliff, andplacing them in communication with the level valley of the Anapus,across which they had to carry their line of blockade. For the presentbuilding operations were suspended on the northern side of the Circle,as they wished first of all to complete the investment of Syracusetowards the south.
Perceiving their intention, the Syracusans began a second counterwork,consisting of a stockade and ditch, which started at the point ofjunction between the old city-wall and the new, and ran across the lowswampy ground as far as the Anapus. Thus the Athenians were confrontedby a new obstacle, which had to be removed, before they could make anyfurther progress. Acting with energy and decision, they sent orders tothe fleet, which was still lying at Thapsus, to sail round into theGreat Harbour; and without waiting for its arrival, before daybreakLamachus led his troops down the cliff, and advanced against thestockade. His men carried hurdles and planks, to secure their footingin the most treacherous parts of the swamp, and, proceeding thus, inthe first light of dawn they came up to the stockade. They found theSyracusans assembled in force to resist them, and an engagement ensued,which speedily ended in favour of the Athenians. The right wing of theSyracusan army fled back into the city, while the left wing retreatedtowards the suburb of Polichne, hotly pursued by the picked troop[Footnote: P. 203.] of Athenian hoplites, who wished to cut them offbefore they reached the river. By this rash movement the Athenians camenear to forfeiting the advantage which they had gained, and broughtupon themselves an irreparable loss. For the Syracusan cavalry turnedon their pursuers, and drove them back in disorder upon the Athenianright. The sudden reverse created something like a panic in that partof the line, and Lamachus, who was in command of the left wing,hastened to their relief, and threw himself, with a handful of men,between the Syracusan cavalry and the fugitives. This gallant actionturned the tide of battle once more, and gave the Athenians on theright wing time to rally; but Lamachus and his followers, pushingforward too hotly, were attacked by the enemy in a place where theirretreat was cut off by a ditch, and slain to a man.
Meanwhile the Syracusans who had fled into the city, observing thetemporary defeat of the Athenians, had taken courage again, and theyreturned to the field, having first sent a detachment to attack theAthenian Circle, where Nicias, who was disabled by sickness, had beenleft in charge with a small garrison. Thinking to make an easy capture,the party sent on this service ran up the slope of Epipolae, andreached the breastwork of the Circle, which they took and demolished.With the scanty force at his disposal, Nicias had little hope ofrepelling the attack, so he had recourse to a desperate expedient. Heordered the camp-servants to set fire to a great pile of timber, whichwas lying, together with a number of siege engines, in front of thewall. They did as he directed, and a great flame arose, which droveback the assailants, and gave warning of his danger to the Athenians inthe plain below, where the whole Syracusan army was now in fullretreat. Almost at the same moment the Athenian fleet was seen sailinginto the Great Harbour, and a strong contingent from the victoriousarmy came swarming up the hill to the rescue. Thereupon the stormingparty from Syracuse turned and fled back to the city, where they foundthe streets thronged by their beaten and dispirited comrades.
The result of this battle was to leave the Athenian in undisputedpossession of the whole country round Syracuse. Lamachus, indeed, hadfallen, and the loss of that daring and active spirit soon made itselfseverely felt. But for the present the fortunes of Athens were in theascendant, and everything seemed to promise a speedy triumph. TheSyracusans were thoroughly cowed by their defeat, and looked passivelyon, while a double wall of blockade crept steadily forwards from thesouthern edge of Epipolae towards the Great Harbour, where the Athenianfleet had now taken up its permanent station. The native Sicels, whohad hitherto held back through fear of Syracuse, now joined theAthenians in great numbers. Even the distant Etruscans, the ancientenemies of Syracuse, sent three war-galleys to take part in the sack ofthe great Dorian city.
Day by day the spirits of the Syracusans sank lower and lower. They nowbegan to feel the actual pressure of a siege. Months had passed sincetheir envoys had sailed for Greece, and there was still no sign of helpfrom Corinth or Sparta. They had lost all hope of saving themselves bytheir own unaided efforts, and no course seemed left to them but tomake the best terms they could with Nicias. Negotiations wereaccordingly opened with the Athenian general, but after much discussionno definite result was attained. In this hour of weakness and distress,the Syracusans became divided aga
inst themselves, and every mansuspected his neighbour of treason. Then they turned upon theirgenerals, who, after holding out such high promises, had brought themto this pass, either by mismanagement, or by deliberate treachery.Hermocrates and his colleagues were deposed from their command, andthree other generals succeeded to their place.
In the eyes of all those who were watching the struggle, the fate ofSyracuse was sealed; she was destined to fall a prey to the devouringambition of Athens. But at this very moment a little cloud wasapproaching from the east, which was fraught with disaster and ruin tothe besieging army.
VII
Just at the time when the Syracusans were brought to the brink ofdespair, Gylippus, after so many months' delay, was on his voyage toSicily. While lying at Leucas, a Corinthian settlement in the Ioniansea, he received the alarming intelligence that Syracuse was alreadycompletely blockaded, and the report was confirmed by every vessel thatcame in from the west. Deceived by these false rumours, he gave up allhope of saving Sicily, but hoping still to forestall the Athenians inItaly, he put out from Leucas with four ships, and steered a straightcourse for Tarentum. From this city, which was friendly to Sparta andSyracuse, he started on his mission among the Italian Greeks, andputting in at Locri he heard for the first time that the Athenian wallwas still unfinished on the northern side of Epipolae, leaving a widegap, through which a relieving force might enter the town.
Two courses now lay open to Gylippus. He might sail southwards, andmake an attempt to run the blockade of Syracuse--or he might land onthe northern coast of Sicily, march across the island, and fight hisway into the city through the unwalled interval. In either case, theenterprise seemed desperate enough. By a very moderate exertion on thepart of Nicias, employing only a fraction of the immense force at hisdisposal, Gylippus might have been destroyed, before he had time tobecome dangerous. But Nicias was lulled into a fatal confidence. He hadheard of the mission of Gylippus, but made no attempt to oppose hisvoyage to Italy, regarding him as a mere free-booter, unworthy ofserious notice. At last, learning that Gylippus was at Locri, he wasinduced to send out four triremes against him. They were instructed totake station at Rhegium, and cut off the daring intruder as he passedthrough the strait. But when they reached Rhegium, the wary Spartan wasalready beyond their reach. He had decided to approach Syracuse byland, and was now far advanced on his voyage to Himera, the only Greeksettlement on the north coast of Sicily. Himera, though an Ioniccolony, was attached to the Dorian interest, and her citizens gave ahearty welcome to the Spartan deliverer. Before long, a little army ofabout three thousand men was assembled at Himera, and ready to followthe fortunes of Gylippus. Seven hundred of these were the sailors andmarines from his own vessels, armed as hoplites, and the Himeraeansfurnished a thousand infantry, light and heavy-armed, and a hundredcavalry. Owing to the recent death of a powerful chieftain, who hadbeen a strong partisan of Athens, the northern Sicels had now changedsides, and they sent a thousand men to serve under the Spartan leader.Small contingents also arrived, in answer to the call of Gylippus, fromGela and Selinus. With this little force, composed of such motleyelements, Gylippus started from Himera, and entered on his march forthe relief of Syracuse. The fate of Syracuse was already wavering inthe balance. As yet no news of approaching succour had reached thebeleaguered city, and the Syracusans had abandoned all hope. To savethemselves from a worse calamity, they resolved to surrender, and anassembly was summoned to settle the terms of capitulation. But at thisvery moment a message came to them by sea, which kindled their courageafresh, and banished these counsels of despair. When Gylippus leftLeucas, a Corinthian fleet of some fifteen vessels was preparing tosail from that port for Syracuse. One of the ships, commanded by acertain Gongylus, was delayed in the harbour, and started after therest. But Gongylus, instead of steering the ordinary course, whichwould have taken him first to Italy, made a bold dash, straight acrossthe sea, and just when the momentous decision was pending, his shipcame to anchor in the Little Harbour. Forthwith the joyful tidingsspread like wildfire through the city: Gylippus was coming, armed withfull authority from Sparta--Corinth had taken up their cause--Syracusewas saved! All thought of surrender was instantly flung away, and newsarriving shortly afterwards that Gylippus was near at hand, the wholeSyracusan force marched out to meet him, and escorted him triumphantlyinto the town.
Thus, without a blow being struck, an immense access of strength hadbeen brought to the besieged, and the grand condition of successfulresistance, on which Alcibiades had laid such weight, was fulfilled. ASpartan officer of consummate ability was now in Syracuse, and he hadmade his way into the city, not alone, not by stealth, but at the headof an army, and before the very eyes of the enemy. Weeks must haveelapsed between the departure of Gylippus from Leucas, and his arrivalat Syracuse; and during all this time, with one trifling exception,Nicias made no effort to oppose his progress. Prudent men might wellhave regarded the enterprise of Gylippus as a wild and desperateadventure; and such it must have proved, but for the astoundingblindness and apathy of Nicias.
At the time when Gylippus reached Syracuse the Athenian lines ofcircumvallation were all but completed on the side of the GreatHarbour; but a wide interval was still left between the Circle and thenorthern sea, and it was here that Gylippus had effected an entrance.To keep this space open was a matter of supreme importance, and thescene of action is now shifted again to the northern slope of Epipolae.On the day after his arrival Gylippus succeeded in capturing theAthenian fort at Labdalum, and the command of this position gaveincreased facilities for the construction of a third counterwall, whichwas forthwith taken in hand, and carried in the direction of Labdalum,until it crossed the blockading line at its northern end.
If the Syracusans succeeded in completing and holding this counterwork,the blockade of Syracuse would be rendered impossible. Yet for sometime Nicias made no attempt to interrupt its progress. As if alreadyconvinced of his inferiority in the field, he took steps to keep hiscommunications open by sea, and with this object he employed a part ofhis forces in fortifying the headland of Plemmyrium, which commandedthe entrance to the Great Harbour. Here he built three forts whichserved as an arsenal for the Athenian stores; and henceforth Plemmyriumbecame the chief station for his fleet. This removal had a disastrouseffect on the Athenian crews; for the place being almost a desert, andthe springs distant and scanty, they were compelled to go far fromtheir quarters in search of forage and water, and while thus engagedthey were cut off in great numbers by the Syracusan horse, who had beenposted at Polichne for this purpose. A rapid demoralization of thecrews was the consequence, and desertions became more frequent everyday.
Meanwhile the counterwall was advancing steadily up the hill, and everyday Gylippus drew up his army, to cover the operations of the workmen.At last he determined to force on an engagement, and in the firstencounter the Syracusans, fighting in a confined space, which preventedtheir cavalry from coming into action, suffered a defeat. In no wisediscouraged by this reverse, on the next day they took up a position inthe more open ground, and offered battle again. By this time theSyracusan counterwork had almost passed the end of the Athenian wall,and if it were carried a few yards further, the siege of Syracuse wouldbe brought to a standstill. Roused by the imminence of the crisis,Nicias determined to make one more effort to regain his mastery in thefield, and led his troops to the attack. The main body of the hopliteswere soon hotly engaged on both sides, and in the midst of the actionGylippus directed his cavalry and light-armed infantry to make a suddencharge on the Athenian left. This movement was executed with so muchskill and resolution that the Athenians in that part of the line gaveway, and drew after them the rest of their comrades, who broke theirranks, and fled for shelter behind the siege works.
The Syracusans lost no time in turning their victory to account. On thevery same night their wall was extended some distance beyond theblockading line, and until this new barrier was overthrown, theinvestment of Syracuse had now become impossible.
Whichever way he looked, Nicias saw himself menaced with failure anddefeat. He had sent twenty ships to intercept the Corinthian squadronon its voyage from Leucas; but the little fleet of rescue succeeded inavoiding the snare, and made its way into the port of Syracuse, thusadding twelve fresh vessels to the defending force. Gylippus himselfwas marching unhindered up and down the island, passing from city tocity, and raising reinforcements of ships and men; and a second embassyhad been despatched by the Syracusans, to carry the news of theirvictory to Corinth and Sparta, and ask for further help. Anotherominous sign of coming events was the bustle and activity now visiblein the dockyards of Syracuse and the waters of the Little Harbour; forthe Syracusans had turned their attention seriously to their fleet, andthought of nothing less than attacking the Athenians on their ownelement.
These symptoms of renewed confidence and energy were observed by Niciaswith growing disquiet. And if he turned his eyes to his own camp, hesaw little to relieve his anxiety. For the predictions of Lamachus hadbeen fulfilled to the letter. By his fatal policy of procrastinationNicias had frittered away the resources of the most splendid armamentthat ever set sail from Peiraeus. His soldiers were infected by thedespondency of their leader, and many of them were stricken by themarsh-fever which haunts the unwholesome district of the Anapus. Aboveall the condition of the fleet showed the lamentable effect of longinaction and delay. All the supplies of the Athenians came to them bysea, and in order to keep their communications open, it was necessaryto keep the whole of the fleet on constant duty. In consequence ofthis, the hulls of the triremes had become sodden with water, whichmade them leaky, and difficult to row. Moreover the crews, which werelargely composed of foreign seamen, had grown restive and mutinousunder the severe strain of hardships and privation, so different fromthe easy and lucrative service in the hope of which they had enlisted.Some took the first opportunity of deserting to the enemy, while othersran away to remote parts of Sicily; and there was no means of fillingthe places thus left vacant.
Such was the burden of care and apprehension which lay heavy on thefeeble shoulders of the Athenian general. He was naturally a weak man,haunted by superstitious terrors, irresolute, easily cast down; andthis infirmity of character was aggravated by a painful and incurabledisease. There was no longer any question of laying siege to Syracuse:he himself was now besieged, and it was all he could do to maintain hisposition within his defences, and keep the sea open for the conveyanceof supplies. In this desperate situation he determined to send awritten despatch to Athens. We are led to suppose that this was anunusual proceeding, and that news from the seat of war was generallysent by word of mouth. The document is given at full length, with allits grievous confessions of incompetence and failure. After settingforth the facts of the case as stated above, Nicias insists that one oftwo things must be done: either the army now lying before Syracuse mustbe recalled to Athens, or the Athenians must send out a second army,equal in strength to the first, and a general to relieve him of hiscommand.
At the conclusion of his despatch Nicias peevishly complains of theexacting temper of the Athenians, and their readiness to blame anyonebut themselves if anything untoward occurred. Whatever may be the truthof the general charge, it was most ill-timed and ungrateful in his owncase. Towards him, at least, the conduct of his fellow-citizens wasmarked by an excess of generosity, amounting to actual infatuation.Nothing is more remarkable than the unshaken confidence of theAthenians in their feeble general, after hearing this terribleindictment, drawn up by his own hand. They refused to accept hisresignation, and passed a decree that large reinforcements should besent to Sicily, with Demosthenes and Eurymedon as generals; and in themeantime they appointed Menander and Euthydemus, two officers alreadyserving before Syracuse, to share with Nicias the burden of command.Before the winter was ended Eurymedon started with ten ships forSicily, to announce that effectual help was coming; while Demostheneswas charged with the duty of enlisting troops and organizing a fleet.
Meanwhile new perils were gathering round the Athenians at home, whichshould have warned them to abandon their wild plans of conquest, andconcentrate all their strength for their own defence. The Spartans hadlong been restrained by a scruple of conscience from an opendeclaration of war, wishing to avoid the guilt which is associated withthe first act of aggression. Eighteen years before they had refused alloffers of arbitration, and deliberately provoked an encounter withAthens, in direct violation of the Thirty Years' Truce, which providedfor an amicable settlement of differences; and by so acting they had,as they believed, incurred the anger of heaven, and brought onthemselves a long train of disasters. But now the position wasreversed: for in the previous year the Athenians had made descents onthe coasts of Laconia, and other districts of Peloponnesus; and theyhad repeatedly turned a deaf ear to the friendly overtures of theSpartans, who proposed to submit all disputed matters to a peacefultribunal.
Thus relieved of their scruples, the Spartans prepared to renew the warin good earnest, and early in the following spring [Footnote: B.C.413.] they summoned their allies to the Isthmus, and marched under Agistheir king into Attica. After ravaging the plain, they encamped atDecelea, fourteen miles north of Athens, and here they established afortified post, which was garrisoned by contingents of thePeloponnesian army, serving in regular order. Once more Alcibiades hadcause to exult in the success of his malignant counsels, which had sentGylippus to Syracuse, and had now planted this root of bitter mischiefon the very soil of Attica.
While the allies were thus engaged at Decelea, a considerable body oftroops had embarked at Taenarum and at Corinth, and sailed to take partin the defence of Syracuse. In Greece, all the old enemies of Athenswere arming against her, and beyond the sea her prospects grew darkerand darker every day. Yet nothing, it seemed, could break the spell offatal delusion which rested on the doomed city. While Attica lay in thegrip of the enemy, a fleet of sixty-five triremes, carrying a greatmilitary force, weighed anchor from Peiraeus, and steered its course,under the command of Demosthenes, for Sicily.
VIII
We must now return to Syracuse, where fortune was preparing a new blowfor the ill-fated Athenian army. Gylippus came back from his mission atthe beginning of spring, bringing with him the reinforcements which hehad gathered from various parts of Sicily. At once resuming theoffensive, he planned an attack on the forts recently erected by Niciasat Plemmyrium, and in order to divide the attention of the Athenians,he determined to make a simultaneous movement against them by sea andland. He himself took command of the army, and setting out at night,made his way round to the rear of the Athenian position at Plemmyrium.Meanwhile the Syracusan fleet lay ready in two divisions, one of which,consisting of thirty-five vessels, was moored in the docks, within theGreat Harbour, while the other, to the number of forty-five, had itsstation in the Lesser Harbour. At the hour appointed by Gylippus, justas day was breaking, both squadrons got under weigh, and bore down uponPlemmyrium, from the opposite sides of Ortygia. Though taken bysurprise, the Athenians put out in haste with sixty triremes, and asea-fight ensued, in which the Syracusans for some time had theadvantage. By this time Gylippus was at hand with his army, and by asudden assault on the Athenian forts he made an easy capture of allthree; for the greater part of the garrison had flocked down to thesea, to watch the progress of the action in the Great Harbour.Fortunately for these men, who had so grossly neglected their duty, theAthenian fleet had now gained a decisive victory, and they were thusenabled to make their escape by water, and cross over to the camp ofNicias, on the other side of the bay.
By the capture of Plemmyrium a great treasure fell into the hands ofthe Syracusans. The loss to the Athenians, in money, stores, and men,was serious enough; but further consequences ensued, which were nothingless than disastrous. The enemy now commanded both sides of theentrance to the Great Harbour, and not a ship-load of provisions couldreach the Athenian camp without an encounter with the Syracusantriremes. Well might despondency and dismay take possession of thebeleaguered army,
cramped in their narrow quarters on the swampy flatsof the Anapus.
All Sicily, with one or two exceptions, had now declared for Syracuse,and reinforcements came pouring in from every side. Gylippus wasresolved, if possible, to destroy the armament of Nicias, before thefresh succours from Athens had time to arrive; and, as before, theattack was to be made simultaneously by sea and land. Since the loss ofPlemmyrium, the Athenian fleet had been penned up in the confined spaceat the head of the Great Harbour. Outside of these narrow limits, thewhole coast was in the hands of the enemy, and any Athenian triremewhich ventured out into open water ran the risk of being driven on ahostile shore. Unless they chose to incur this great peril, theAthenians would have to fight in close order, with the long, taperingprows of their vessels exposed to collision.
The Syracusans skilfully availed themselves of the advantage thusoffered. The impact of prow with prow, which had hitherto been regardedas a disgraceful evidence of bad seamanship, had now become the mosteffective method of attack; and in order to execute this simplemanoeuvre without damage to their own ships, the Syracusans shortenedthe prows of their triremes, and strengthened them with heavy beams oftimber, thus converting them into a broad and solid mass, which couldbe driven with crushing force against the slender beaks of the Atheniangalleys.
When all was ready, Gylippus led out his troops, and assailed theAthenian wall which faced towards Syracuse, and at the same time thegarrison stationed at Polichne left their quarters, and made anotherattack on the opposite side. The assault had already commenced, whenthe Syracusan fleet, which numbered eighty triremes, was seen advancingtowards the inner shore of the bay, where the ships of Nicias laymoored; and the Athenian seamen, who had not expected to be called intoaction, hastened in some confusion to man their ships, seventy-five ofwhich were presently engaged with the enemy. After a day passed inirregular and desultory fighting, the battle ended slightly in favourof the Syracusans. During the next day the Syracusans remainedinactive, and Nicias employed the interval in repairing the ships whichhad suffered damage, and providing for the defence of his fleet. TheAthenian naval station was protected by a row of piles, rammed into thebottom of the sea, forming a semi-circular breastwork, with an openingabout two hundred feet wide, where the ships passed in and out. Oneither side of this entrance Nicias caused a merchant vessel to bemoored, and each vessel was provided with an engine called a dolphin, aheavy mass of lead, suspended from the yard-arm, which could be droppedon the deck of any hostile trireme attempting to pass.
Early on the following morning the Syracusans resumed hostilities bothby sea and land, and after several hours of desultory fighting, theydrew off their fleet, and sailed back to their station under the wallsof the city. The Athenians were well pleased by this sudden relief, andconcluding that their work was done for the day, they disembarked atleisure, and began to prepare their midday meal. But before they hadtime to snatch a mouthful, the whole Syracusan fleet was seen advancingagain from the opposite shore, and the hungry and weary Athenian crewswere summoned on board to repel a second attack. This crafty manoeuvrewas due to a suggestion of Ariston, the most skilful of the Corinthianseamen, by whose advice provisions had been brought down to the beach,so that the Syracusan crews were kept together, and ready to renew theaction, after a brief interval for repose and refreshment.
For a little while the two fleets faced each other, without venturingto attack; then the Athenians, who were feverish with hunger andfatigue, could restrain themselves no longer, but with one consent theydashed their oars into the water, and with shouts of mutualencouragement charged down upon the enemy. The Syracusans kept a firmfront, and opposing their massive prows to the rash assault, inflictedgreat damage on the Athenian triremes, many of which were completelywrecked by the shock of the collision. On every side the Athenians werehard beset; the light-armed troops posted on the decks of the Syracusanvessels, plied them with a shower of javelins, while the waters swarmedwith a multitude of boats, manned by daring adventurers, who rowedboldly up to the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the oars, andhurled darts through the port-holes at the rowers. After fighting forsome time at a great disadvantage, with exhausted crews, and in anarrow space, where they had no room to manoeuvre, the Athenians werecompelled to fall back, and sought refuge behind their palisade.
This important success raised the spirits of the Syracusans higher thanever. They had gained a decisive victory over the greatest naval powerin Greece, sunk seven triremes, disabled many more, and slain or takenprisoners a large number of men. Flushed with pride and hope, theyimmediately began to prepare for a final attack, which was to end inthe complete destruction of their enemies both by sea and land. Butthese high expectations received a sudden check; for on the day afterthe battle, [Footnote: Or possibly two days.] the watchers on the wallsof Syracuse descried a great fleet on the northern horizon. Presentlythe regular beat of ten thousand oars could be distinctly heard; itgrew louder and louder, and as the vanguard came into full view, thealarmed Syracusans recognized the truth. There was no mistaking thepeculiar build and familiar ensigns of the renowned Athenian galleys.This could be no other than the fleet of Demosthenes, arrived just intime to save the shattered armament of Nicias, and once more turn thetide of war against Syracuse. A great multitude rushed to thebattlements, and gazed with keen pangs of anxiety as the long line oftriremes, seventy-three in number, swept past the walls of Ortygia,rounded the southern point, and crossing the Great Harbour, droppedanchor at the naval station of Nicias. If anyone not concerned in thestruggle had been present, he might have admired the grand exhibitionof military pomp and power, the perfect trim and condition of thetriremes, the precision of the rowing, and the glittering ranks of thehoplites, javelin-men, archers, and slingers, who thronged the decks.But no such feeling could find room in the minds of the Syracusans.After their long trials and sufferings, on the very eve of theircrowning triumph, a new host of enemies had sprung up against them, andall their toils were beginning anew.
IX
When Demosthenes arrived at Syracuse, the position of affairs was asfollows: the blockading wall of the Athenians still extended in anunbroken line from the circular fort on Epipolae to the camp and navalstation of Nicias at the head of the Great Harbour; but the Athenianswere cut off from access to the northern slope of Epipolae by theSyracusan counterwall, which had been carried up the whole length ofthe plateau as far as the hill of Euryelus. Along the northern edge ofthe cliff the Syracusans had established three fortified camps, wherethe defenders of the counterwall had their quarters, and on the summitof Euryelus a fort had been erected, which held the key to the wholesystem of defence.
Demosthenes saw at once that, before any progress could be made withthe siege of Syracuse, it was necessary to gain possession of thecounterwall, and confine the Syracusans within the limits of theircity. The sooner he made the attempt, the greater was his chance ofsuccess; for every day wasted would give new confidence to the enemy,and the condition in which he found the troops of Nicias was a visiblewarning against the fatal consequences of delay. An attack made on thecross-wall from its southern side ended in total failure; hissiege-engines were burnt, and the storming-parties repulsed at everypoint. The only course which remained was to march round to thenorth-western extremity of the plateau, carry the fort of Euryelus, andassail the Syracusans within their own lines. After consulting with hiscolleagues, Demosthenes determined to try the hazardous method of anight-attack, hoping thus to take the garrison on Euryelus by surprise.He himself, with Eurymedon and Menander, took the command, and thewhole Athenian army was engaged in the adventure, except those whoremained behind with Nicias to guard the camp. On a moonlight night inAugust, at the hour of the first watch, the march began. Movingcautiously up the valley of the Anapus, they turned the northern end ofthe hill, and reached the path by which Lamachus had ascended in thespring of the previous year. At first all seemed to promise success tothe Athenians unobserved by the enemy, Demosthenes ascended the hill,stormed the fo
rt, and, drove the garrison back on the three fortifiedcamps which flanked the Syracusan counterwall on its northern side. Thefugitives raised the alarm, and the call was promptly answered by apicked troop of six hundred hoplites, who were stationed nearest to thepoint of danger. These men made a gallant stand, but they wereoverpowered by superior numbers, and thrust back on the main body ofthe Syracusans, who were now advancing under Gylippus to the rescue.They in their turn were forced to give ground before the impetuouscharge of Demosthenes, and a general panic seemed about to spreadthrough the whole Syracusan army. Already the Athenians had begun tothrow down the battlements of the counterwall, and if they were allowedto proceed, Syracuse would once more be exposed to imminent danger.
But now occurred one of those sudden turns of fortune which were socommon in Greek warfare. As the soldiers of the Athenian van rushedforward too hotly, wishing to complete the rout of the enemy they fellinto disorder, and in this condition they were confronted by a stoutlittle troop of Boeotian hoplites, who had found their way to Syracuseearlier in the summer. This unexpected resistance checked the furiousonset of the Athenians, and the Boeotians, pursuing their advantage,charged in solid phalanx and put them to flight. Once more the tide ofbattle had turned against Athens. Restored to confidence by the steadyvalour of their allies, the Syracusans closed their ranks, and advancedin dense masses up the hill. A scene of indescribable horror andconfusion ensued, so that no one was afterwards able to give a clearaccount of what had happened. On the narrow neck of land which formsthe western end of Epipolae two great armies were rushing to theencounter. On one side was the main body of the Athenians, stillignorant of the defeat of their comrades, and hurrying forward to sharein the victory. On the other side was the whole host of Syracuse,advancing with deafening shouts to meet them; and in the middle werethe men of Demosthenes, flying in headlong rout before the conqueringBoeotians. In the uncertain light, the fugitives were at first mistakenfor enemies, and many of them perished miserably by the spears of theirown countrymen. On came the Syracusans, bearing down all before them;but the Athenians, as they strove to escape, were flung back upon theenemy by fresh bodies of their own men, who were still thronging bythousands up the northern path of Euryelus. All semblance of order wasnow lost in the Athenian army, which was broken up into detachedparties, some flying, some advancing, and shouting their watchword toall whom they met, so as to learn whether they had to do with friend orfoe. But the Syracusans soon learnt the watchword, which thus became ameans of betraying the Athenians to their own destruction. To add tothe confusion, the Dorian allies of Athens raised a paean, or war-song,so similar to that of the Syracusans, that the Athenians fled at theirapproach supposing them to be enemies. The grand army of Demosthenes,which had set out with such high hopes, was now no better than a mob ofwild and desperate men, friend fighting against friend, and citizenagainst citizen. At length the whole multitude turned and fled, eachman seeking to save himself as best he could. Some, hard pressed by theenemy, flung themselves from the cliffs, and were dashed to pieces onthe rocks below; others succeeded in reaching the plain, and foundtheir way back to the camp of Nicias; while not a few lost their way,and wandered about the country until the following day, when they werehunted down and slain by the Syracusan horseman.
Demosthenes had done all that a man could to recover the ground lost byNicias, and resume the aggressive against Syracuse. His well-laidscheme had ended disastrously, and only one course remained, consistentwith public duty and common sense. To waste the blood and treasure ofAthens in Sicily any longer would be suicidal folly. The Athenians athome were in a state of siege, and needed every man and every ship forthe defence of their own territory, and the maintenance of their empirein Greece. Sickness and despondency had already wrought dire havocamong the troops encamped before Syracuse. To remain was utter ruin,both to themselves and their fellow-citizens. The sea was still open,and the new armament, with what remained of the old, would be strongenough to secure their retreat. Let them embark without delay, turntheir backs on the fatal shores of Sicily, and hoist sail for home.
These arguments were urged by Demosthenes with unanswerable force at aprivate meeting of the generals which was held immediately after thedefeat on Epipolae But unhappily for all those most nearly concerned inthe debate, the influence of Nicias was still supreme in the Atheniancamp; and to spur that gloomy trifler into decisive action was beyondthe power even of Demosthenes. Nicias knew that, if he gave the word toretreat, in a few weeks he would have to stand before the bar of hiscountrymen, and give an account of the great trust which he hadbetrayed. It would be better, he thought, to perish under the walls ofSyracuse, than to brave that stern tribunal, and read his doom on thoseangry, accusing faces. And apart from these selfish terrors, he wasstill in communication with his partisans in Syracuse, who encouragedhim to wait for a favourable turn of affairs. Thus fettered to the spotboth by his hopes and his fears, he obstinately refused to move.
While Demosthenes argued, and Nicias demurred, Gylippus had not beenidle. A day or two after the battle, he once more left Syracuse, andtraversed the whole length of the island, collecting troops on his way.At Selinus he was joined by the Peloponnesian and Boeotian soldiers whohad sailed from Taenarum early in the spring, and had just reached thatport, after a long and adventurous voyage. With this welcome additionto his forces, and thousands more who had answered his call from allparts of Sicily, he returned to Syracuse, and prepared to put out allhis strength in a general assault on the army and fleet of Athens.
The Athenians had not yet abandoned their lines on the southern side ofEpipolae, and from this position they watched the arrival of the newarmy raised by Gylippus, as it defiled down the slope, and pouredthrough the gates of Syracuse to swell the ranks of their enemies. Intheir own camp the state of things was growing worse every day, andeven Nicias now became convinced that to remain any longer would besheer madness. With the hearty concurrence of his colleagues, he gavehis vote for immediate departure, and the order was secretly passedround the camp that every man should hold himself in readiness to go onboard, as soon as the signal was given. It was necessary to proceedwith caution, for if the enemy were informed of their purpose, theywould have to fight their way through the Syracusan fleet. Thepreparations were accordingly made with as little noise as possible andin a short time all was ready for the voyage. Night sank down on theAthenian camp, but among all that vast multitude no one thought ofsleep, for the whole host was waiting in breathless eagerness for thesignal to embark. Over the eastern waters the full moon was shining,making a long path of silver and pointing the way to home. But suddenlya dark shadow touched the outer rim of that gleaming disk, and creptstealthily on, until the whole face of the moon was veiled in darkness.A whisper, a murmur, a shudder went round among those anxious watchers,and before the shadow had passed away, ten thousand tongues wereeagerly discussing the meaning of that mysterious portent. Most wereagreed that it was a warning from heaven, forbidding their departureuntil the angry powers had been appeased by sacrifice and prayer. Inthe mind of Nicias, enslaved by the grossest superstition, there was noroom for doubt. He was surrounded by prophets, whose advice he soughton every occasion, and guided by them he proclaimed that for thricenine days, the time required for a complete circuit of the moon, therecould be no talk of departing.
But the Athenians were soon engaged in a sterner task than the vainrites of propitiation and penitential observance. The news of theirintended retreat, and its untoward interruption, so raised the spiritsof the Syracusans, that they resolved to risk another sea-fight, andafter some days spent in training their crews, they sailed out withseventy-six ships, and offered battle, and Gylippus at the same timeattacked the Athenian lines by land. The Athenians succeeded inrepulsing the assault on their walls, but in the encounter between thefleets, though they out-numbered the enemy by ten ships, they suffereda decisive defeat. Eurymedon was slain, and eighteen vessels fell intothe hands of the Syracusans, who put all the crews to the swo
rd.
The pride and ambition of the Syracusans now knew no bounds. Relievedfrom all fear for the safety of their city they began to take a loftierview of the struggle, and to grasp the full compass and grandeur of theissues involved. It was no mere feud between two rival states, but agreat national conflict, which was to end in the downfall of awide-spread usurpation, and the deliverance of a hundred cities frombondage. The whole naval and military forces of Athens lay crippled andhelpless within their grasp; they would shatter to pieces theinstrument of tyranny, and win an immortal name as the liberators ofall Greece. Their first care was to prevent the escape of theAthenians, and for this purpose they began to close the mouth of theGreat Harbour by a line of triremes and vessels of burden, anchoredbroadside across the channel.
X
The Athenians were thus caught in a trap, and their only hope of savingthemselves was to force the barrier of the Great Harbour, and escape bysea, or, failing that, to make their way by land to some friendly city.As a last sad confession of defeat, they withdrew the garrison fromtheir walls on Epipolae, and reduced the dimensions of their camp,confining it to a narrow space of the coast, where the fleet laymoored. Every vessel which could be kept afloat was prepared foraction, and when the whole force was mustered, out of two greatarmaments only a hundred and ten were found fit for service. A smallbody of troops was left to guard the camp, and all the rest, exceptsuch as were totally disabled by sickness, were distributed asfighting-men among the ships. For the countrymen of Phormio had nowreverted to the primitive conditions of naval warfare, in which thetrireme was a mere vehicle for carrying troops, and not, as in the daysof that great captain, the chief weapon of offence. Every foot ofstanding-room on the decks was occupied by a crowd of hoplites,javelin-men, archers, and slingers, and on their prowess the issue ofthe battle depended. To lay their vessels aboard the enemy with aslittle delay as possible, and leave the rest to the soldiers, was nowthe chief object of the Athenian captains; and the better to effect.this, men were stationed on the prows, armed with grappling-irons, tohold the attacking trireme fast, and prevent her from backing awayafter the first shock of collision.
With hearts full of sad foreboding, the great multitude mustered on thebeach, and waited for the word to embark. On a rising ground, frontingthe camp, the generals; stood grouped in earnest consultation; thenevery voice was hushed, as Nicias came forward, and beckoned with hishand, commanding silence. The form of the general was bowed with years,and his face lined with pain and sickness, but in his eye there was anunwonted fire, and his tones rang clear and full, as he reminded hishearers of the great cause for which they were to fight, and the mightyinterests which hung in the balance that day. "Men of Athens," he said,"and you, our faithful allies, your lives, your liberty, and the futureof all who are dear to you, are in your own hands. If you would eversee home again, you must resolve to conquer fortune, even against herwill, like seasoned veterans, inured to the perils and vicissitudes ofwar. Hitherto we have generally got the better of the enemy on land andwe are now going to fight a land battle on the sea. As soon as you comewithin reach of a Syracusan vessel, fling your grappling-irons, andhold her fast, until not a man is left alive to defend her deck. Thiswill be the task of the soldiers, whom I need not tell to do theirduty. And you, seamen of the Athenian fleet, be not dismayed because wehave forsaken our former tactics, but trust to the strong arms of thefighting men. Remember, those of you who are not of Attic descent, howlong you have enjoyed the high privileges of Athenian citizens, and thehonour reflected on you by your connection with Athens.
"My last word shall be spoken to you, fellow-citizens, Athenians bornand bred. You know what you have to expect from the Syracusans, if thislast struggle should end in defeat. But consider further what will bethe fate of your friends at home. Their docks are empty, their wallsare stripped of defenders, and if you fail them, Syracuse will unitewith their old enemies, and bear them down. Here, where we stand, arethe army, the fleet, the city, and the great name of Athens; go, then,and fight as you never fought before, for never yet had soldier such aprize to win, and such a cause to defend."
When Nicias had concluded his stirring appeal, the embarkation of thetroops began. As the fatal moment drew nearer and nearer, the anxietyand distress of the Athenian general became unbearable. Feeling that hehad not said enough, he hurried to and fro, addressing each captainwith an agony of supplication, and imploring him by every sacredname,--his wife, his children, his country, and his country's gods,--toplay a man's part, forgetting all thoughts of self. Having exhaustedevery topic of entreaty, and seen the last man on board, he turnedaway, still unsatisfied, and addressed himself to the task of drawingup the troops left under his command for the defence of the camp. Thesewere disposed along the shore in as long a line as possible, that theymight encourage those fighting on the sea by their presence, and lendprompt help in case of need. Behind them, every point of outlook washeld by a throng of anxious spectators,--the sick, the maimed, and thewounded,--every man who had strength to crawl from his bed, and watchthat last desperate struggle for liberty and home.
And now the Athenian admirals, Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus,raised the signal, and the great fight began. The foremost shipssucceeded in reaching the mouth of the Great Harbour, and began tobreak through the barrier, when the whole Syracusan fleet closed inupon them on all sides, and forced them back Then the battle becamegeneral, and soon the two fleets were scattered over the whole surfaceof the bay in little groups, and each group engaged in a wild andfurious melee. There was no attempt to manoeuvre, but ship encounteredship; as accident brought them together, and advanced to the attack,under a shower of javelins and arrows. Then followed the dull crash ofcollision, and the fierce rush of the fighting-men, as they endeavouredto board. Here and there could be seen knots of three or four triremes,locked together with shattered hulls and broken oars, while thesoldiers on the decks strove for the mastery. Nearly two hundredtriremes, and some forty thousand men, were engaged in that tumultuousfight; and the thunder of the oars, the crash of colliding triremes,and the yells of the assailants, raised an uproar so tremendous that itwas impossible to hear the voice of command. All order and method waslost, yet still they fought on, the Syracusans with a savage thirst forvengeance, the Athenians with the fury of despair; and for a long timethe issue remained doubtful.
All this scene of havoc and carnage was witnessed by the wholepopulation of Syracuse, who thronged the walls, or stood in arms alongthe shore, and followed every incident with breathless interest. Butabove all among the Athenians left behind in the camp excitement wasstrained to the point of anguish. Here the view was more restricted,and each group of spectators had its attention fixed on some one of themany encounters which were raging in different parts of the bay. Somewho saw their friends conquering, shouted with joy and triumph; someshrieked in terror, as an Athenian ship went down; and others, when thecombat long wavered, rocked their bodies to and fro in an agony ofsuspense. Thus at the same moment every shifting turn of battle,victory and defeat, panic and rally, flight and pursuit, was mirroredon those pale faces, and echoed in a thousand mingled cries.
But at length these discordant voices were united in one general noteof horror, as the whole Athenian fleet, or all that was left of it, wasseen making in headlong rout for the upper end of the bay, with thevictorious Syracusans pressing hard behind. Then most of those who werewatching from the shore were seized with uncontrollable terror, andsought to hide themselves in holes and corners of the camp; while afew, who were more stout-hearted, waded into the water, to save theships, or rushed to defend the walls on the land side. But for thepresent the Syracusans were contented with their victory, and afterchasing the fugitive triremes as far as their defences, they wheeledand rowed back across the Great Harbour, through floating corpses, andthe wrecks of more than seventy vessels. On their arrival at Syracusethey were hailed with such a burst of enthusiasm as had rarely beenwitnessed in any Greek city. The victory, indeed, had been
dearlybought, but it was well worth the cost, and the power of Athens hadsustained a blow from which it could never recover. But among all thethronging hosts of Syracuse, who now gave themselves up to revel andrejoicing, there was one man at least who knew that even now the dangerwas not yet past. Forty thousand Athenian soldiers were still encampedwithin sight of the walls, and if they were allowed to escape, theymight establish themselves in some friendly city, and begin the waragain. All this was strongly felt by Hermocrates, and he lost no timein imparting his cares and anxieties to the responsible leaders. TheAthenians, he urged, would be almost certain to decamp during thenight: let a strong force be sent out at once from Syracuse, to occupyall the roads, and cut off their retreat. The advice was good, but inthe present temper of the army it was felt to be impracticable. Thewhole city had become a scene of riot and wassail, and if the orderwere given to march, it was but too evident that not a man would obey.Baffled in this direction, the keen-witted Syracusan hit upon anotherplan, which he at once proceeded to carry into effect.
Hermocrates was not mistaken in his conjecture. The beaten anddispirited Athenians had now but one thought,--to break up their campwith all despatch, and make their escape by land. They had still sixtytriremes left, and Demosthenes proposed to make one more attempt toforce the entrance of the Great Harbour; but when his suggestion wasmade known to the crews, they broke into open mutiny, and flatlyrefused to go on board. The generals were therefore compelled to adoptthe only alternative, and it was resolved to set out on that verynight. But Fortune had not yet exhausted her malice against the haplessAthenians. The order to strike camp had been issued, and the soldierswere busy preparing for the march, when a party of horsemen rode up tothe Athenian outposts, and hailing the sentinels, said that they had amessage to Nicias from his friends in Syracuse. "Tell him," said thespokesman of the party, "That he must not attempt to stir to-night, forall the roads are held by strong detachments of the Syracusans. Let himwait until he has organised his forces, for a hasty and disorderedflight is sure to end in disaster."
The message, of course, came from Hermocrates, who had contrived thistrick to delay the departure of the Athenians, until time had beengained to occupy the passes on their route. That Nicias should havefallen into the snare is not surprising, but it is less easy to explainhow Demosthenes and the other generals came to be deceived by sotransparent a fraud. Yet such was in fact the case; the insidious hintwas accepted as a piece of friendly advice, and the march waspostponed. For a whole day and night the Athenians still lingered onthe spot, and thus gave ample time for their enemies to draw the netround them, and block every avenue to safety.
On the third day after the battle, the order was given to march. As thegreat army formed into column, the full horror of their situation camehome to every heart. This, then, was the end of those grand dreams ofconquest with which they had sailed to Sicily two years before! On theheights of Epipolae their walls and their fort was still standing, amonument of failure and defeat. Each familiar landmark reminded them ofsome fallen comrade, or some disastrous incident in the siege. If theyglanced towards the Great Harbour, they could see the victoriousSyracusans towing off the shattered hull of an Athenian trireme, thelast sad remnant of two great armaments. If they turned their thoughtstowards Athens and home, they found no comfort there; for their belovedcity was beset with enemies, and in themselves, beaten and broken asthey were, lay her chief hope of salvation. The past was all black withcalamity, and the future loomed terrible before them, threateningcaptivity and death; and the present, in that last hour of parting, wasfull of such sights and sounds of woe as might have stirred pity evenin the breasts of their enemies. Around them, the camp was strewn withthe unburied corpses of brothers, comrades and sons, and thousands morewere tossing on the waves, or flung up on the shores of the bay. Andwhile the neglect of that sacred duty pressed heavily on theirconscience, still more harrowing were the cries of the sick andwounded, who clung round their knees, imploring to be taken with them,and when the army began to move followed with tottering steps, untilthey sank down exhausted, calling down the curse of heaven on theretreating host. Such was the anguish of that moment, that it seemed asif the whole population of some great city had been driven into exile,and was seeking a new home in a distant soil.
In this dire extremity, when the strongest spirits were crushed withmisery, one voice was heard, which still spoke of hope. It was thevoice of Nicias, who, when all others faltered, rose to a pitch ofheroism which he had never shown before. Bowed as he was with care, andwasted by disease, he braced himself with more than human energy, andmoved with light step from rank to rank, exhorting that strickenmultitude in words of power. "Comrades," he said, "even now there is noneed to despair. Others have been saved before now from calamities yetdeeper than ours. You see in what state I am, cast down from the summitof human prosperity, and condemned, in my age and weakness, to sharethe hardships of the humblest soldier among you,--I, who was everconstant in the service of the gods, and punctual in the performance ofevery social duty. Yet have I not lost faith in the righteousness ofheaven, nor should you give up all for lost, if by any act of yours youhave fallen under the scourge of divine vengeance. There is mercy, aswell as justice, among the gods, and we, in sinking thus low, havebecome the proper objects of their compassion. Think too what firmground of confidence we have, in the shields and spears of so manythousand warriors. There is no power in Sicily which can resist us,either to prevent our coming or to shorten our stay. A few days marchwill bring us to the country of the friendly Sicels, who have alreadyreceived notice of our approach. Once there, we can defy all attack,and look forward to the time when we shall see our homes again, andraise up the fallen power of Athens."
These and similar exhortations were repeated by Nicias again and again,as the army moved slowly forwards up the valley of the Anapus, keepinga westerly direction, towards the interior of the island. The troopswere formed in a hollow oblong, with the baggage animals andcamp-followers in the middle, and advanced in two divisions, Niciasleading the van, and Demosthenes bringing up the rear. The vigilanceand activity of Nicias never relaxed for a moment. Careless of his manyinfirmities and exalted rank, he passed incessantly up and down thecolumn, chiding the stragglers, and attending to the even trim of hislines. On reaching the ford of the Anapus, they put to flight adetachment of the enemy which was stationed there to oppose theirpassage, and crossing the river, continued their march. But now thereal difficulties of the retreat began to appear. The Syracusans had nointention of hazarding a pitched battle, but their horsemen and lightinfantry hung upon the flanks of the Athenian army, making suddencharges, and keeping up a constant discharge of javelins.
At nightfall the Athenians encamped under the shelter of a hill, somefive miles from their starting-point, and setting out at daybreak onthe following day, they pushed on with pain and difficulty, harassed atevery step by the galling attacks of the Syracusan troops. [Footnote:Thucydides, with characteristic brevity, leaves this to be inferredfrom the slowness of their progress.] A march of two miles and a halfbrought them to a village, situated on a level plain, and here theyhalted, wishing to supply themselves with food, and replenish theirwater-vessels; for the country which they had now to traverse was adesert, many miles in extent. Directly in their line of route there isa narrow pass, when the road, on entering the hill country, drops sheerdown on either side into a deep ravine, and if they could once crossthis dangerous point they would be within reach of their allies, theSicels. But it was too late to proceed further that day, and while theylay encamped in the village, the Syracusans hurried on in advance, andblocked the pass by building a wall across the road. When the Atheniansresumed their march next morning, they were fiercely assailed by theenemy's light horse and foot, who disputed every inch of ground, and atlast compelled them to fall back on the village where they had encampedthe night before. Provisions were now growing scanty, and every attemptto leave their lines in search of plunder and forage was baffled by
theSyracusan horse.
On the fourth day they broke up their camp early, and by incessantfighting succeeded in forcing their way as far as the pass. But allfurther advance was prevented by the wall, and the dense masses ofinfantry posted behind it. In vain the Athenians flung themselves againand again upon the barrier. The troops stationed on the cliffs aboveassailed them with a shower of missiles, and the solid phalanx ofhoplites repulsed every assault. Convinced at last that they werewasting their strength to no purpose, they desisted, and retiring fromthe wall halted at some distance for a brief interval of repose. Duringthis pause a storm of rain and thunder broke over their heads; and tothe weary and disheartened Athenians it seemed that the very elementswere in league with the enemy against them. But they had little time toindulge in these melancholy reflections; for while they were resting,Gylippus stole round to their rear, and prepared to cut off theirretreat by building a second wall across the pass. The news of thisimminent peril roused the Athenians from their stupor, and they marchedback with all speed along the road by which they had come. A pickedbody of troops, sent on in advance, scattered the soldiers of Gylippus,and the whole army then emerged from that death-trap, and encamped forthe night in the open plain.
The next day was spent in a last desperate effort to reach the hillcountry. But being now on level ground, they were exposed on all sidesto the attacks of the Syracusan horse, who charged them incessantly,and slew their men by hundreds, with hardly any loss to themselves. Thehopeless struggle continued until evening, and when the enemy drew off,they left the Athenians not a mile from the place where they had passedthe previous night.
The original plan of the Athenian generals had been to penetrate thehighlands of Sicily to the west of Syracuse, and then strike acrosscountry, until they reached the southern coast, in the direction ofGela or Camarina. [Footnote: I have followed Holm, as cited inClassen's Appendix (Third Edition, 1908).] But after two days' fightingthey had utterly failed to force an entrance into the mountains. Manyof their soldiers were wounded, the whole army was weakened by famine,and a third attempt, made in such conditions, must inevitably end inutter disaster. They resolved therefore to change their route, andmarch southwards along the level coast country, until they could reachthe interior by following one of the numerous glens which pierce thehills on this side of Sicily. Having come to this decision, they causeda great number of fires to be lighted, and then gave the order for animmediate start, hoping by this means to steal a march on the enemy.This sudden flight through the darkness, in a hostile country, withunknown terrors around them, caused something like a panic in theAthenian army.
Nicias, however, who was still leading the van, contrived to keep hismen together, and made good progress; but the division underDemosthenes fell into great disorder, and was left far behind. Bydaybreak, both divisions [Footnote: See note, p. 242.] were withinsight of the sea, and entering the road which runs north and southbetween Syracuse and Helorus, they continued their march towards theriver Cacyparis. Here they intended to turn off into the interior, withthe assistance of the Sicels, whom they expected to meet at the river.But when they reached the ford of the Cacyparis, they found, instead ofthe Sicels, a contingent of Syracusan troops, who were raising a walland palisade to block the passage. This obstruction was overcomewithout much difficulty, and the whole Athenian army crossed the riverin safety. But the presence of the enemy on this side of Syracuse wassufficient to deter them from taking the inland route by the valley ofthe Cacyparis, and following the advice of their guides, they kept themain road, and pressed on towards the south.
We must now return for a moment to the Syracusans under Gylippus, whoremained in their camp all night, not far from the pass which they hadso successfully defended. When they found in the morning that theAthenians had departed, they were loud in their anger against Gylippus,thinking that he had purposely suffered them to escape. The tracks ofso many thousands left no room for doubt as to the direction which thefugitives had taken, and full of rage at the supposed treachery oftheir leader, the Syracusans set out at once in hot pursuit. Aboutnoon, on the sixth day of the retreat, they overtook the division ofDemosthenes, which had again lagged behind, and was marching slowly andin disorder separated from the other half of the army by a distance ofsix miles. Deprived of all hope of succour from his colleague, andhemmed in on all sides by implacable enemies, Demosthenes called ahalt, and prepared to make his last stand. But his men, who from thefirst had held the post of honour and danger, were fearfully reduced innumbers, faint with famine, and exhausted by their long march. Drivento and fro by the incessant charges of the Syracusan cavalry, theycould make no effective resistance, and at last they huddled pell-mellinto a walled enclosure, planted with olive-trees, and skirted oneither side by a road. They were now at the mercy of the Syracusans.who surrounded the enclosure, and plied them with javelins, stones, andarrows. After this butchery had continued for many hours, and thesurvivors were brought to extremity by wounds, hunger, and thirst,Gylippus sent a herald, who was the bearer of a remarkable message."Let those of you," he said, "who are natives of the islands subject toAthens, come over to us, and you shall be free men." The offer wasaddressed to the Greeks from the maritime cities of the Aegaean, whomight be supposed to be serving under compulsion, and it speaks volumesfor the loyalty and attachment of these men to Athens that most of themrefused to accept their freedom from the hands of her enemies. Atlength, however, the whole army of Demosthenes, which had now dwindledto six thousand men, was induced to surrender, on condition that noneof them should suffer death by violence, by bonds, or by starvation. Atthe command of their captors they gave up the money which they had withthem, and the amount collected was so considerable that it filled thehollows of four shields. When the capitulation was concluded,Demosthenes, who had refused to make any terms for himself, drew hissword, and attempted to take his own life; [Footnote: This interestingfact is recorded by Plutarch and Pausanias, who copied it from thecontemporary Syracusan historian, Philistus.] but he was prevented fromeffecting his purpose, and compelled to take his place in the mournfulprocession which was now conducted by a strong guard along the road toSyracuse.
Meanwhile the vanguard under Nicias, in total ignorance of the fatewhich had befallen their comrades, marched steadily forwards, andcrossing the river Erineus, encamped for the night on a neighbouringhill. Here they were found next morning by Gylippus and the Syracusans,who informed them that Demosthenes and his men had surrendered, andcalled upon them to do the same. Doubting their good faith, Niciasobtained a truce, while he sent a horseman to ascertain the facts; andeven when he had learnt the truth from his messenger, he still tried toparley, offering, in the name of the Athenian state, to defray thewhole cost of the war, and to give hostages for payment, at the rate ofan Athenian citizen for each talent, on condition that he and his menwere allowed to go. But the Syracusans were in no mood to listen tosuch proposals, even if Nicias had spoken with full authority fromAthens. Bare life they would grant, but no more, and as the Atheniansrefused to yield on these terms, they closed in upon them, and thecruel, hopeless struggle began again, and continued until evening. Thewretched Athenians lay down supperless to snatch a few hours of rest,intending, when all was quiet, to steal away under cover of darkness.But when they rose at dead of night, and prepared to march, a shoutfrom the Syracusan camp warned them that the enemy were on the alert,and they were compelled to return to their comfortless bivouac. Threehundred, however, persisted in their intention, and forcing their waythrough the Syracusan lines, gained for themselves a brief respite fromcapture.
A whole week had now elapsed since the ill-fated army left its quarterson the shores of the Great Harbour, and a few thousand starving andweary men were all that remained of that great host. At dawn on theeighth day Nicias gave the word to march, and they pressed on eagerlytowards the Assinarus, a stream of some size, with high and precipitousbanks, not more than two miles distant from their last halting-place.They had still some faint hope of making
good their escape, if theycould but cross the river. So they fought their way onwards, throughthe swarming ranks of the Syracusans, who closed them in on all sides,and thrust them together into one solid mass. There was life, there wasfreedom a little way beyond,--or, if that hope proved futile, at anyrate there was water; and every fibre in their bodies ached and burnedwith intolerable thirst. They reached the river; both banks werealready lined by the Syracusan horse, who had ridden on before, andstood guarding the ford: but there was no stopping the wild rush ofthat maddened, desperate multitude. Down the steep bank they plunged,trampling on one another, and flung themselves open-mouthed upon thestream, with one thought, one wish, overpowering every otherimpulse,--to drink, and then to die. Some fell upon the spears of theircomrades, and perished, others slipped on the floating baggage, losttheir foothold, and were swept away by the flood. Yet still they pouredon, by hundreds and by thousands, drawn by the same longing, and thrustdownwards by the weight of those behind, until the whole riverbed wasfilled with a huddled, surging mob of furious men, who drank, and stilldrank, or fought with one another to reach the water. All this time aniron storm of missiles rained down upon them from the thronging hostsof their enemies on the banks above, while some, in the midst of theirdraught, were pierced by the spears of the Peloponnesians, who followedthem into the river, and slew them at close quarters. The water grewred with blood, and foul from the trampling of so many feet, but thethirsty multitude still came crowding in, and drank with avidity of thepolluted stream.
For a long time the slaughter raged unchecked, and the river-bed waschoked with heaps of slain. A few, who escaped from the river, werepursued and cut down by the Syracusan horse. Nicias had held out untilthe last moment; but when he perceived that all was lost, his men beingpowerless either to fight or fly, he made his way to Gylippus, andimplored him to stop the useless carnage. "I surrender myself," hesaid, "to you and the Spartans. Do with me as you please, but put anend to this butchery of defenceless men." Gylippus gave the necessaryorder, and the word was passed round to kill no more, but take captivethose who survived. The order was obeyed, though slowly and withreluctance, and the work of capture began. But few of those taken inthe river ever found their way into the public gaol, where Demostheneswas now lying, with the six thousand who had surrendered on the daybefore. For, as there had been no regular capitulation, large numbersof the prisoners were secretly conveyed away by the Syracusans, whoafterwards sold them into slavery for their own profit. As for thethree hundred who had broken out of camp on the previous night, theywere presently brought in by a party of cavalry despatched in pursuit.
When the first transports of joy and triumph were over, an assembly wascalled to decide on the fate of the two Athenian generals, and of thosestate prisoners, some seven thousand in number, who were the solevisible remnant of two great armies. Then arose a strange conflict ofmotives. The first who put forward his claims was Gylippus, to whosegenius and energy the victorious issue of the struggle was mainly due.As a reward for his services, he asked that Nicias and Demosthenesshould be left to his disposal, for he wished to have the honour ofcarrying home with him these famous captains, one the greatest friend,the other the greatest enemy of Sparta. But the general voice of theassembly was strongly against him. Nothing but the blood of the twoprincipal offenders could satisfy the vengeance of the Syracusans, andthose who had intrigued with Nicias were anxious to put him out of theway, in fear lest he should betray them. Moreover the Corinthian alliesof Syracuse, who for some reason had a special grudge against Nicias,demanded his immediate execution. In vain Hermocrates pleaded the causeof mercy, [Footnote: Plutarch, _Nicias_, c. 28.] and urged hisfellow-citizens to make a generous use of their victory. Sentence ofdeath was passed, and these two eminent Athenians, so different incharacter and achievement, were united in their end.
Far worse was the doom pronounced on the six thousand men ofDemosthenes, and the thousand more who were brought to Syracuse afterthe massacre at the Assinarus. They were condemned to confinement inthe stone quarries, deep pits surrounded by high walls of cliff, underthe south-eastern edge of Epipolae. Penned together in these rooflessdungeons, they were exposed to the fierce heat of the sun by day, andto the bitter cold of the autumn nights, and having scarcely room tomove, they were unable to preserve common decency, or commoncleanliness. Many died of their wounds, or of the diseases engenderedby exposure, and their bodies were left unburied, a sight of horror anda source of infection to the survivors. To these frightful miserieswere added a perpetual burning thirst, and the lingering torture ofslow starvation, for each man received as his daily allowance a poorhalf pint of water, and a mere pittance of food, just enough to avoidbreaking the letter of the conditions which Demosthenes had made forhis troops. In this state they were left without relief for ten longweeks; then all except the Athenians themselves, and their allies fromthe Greek cities of Sicily and Italy, were taken out and sold as slaves.
EPILOGUE
Such was the end of the Sicilian Expedition, which ultimately decidedthe issue of the Peloponnesian War. Forsaking the wise counsels oftheir greatest statesman, and carried away by the mad sophistry ofAlcibiades, the Athenians had committed themselves, heart and soul, toa wild game of hazard, in which they had little to win, and everythingto lose. By this act of desperate folly they brought on themselves anoverwhelming disaster, from which it was impossible for them wholly torecover. With wonderful vitality they rallied from the blow, andstruggled on for nine years more, against the whole power ofPeloponnesus, and their own revolted allies, backed by the influenceand the gold of Persia. They gained great victories, and under prudentleaders they might still have been saved from the worst consequences oftheir defeat in Sicily. But at every favourable crisis they wantonlyflung away the advantage they had gained, and abandoned themselves toblind guides, who led them further and further on the road to ruin.
The history of Thucydides ends abruptly in the twenty-first year of thewar, and for an account of the closing scenes we have to go to thepages of Xenophon. It will be convenient, therefore, to bring ournarrative to a close at the point which we have reached, for anyattempt even to sketch the events of this confused and troubled periodwould carry us far beyond the limits of the present volume. And so forthe present we take leave of the Athenians, in the hour of theirdecline. Their light is burning dim, and yet darker days are awaitingthem in the future. But they are still great and illustrious, as thechief guardians of those spiritual treasures which are our choicestheritage from the past.
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