STORIES FROM THUCYDIDES
CORINTH AND CORCYRA
I
It was in a remote corner of the Greek world that the trouble beganwhich was destined to breed such mischief and havoc for the whole ofGreece. At the beginning of the seventh century before our era theisland of Corcyra had been colonised by the Corinthians. The colonygrew and flourished, and in its turn founded other settlements on theopposite coasts of Epirus and Illyria. Among these was Epidamnus,called by the Romans Dyrrachium, and in Roman times the ordinarylanding-place for travellers from Italy to Greece. After many years ofprosperity the resources of Epidamnus were much crippled by internalfaction, and by wars with the neighbouring barbarians. Four yearsbefore the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the nobles of Epidamnus,who had been expelled in the last revolution, made an alliance with thenative tribes of Illyria, and by constant plundering raids reduced theEpidamnians to such straits that they were compelled to apply toCorcyra for help. But the Corcyraeans, whose sympathies were on theside of the banished nobles, refused to interfere.
Epidamnus, as we have seen, was a colony founded by a colony, andaccording to Greek custom the original settlers had been led by acitizen of Corinth, the mother-city of Corcyra. Seeing, therefore, thatthey had nothing to hope from the Corcyraeans, the distressed people ofEpidamnus began to turn their thoughts towards their ancientmetropolis, and considered whether they should appeal to her to savethem from ruin. But as this was a step of doubtful propriety, theyfirst consulted the oracle of Delphi, the great authority on questionsof international law. Receiving a favourable answer, they sent envoysto Corinth, and offered to surrender their city to the Corinthians, inreturn for their countenance and protection.
The Corcyraeans had long been in evil odour at Corinth, for they hadgrown insolent in prosperity, and neglected all the observances whichwere due from a colony to the mother-city. They were, in fact, superiorto the Corinthians in wealth and power, and their fleet, numbering ahundred and twenty triremes, was second only to that of Athens. Corcyrawas famous in legend as the seat of the Phaeacians, a heroic sailorrace, whose deeds are sung by Homer in the _Odyssey_; and theCorcyraeans regarded themselves as the lawful inheritors of their fame.For all these reasons they despised the Corinthians, and made no secretof their contempt. Remembering the many occasions on which they hadbeen publicly insulted by Corcyra, the Corinthians lent a favourableear to the petition of Epidamnus, and determined to appropriate thecolony to themselves. Accordingly they invited all who chose to go andsettle at Epidamnus, and sent the new colonists under a militaryescort, with instructions to proceed by land to Apollonia, for fearlest they should be obstructed by the Corcyraean fleet, if they went bysea.
Great was the indignation at Corcyra when the news arrived that hercolony had been surrendered to Corinth, and a force of forty ships wassent off in haste, bearing a peremptory demand to the Epidamnians thatthey should receive back their exiles and send away the new colonists.As the citizens refused to obey their mandate, they prepared to laysiege to the town, which is situated on an isthmus.
When the Corinthians heard of the danger of Epidamnus, they began tomake preparations on a much larger scale, collecting a host of newcolonists, and a fleet of seventy-five ships to convoy them on theirpassage to Epidamnus. Apprised of these proceedings, the Corcyraeanssent envoys to Corinth, with a civil remonstrance against the arbitraryinterference with their own colony. They were willing, they said, tosubmit the matter to arbitration, and in the meantime to suspend allhostilities against the revolted city. But the Corinthians paid noattention to their overtures, and all being now ready, the greatmultitude, drawn from all parts of Greece, set sail for Epidamnus. Whenthey reached Actium, at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, they were metby a herald, sent out from Corcyra in a skiff, to forbid theirapproach. This was a mere manoeuvre, to throw the guilt of commencinghostilities on the Corinthians; and meanwhile the Corcyraeans mannedtheir ships, to the number of eighty, and put out to meet the enemy'sfleet. In the sea-fight which followed the Corcyraeans gained acomplete victory, and on the same day Epidamnus was compelled tocapitulate to the besieging force.
By this victory the Corcyraeans gained complete command of the westernor Ionian sea, and for the rest of the summer they sailed from place toplace, plundering the allies of Corinth. The Corinthians, however, werenot at all disposed to acquiesce in their defeat, and during the wholeof the following year they were busy organising a fresh expedition on avast scale, being resolved at all costs to put down the insolence ofCorcyra. These preparations caused no small anxiety to the Corcyraeans.Hitherto they had stood apart, and refused to take any share in thecomplicated game of Greek politics. The course of affairs during thelast forty years had tended more and more to divide the Greek worldinto two opposite camps, arrayed under the banners of Athens andSparta. As Dorians, the Corcyraeans would naturally have enrolledthemselves among the allies of Sparta,--as islanders and seamen, theymight have leaned to the side of Athens: but confident in their remotesituation, and in the power of their fleet, they had chosen to remainneutral. But finding themselves threatened with destruction, they nowresolved to abandon their policy of selfish isolation, and sue foradmission into the Athenian alliance. Ambassadors were sent to Athensto urge their plea; and the Corinthians, hearing of their intention,sent representatives of their own to oppose the application.
The Athenians were fully alive to the gravity of the question whichthey were called upon to decide, and after listening to the argumentsof the Corcyraean and Corinthian orators, they adjourned the debateuntil the next day. To Corinth they were bound by old ties ofobligation; for on three distinct occasions the Corinthians had donethem signal service. More than seventy years before the date which wehave reached, the Spartans summoned their allies to consider whether itwas expedient to compel the Athenians to receive back the banishedtyrant Hippias; and it was chiefly by the eloquence of the Corinthianspeaker Sosicles, who drew a vivid picture of the miseries ofdespotical government, that they were shamed out of their purpose. Afew years later, when the Athenians were at war with Aegina, they wereaided by twenty Corinthian ships. And quite recently, in the greatperil which menaced Athens at the revolt of Samos, Corinth had oncemore shown herself a friend. At a congress of the Peloponnesian allies,summoned to consider an appeal from the Samians for help, theCorinthians had spoken strongly against interference with the revoltedallies of another city. Corinth was a place of old renown, the queen ofthe Isthmus, a centre of civilisation; whereas Corcyra was a remoteisland, and her people, though Greeks by descent, were in manners andcharacter more than half barbarians.
But there were two arguments put forward by the Corcyraean orator,which outweighed all other considerations of policy or friendship. Thefirst was addressed to the fears of the Athenians, the second to theirambition. War, he argued, was inevitable, and it was of the utmostimportance for Athens to secure the alliance of the Corcyraean fleet,and prevent it from being added to the naval forces of her enemies. Andhis concluding words struck a note which found a response among themore daring spirits among his hearers, whose thoughts, as it wouldseem, were already turning to the western colonies of Greece, as a newfield of enterprise and conquest. "It will not do," he said, "to be toonice. While you are hesitating, and weighing nice points ofinternational right, you will be outdistanced in the race for power, ifyou tamely give up a great naval station which holds the key to Italyand Sicily."
Such reasoning, hollow and false as it was, turned the scale in favourof Corcyra, and a defensive alliance was concluded, pledging theAthenians and Corcyraeans to aid each other against any attack on theterritory or allies of either state. For the Athenians wished to avoidbreaking the Thirty Years' Truce, and therefore refrained from enteringinto any agreement which might oblige them to acts of open aggressionagainst Corinth.
There can be little doubt that Pericles, who was mainly responsible forthis decision, committed a fatal error in advising the Athenians totake up the cause of Corcyra. By this a
ct Athens incurred theimplacable hostility of Corinth, and revived the old grudge which thatcity had conceived against her when Megara joined the Athenianalliance. In the constantly shifting currents of Greek politics, Athensmight well, under wise guidance, have steered her way safely throughthe perils which surrounded her. The Corinthians had half forgottentheir grievance, as is proved by their conduct at the revolt of Samos;and the tone of their representative at the Corcyraean debate isdecidedly friendly. The Spartans were sluggish and procrastinating bynature, and required some powerful impulse to induce them to act withvigour; and this impulse was now supplied by Corinth. By accepting,therefore, the alliance of Corcyra, Athens barred the way to allcompromise, and gathered into one head all the scattered causes ofjealousy and hatred which had been accumulating against her in the lastfifty years.
Early in the following year the Corinthian fleet, numbering a hundredand fifty sail, put to sea from Corinth, to renew the war with Corcyra,and a battle was fought off the coast of Epirus. The engagement waslong and fierce, and the event was finally decided by a small squadronof Athenian ships, which had been sent with instructions to hinder anyattempt of the enemy to land on the island Seeing that the Corcyraeanswere being forced back upon their own coast, the Athenian captains, whohad hitherto looked on, and taken no part in the battle, now assumedthe offensive, and lent such effectual aid that the Corinthians wereheld in check until the sudden appearance of twenty additional shipsfrom Athens, which had been sent off immediately after the others, putan end to the action. This timely interference saved Corcyra from ruin;for next day the Corinthians, after a formal remonstrance, set sail forhome, taking with them two hundred and fifty prisoners, belonging tothe noblest families in Corcyra, whom they kept in safe custody, buttreated with great consideration, hoping by means of them at somefuture time to recover their influence in the island.
II
It was not long before the effects of this impolitic breach withCorinth were sensibly felt by Athens. In the course of the followingsummer, Potidaea, a Corinthian colony, situated on the borders ofMacedon, and included in the Athenian alliance, openly raised thestandard of revolt, encouraged by promises from Sparta, and by thepresence of a strong body of hoplites, sent for its support fromCorinth. Potidaea was presently closely invested by an Athenian armyand fleet, and the Corinthians pretended to make this a fresh ground ofcomplaint, though they had themselves incited the city to throw off itsallegiance to Athens.
Feeling that matters were now approaching a crisis, the Spartanssummoned a congress of their allies, and invited all who had anygrievance against Athens to state their case. Then some spoke of thewrongs of Aegina, formerly not the least among Greek cities, but now socrushed under the yoke of Athens that she had not dared to raise hervoice openly against the tyrant-city. The Megarians complained of therestrictions on their commerce, which threatened them with an emptyexchequer and a starving population; and others followed in the samestrain. When all the rest had spoken, the Corinthian orator, who hadreserved his eloquence till the end, came forward and delivered avehement harangue, containing hardly any specific charge againstAthens, but well calculated to inflame the passions and provoke thepride of the Spartans. Though the acknowledged leader of Greece, andchampion of her liberties, Sparta, he said, had always been the last tosee the dangers which menaced the common country, and the last to takemeasures for her defence. Spartan apathy and indolence had brought theGreeks to the brink of ruin in the Persian War; and when that dangerwas passed, the same fatal indifference had enabled Athens to advancestep by step on the path of aggrandisement; until now she had grown sostrong that the united force of the whole Peloponnesian league would berequired to put her down. Why had not the Spartans listened to thewarnings which they had heard, when the Athenians were rebuilding theirwalls? Then they might have stopped the evil at its source, and saved amultitude of cities from slavery and oppression. "Consider," cried theorator, warming to his subject, "what manner of men these Atheniansare, and how vast is the difference between them and you. While you areshut up in this inland valley, treading the dull round of mechanicalroutine, they are continually pushing forward the boundaries of theirempire, toiling night and day to make their city great, never satisfiedwith what they have, always thirsting for more. Cautious, timid, andconservative as you are, hardly to be roused from your sloth by themost imminent perils, how can you hope to curb the flight of Athenianambition, which knows no limit, and is checked by no reverse?
"Men of Sparta, I speak as a friend, and you will not take my candouramiss. New times require new manners, and if you would maintain yourgreat position you must move with the march of events, and abandon yourold-fashioned ways. Do not mistake stagnation for stability, but learna lesson even from these hated Athenians, who have risen to theirpresent pitch of greatness by adapting themselves to every new need asit arose.
"You know what you have to do, if you would wipe out the reproach whichrests upon you, and keep the respect of your faithful allies. Send anarmy into Attica, and compel the Athenians to withdraw their forcesfrom Potidaea. And let it be done speedily, for while we are talkingour kinsmen are perishing."
It happened that an Athenian embassy was present in Sparta, having beensent there on some other business, and not for the purpose ofrepresenting Athens at the debate. But when they heard of the outcrywhich had been raised against their city, the envoys asked permissionfor one of their number to address the Spartan assembly, wishing toexplain the true character and origin of the Athenian Empire, and towarn the Spartans against plunging the whole country into the horrorsof civil war. Leave being granted, the Athenian orator entered on hissubject by sketching the course of events for the last sixty years.Athens, he said, had twice saved Greece, first at Marathon, andafterwards at Salamis. On the first of these occasions she had stoodalmost alone against an overwhelming force of Persians; and ten yearslater, though betrayed by her allies, she had borne the brunt againstthe navy of Xerxes. Who, then, was worthier than she to hold empireover Greeks? That empire had been forced upon her by the inertness ofSparta, and by the cowardice and sloth of her own allies in the Delianleague. The power thus gained had been used with moderation, in markedcontrast to the previous tyranny of Persia exercised over the samecities, and the arrogance of Spartan officers when engaged on foreignservice. But a light yoke, it would seem, was harder to bear than aheavy one; if Athens had openly oppressed her subjects, she would neverhave heard a murmur.
Having thus tried to combat the prejudice against Athens, the oratoraddressed himself directly to the Spartans, and said: "Consider theawful responsibility which you will incur, if you suffer yourselves tobe carried away by the invectives of your allies, and drive us againstour will to tempt with you the dark uncertainties and perilous issuesof war. There is still time for an amicable settlement of ourdifferences: Athens is prepared to make all reasonable concessions, andto submit to arbitration, as the terms of the treaty direct. And if youdecline to accept this offer, the guilt of the aggressor will lie withyou."
It is remarkable that the speaker, in tracing the later course ofAthenian policy, lays no claim to those high motives of patriotismwhich had inspired his people with sublime self-devotion twogenerations back. He boldly asserts the principle that it is lawful forthe stronger to rule the weaker, and claims merit for Athens inabstaining from excessive abuse of her power. The Athenians, we maybelieve, had been tainted by the baseness of their confederates. In theearly days of the Delian league they had not attempted to educate theGreeks whom they led up to the standard of their own splendidzeal,--or, if the attempt had been made, it was unsuccessful. They hadtaken upon themselves the whole burden of a great public duty, andstanding alone, without moral support from their countrymen, they hadgradually fallen away from the pure and lofty virtues of theirancestors. This decay of public morality proceeds with rapid strides inthe years which follow, and we shall presently hear the doctrine thatmight is right proclaimed with cynical frankness by the lips of anAthenian.
r /> Having heard the complaints of their allies against Athens, and thereply of the Athenian orator, the Spartans ordered all but those oftheir own race to withdraw, and continued the debate with closed doors.A great majority of the speakers were in favour of declaring immediatewar on Athens. But there was one important exception: the agedArchidamus, who for the last fourteen years had been reigning as soleking at Sparta, spoke strongly against the imprudence of assuming theaggressive, before they had made adequate preparations to cope with theoffending city. It was an opinion generally held by the war-party thatthe Athenians would be ready to make any concessions, in order to savethe land of Attica from ravage. This, said Archidamus, was a greaterror; and the event proved that he was right. The Athenians, withtheir great colonial empire, and complete command of the sea, werequite independent of the products of their own estates in Attica. Andmany years must elapse before the states of Peloponnesus could train afleet, and attack them on the sea, where alone they were assailable. Itwas folly to suppose that such a contest could be decided by a singlesummer campaign, as was commonly believed by the enemies of Athens. "Ifear rather," said the king, with prophetic foresight, "that we shallleave this war as an inheritance to our children; such is the power,and such the pride, of the state with which we have to contend." On theother hand, the Spartans, as champions of the liberties of Greece, mustnot allow the common oppressors of their countrymen to continue theircareer of tyranny unchecked. Let them first, however, try what could beeffected by negotiation, and in the meantime prepare for war, bybuilding ships, and above all by collecting money, without which alltheir valour would be useless. Then, if Athens still refused to listento reason, they might declare war with better hope of success.
The speech of Archidamus shows a true insight into the nature of thecrisis which the Spartans were called upon to face, and his views wereamply justified by subsequent events. His wise words were no doubtapplauded by the older and more sober-minded among his hearers. Butthere was another and a much more numerous party at that time inSparta, filled with bitter envy and hatred against Athens. Theirpassions had been inflamed by the invectives of the Corinthian orator,and without counting the cost they were resolved to try the issues ofimmediate battle. Their blind rancour found expression in the curt andpithy harangue of Sthenelaidas, one of the five Ephors, a college ofmagistrates which in recent years had greatly encroached on theauthority of the kings. Sthenelaidas spoke with true laconic brevity."I don't understand," he said, "all the fine talk of these Athenians.They have told us a great deal about their own merits, but have notsaid a word in answer to the charges brought against them. Even if weaccept their own account of themselves, their good conduct in the pastonly lends a darker colour to their present crimes. We have one plainduty to perform, and that is to save our faithful allies fromill-treatment. The time for words is past--leave them to thetransgressor. Our part is to act, at once, and with all our might, andput down the overwhelming insolence of Athens."
Then, in his capacity as Ephor, Sthenelaidas, without staying forfurther argument, forthwith put the question to the Spartan assembly.According to their ordinary procedure, the Spartans gave their votes bycries of "Ay" and "No." But on this occasion Sthenelaidas pretended tobe unable to distinguish whether the "Ays" or "Nos" had it, and wishingto encourage the war-party by showing how much they were in themajority, he ordered the house to divide on the question whether thetreaty was broken, and whether the Athenians were in the wrong or not.The division was made, and a great majority were in favour of themotion, recording their votes against Athens. The allies were thencalled in, and informed to the result of the private debate, and a daywas named for a general synod of the whole Peloponnesian league, toreconsider the situation and decide whether war was to be declared.
In the interval, before the final assembly of the allies, the Spartanssent to ask the oracle at Delphi whether it was expedient for them tomake war; and the answer, according to common report, was that if theyfought with all their might they would conquer, and that the god[Footnote: Apollo.] would be on their side. The Corinthians were at thesame time carrying on an active canvass against Athens, sending theiragents from city to city to blow up the flames of war.
In the autumn of the same year the allies met in full synod at Sparta,and once more the Corinthian speaker led the cry against Athens, andcalled for a unanimous war-vote, flattering his hearers with hopes of aspeedy victory. The Spartans, he said, had at last set a good exampleto their allies, and shown themselves convinced that imperial citieshad imperial obligations, by pronouncing in favour of war. Every memberof the league must join heartily in the struggle, whether he belongedto an inland or to a maritime city; for if the seaports were closed bythe Athenian fleets, the inland towns would be prevented from exportingtheir products, and importing what they wanted from abroad. War, then,was in the interest of the whole body of allies. And on the moral sidetheir position was equally sound, for they were only acting ondesperate provocation, and the common god of Greece had promisedsuccess to their arms. But to deserve that success, all must co-operateheartily, contributing freely from their private purses to raise afleet which would make them a match for Athens on her own element. Andthey must watch the course of events with a vigilant eye, and be readyto seize any opportunity which might arise to aim a decisive blow attheir common enemy. Let them be warned by the experience of theIonians, and put out all their strength to save themselves from beingswallowed up by the devouring ambition of Athens. Justice, heaven'sfavour, the good-will of all Greece, were on their side.
Others spoke to the same effect, and then the representatives of eachcity were called up in turn to give their vote; and by far the greaternumber voted for war. But many months elapsed before any overt act ofhostility occurred, and the time was occupied in preparations for aninvasion of Attica, and in a series of demands sent by Sparta to trythe temper of the Athenians, and put them in the wrong, if they refusedto comply. The first of these messages was conveyed in mysteriousterms, bidding the Athenians "to drive out the curse of the goddess."The meaning of this was as follows: nearly two hundred years before acertain Cylon tried to make himself tyrant of Athens: the attempt wasfrustrated, and some of his adherents, who had taken refuge in thesacred precinct of Athene, were put to death by the magistrates, afterthey had surrendered under a solemn promise that their lives should bespared. The illustrious family of the Alcmaeonidae was especiallyconcerned in this act of murder and sacrilege, and the Spartans, inreviving the memory of an ancient crime, were aiming a blow atPericles, who was descended on his mother's side from the Alcmaeonidae.For the Athenians were highly sensitive in all matters of religion, andit was possible that they might even banish Pericles, if theirconsciences were suddenly alarmed. And though this was not likely, theSpartans hoped at any rate to lessen his influence, which was adverseto themselves, and fasten on him the odium of being, in some sense, thecause of the war. But their manoeuvre was unsuccessful, and theAthenians retorted by bidding the Spartans drive out the curse ofTaenarus, in allusion to the murder of certain Helots who had takensanctuary in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus. And they furthercharged the Spartans to rid themselves of the curse of Athene of theBrazen House. This was a holy place in Sparta, where Pausanias, whenconvicted of treasonable correspondence with Persia, had sought refugefrom the vengeance of the Spartans. He was kept a close prisoner in thetemple by the Ephors, who set a watch on him, to prevent him from beingsupplied with food, and when he was reduced to the last extremity,brought him out to die. But though his death occurred outside thetemple, this did not save them from the sin of sacrilege, and a publicreprimand by the Delphic God.
The game of diplomatic fencing went on for some time, and envoys werecontinually passing to and fro between Athens and Sparta. The Athenianswere required to raise the siege of Potidaea--to allow the Aeginetansto govern themselves--to rescind the decree against Megara; and whenall these demands were met by a firm refusal, the Spartans sent twoambassadors, bearing their ultimatum,
which was worded as follows: "TheLacedaemonians wish that there should be peace, and war may be avertedif ye will let the Greeks go free." Knowing that the decisive momenthad now arrived, the Athenians met together in full assembly, to decideon their final answer. There were many speakers on either side, somearguing for peace, others for war: and then was heard that majesticvoice, which, for more than thirty years, had guided the counsels ofAthens--the voice of the Olympian Pericles. He had chosen his line ofpolicy a year before, in the fatal affair of Corcyra, and it was nowtoo late to draw back: peace with honour was no longer possible forAthens. The furious zeal of Corinth had united her enemies against her,and they were bent on her ruin. The demands put forward by Sparta werea mere pretext, and if the Athenians had yielded the smallest point,new concessions would have been required of them, until they werestripped of all that had been won by the strenuous toil and devotion oftwo generations. "We must listen," said Pericles, in the course of along speech, "to no proposal from Sparta which is not made as from anequal to an equal. Dictation is not arbitration. If we are to fight atall, the occasion matters little, be it small or great. What right hasSparta to require of us that we should rescind the decree againstMegara, when her own laws jealously exclude all strangers from enteringher streets? Or why should we relax our hold upon our allies, or breakoff the relations with them which were sanctioned by the Thirty Years'Truce? No, all this is a mere pretence, and if we are deceived by it,we shall be led on step by step to deeper and still deeper humiliation.It may seem a hard thing to give up the fair land of Attica to pillageand devastation. But think how far greater was the sacrifice made byour grandsires, who refused the fairest offers from Persia, and gave upall they had, rather than betray the common cause. Athens and Atticawere then all the country they had, and these lost they had nothingleft but their ships, their strong arms, and their stout hearts. In ourcase, on the other hand, all the essential elements of our power--ourcity, our fleet, our colonial empire--remain untouched. Shall we, then,sell our honour to save a few vineyards and olive-grounds fromtemporary damage? That would be a short-sighted policy indeed, and inthe end would involve not only dishonour, but the loss of our wholeempire. Let us act, then, in the spirit of our fathers, and send awaythe Spartan ambassadors with the only answer which is consistent withour dignity and our interest."
The reply to the Spartan ultimatum was framed as Pericles had directed,and from this moment all negotiations ceased. And here we close ouraccount of the events which led to the Peloponnesian War.