NAVAL VICTORIES OF PHORMIO
I
During the last half-century the art of naval warfare had made greatprogress in Greece. The Greek war-galley, or trireme, a vesselpropelled by three banks of oars, had always been furnished with asharp-pointed prow, for the purpose of ramming an opponent's ship; butmany years elapsed before the Greeks attained genuine skill in the useof this formidable weapon. According to the ordinary method offighting, after the first shock of collision the affair was decided bythe hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry, stationed on the decks of thetwo contending ships; and in this manner was fought the engagementbetween the Corcyraean and Corinthian fleets which occurred in theyear before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. There the ship wassimply a vehicle, which served to bring the antagonists together, andthe rest was left to the prowess of the hoplites.
The Athenians were the first to abandon this crude and clumsy style offighting, and in the course of two generations their seamen had becomerenowned throughout Greece for the unrivalled skill which they showedin working and manoeuvring the trireme. A few hoplites were stillcarried, to serve in cases of emergency; but by far the most importantpart in the encounter was played by the trireme itself, with its long,tapering, sharp-pointed prow. To use this deadly but delicateinstrument with effect required great coolness, dexterity, andjudgment, on the part of the steersman, and a crew under perfectcommand. The tactics usually employed were as follows: watching hisopportunity, the captain gave the order "full speed ahead!" and dartingrapidly through the enemy's line, wheeled suddenly round, and drove thebeak of his galley with terrible force against the stern or side of thevessel selected for attack. One blow from the long lance-like point,propelled by the whole weight and impetus of the trireme, wassufficient to sink or disable an enemy's ship, and the attacking galleywas then backed away from the wreck, and directed against anothervictim.
The incessant practice of nearly half a century had enabled theAthenians to attain consummate mastery in this new method of navalwarfare; and they were now to give signal proof of their immensesuperiority over the other maritime powers of Greece.
In the same summer which witnessed the investment of Plataea, theSpartans planned an expedition against Acarnania, the westernmostprovince of Greece, which they wished to detach from the Athenianalliance. A Spartan officer, named Cnemus, was sent off in advance,with a thousand hoplites, to raise the wild mountain tribes, and led anattack against Stratus, the capital of Acarnania; and in the meantimeorders were sent round to equip a numerous fleet, which was to supportthe operations of Stratus by harassing the coast districts.
The attack on Stratus failed altogether, chiefly in consequence of theimpetuosity of the rude mountaineers serving under Cnemus, who advancedunsupported against the town, and meeting with a severe repulseembarrassed the movements of their Greek allies. About the same timethe Peloponnesian fleet, consisting of forty-seven ships, was sailingdown the Corinthian Gulf to co-operate with Cnemus. It was known thatPhormio, the Athenian admiral, was stationed at Naupactus with asquadron of twenty vessels; but the Peloponnesian captains neverdreamed that he would venture to attack them with so small a force, andthey pursued their voyage along the southern shore of the gulf, withoutmaking any preparations for a battle. Phormio, however, had otherintentions: keeping close to the opposite shore, he followed theirmovements, and allowed them to pass through the narrow strait whichdivides the inner from the outer gulf, wishing to avoid an engagementuntil they reached the open water. The Peloponnesians dropped anchorfor the night at Patrae in Achaia, and Phormio took up his station atChalcis, a harbour-town of Aetolia, at the mouth of the Evenus. Beingnow convinced that Phormio meditated an encounter, for which they hadlittle inclination, the Peloponnesian admirals made an attempt[Footnote: I have adopted the reading of Bloomfield, approved byClassen (4th Edition).] to steal across under cover of darkness. Butthis manoeuvre was detected, and they found their way barred by theAthenian squadron in the middle of the channel. Being thus driven tobay the Peloponnesians drew up their ships in a circle, with theirprows turned outwards, like a flock of sheep assailed by a dog. Withinthe circle were placed the smaller vessels accompanying the fleet, andfive of the swiftest galleys, which were intended to lend assistanceagainst any attack of the enemy.
To keep a large flotilla in such a position, even in a calm sea, whereno hostile movement was made against them, would have been a task totry the skill of the most accomplished mariners. But the Peloponnesiancrews were untrained, the decks of their ships were crowded withsoldiers, and they were hampered by the crowd of smaller craft. Worstof all, they were threatened in every direction by the agile Atheniangalleys, which, moving in single file, swept round and round them,approaching closer and closer at every circuit, so that they werepenned together in an ever-narrowing space, and in danger of foulingone another. To complete their confusion, the morning breeze began toblow from the gulf; and Phormio, who had been waiting for this, nowgave the signal for attack. The Peloponnesians hardly attempted anydefence; for the unskilful crews of the galleys could not manage theiroars in the rising sea, and the steersmen had consequently no controlof their vessels. All their efforts were employed in keeping clear ofone another, warding off a collision with long poles, amid a hubbub ofcurses and abuse. Into this huddled, swaying mass of war-galleys andmerchant-craft mingled together now dashed the Athenian triremes,wrecking every vessel which they met. A wild panic ensued among thePeloponnesian crews, and as fast as they could extricate themselvesthey rowed off and sought shelter in the harbour of Patrae. From herethey afterwards sailed to Cyllene, the dockyard of Elis, where theywere joined by Cnemus with the troops from Acarnania. Twelve ships fellinto the hands of the Athenians, and taking these with them they sailedfirst to Rhium, a level headland on the Locrian Coast, on which stood atemple of Poseidon. Having left one of the captured ships as athank-offering to the god of the sea, they made their way back to theoriginal station at Naupactus.
II
The authorities at Sparta were highly indignant at the failure of theirexpedition in Acarnania, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet byso inferior a force. For this was their first experience of a sea-fightsince the outbreak of the war, and they made no allowance for the wantof skill in their own crews, attributing the disaster to merecowardice. They did not reflect how vast was the difference between rawsailors, lately transferred from the plough to the oar, and the veteranseamen of Athens, trained under a system which had been slowlyperfected in the course of half a century. So they sent threecommissioners to Cnemus, with peremptory orders to prepare for anothersea-fight, and not allow himself to be shut up in harbour by the feeblesquadron of Phormio. One of these commissioners was Brasidas, abrilliant young officer, who had gained distinction two years before bysaving the harbour-town of Methone, on the coast of Messenia, frombeing captured by the Athenians. We shall hear much more of him in thesequel.
On the arrival of Brasidas and his colleagues, the ships lying atCyllene were made ready for immediate service, and orders were sentround to the allied cities for other ships. Phormio also sent an urgentdespatch to Athens announcing his victory, and asking forreinforcements; and the Athenians sent twenty triremes to his aid.These vessels, however, arrived too late, for the admiral, acting oninstructions from Athens, sailed first to Crete, where he was delayed along time by contrary winds. Phormio, with his twenty triremes, wastherefore compelled to engage the whole Peloponnesian fleet, numberingseventy-seven ships, which had now sailed round from Cyllene, and takenup its station just within the strait, close to the Achaean town ofPanormus. A strong force of Peloponnesian soldiers was encamped on theshore, to co-operate with the fleet. Phormio anchored his ships justoutside the strait, being resolved, if it were in any way possible, notto fight the Peloponnesians in the narrow waters. As thePeloponnesians, on their side, were equally determined not to be luredout into the open sea, the two fleets remained confronting each otherfor a whole week, without attempting any aggressive movement. At lastthe
Peloponnesian leaders decided to give battle with Phormio at once,fearing that if they delayed any longer he would be reinforced fromAthens.
It was the universal custom of Greek commanders to wind up the courageof their men on the eve of a battle by a short and pithy address,calculated to inspire them with confidence, by giving them a reasonablehope of victory. Such a practice, strange as it may seem to us, wasnatural among a people whose armies and fleets were recruited from thegeneral body of the citizens, accustomed to free speech in their publicassemblies. They were not men of war by profession, trained in habitsof blind obedience, but sensitive Greeks, who carried into the camp thenoble freedom of civic life, and were not prepared to shed their bloodwithout sufficient cause, and a fair prospect of success.
Seldom was there greater need of this sort of military eloquence thanon the present occasion. On both sides there was much discouragement,and a general reluctance to begin the fight. The Peloponnesians werecowed by their recent defeat, and dreaded the naval skill of theAthenians, which seemed to them almost supernatural; and Phormio's menshrank from an encounter with such enormous odds. Accordingly thePeloponnesian captains on one side, and Phormio on the other, did whatthey could to argue their crews into a more hopeful frame of mind. ThePeloponnesian seamen who had taken part in the first battle werereminded that they had been caught unprepared, and assured that thistime every precaution would be taken to prevent a second reverse. Theywere flattered by the confident assertion that the superior skill ofthe Athenians was far outweighed by their own superior courage. "Look,"said one of the admirals, speaking to his own division, "at thispowerful armament, outnumbering the enemy by four to one--look at thearmy drawn up on the shore, ready to lend aid to any who are hardpressed--and you will see that with such advantages defeat isimpossible. Do your duty like men, and expect to be rewarded orpunished according to your deserts." Similar addresses, combiningencouragement with threats, were heard in the other parts of the fleet.
Among the Athenian sailors there had been much jesting about theland-lubbers of Peloponnesus, and in the first flush of their victorythey had been ready to face any odds on the sea. But now, seeingthemselves confronted by such overwhelming numbers, they had lost heartfor the moment, and were seen standing about in little groups, shakingtheir heads and whispering fearfully together. It was an anxious momentfor Phormio; he knew the immense importance of maintaining, at anycost, the naval reputation of Athens, and if his men went into battlein their present temper, they were certain to suffer a crushing defeat.Determining, therefore, if possible, to allay the panic which was fastspreading throughout the fleet, he summoned the crews into hispresence, and harangued them as follows:--
"Comrades, I have called you hither to assure you that you have nocause for alarm. The numbers of the enemy, which seem to you soformidable, should, if properly considered, be a ground of confidence;for this unwieldy armament is a sign that they are thoroughlyterrified, and seek safety in a huge crowd of ships. The firmness anddiscipline which they have acquired by long experience of land warfarewill avail them little on the sea For courage is largely a matter ofhabit, and the bravest landsman is a mere coward when he is taken awayfrom his own element, and set down on the heaving deck of a war-galleywhere he can hardly keep his feet. The disorganized multitude withwhich we shall have to deal is a mere mob, held together by theauthority of Sparta, demoralized by their late defeat, and forced tofight against their will. Face them boldly, and our very audacity inassailing such numbers will sink them still deeper into helplessterror, for they will think that we must be invincible, or we shouldnever run such risks. It shall be my business to bring on theengagement in blue water, where we shall have them at our mercy. Nowevery man to his station; be prompt, and be silent, and attend to theword of command. Remember your old spirit, and reflect that the honourof Athens is in your hands to-day."
The great object of the Peloponnesian leaders was to compel Phormio togive battle in the confined space of the strait. With this intentionthey determined to make a sudden movement towards the northern coast ofthe gulf, threatening an attack on Naupactus. At daybreak they drew uptheir ships in four lines, with the coast of Peloponnesus behind them,and with twenty fast-sailing triremes stationed on the right wing, tocut off Phormio's fleet, if, as they anticipated, he advanced to thedefence of Naupactus. Wheeling then to the right, the ships sailed somedistance, four abreast, towards the inner gulf; and when they cameopposite to Naupactus, they changed their course, and moved in column,with the right wing leading towards the northern shore.
The manoeuvre, so far as concerned its immediate purpose, wascompletely successful. Phormio, much against his will, was obliged toleave his station outside the strait, and go to the aid of Naupactus,which had been left undefended. Great was the delight of thePeloponnesian captains when they saw the little Athenian squadroncreeping close, in single file, along the northern side of the gulf,for they thought that not one of the twenty would escape them. At agiven signal, the whole fleet formed into line, resuming its originalorder, four deep, and bore down upon the Athenians. Eleven of Phormio'striremes succeeded in clearing the strait, and getting into the openwaters in the direction of Naupactus; but the remaining nine wereovertaken and driven aground, and their crews, except those who escapedby swimming, were put to the sword. Some of these vessels were towedoff as prizes by the Peloponnesians, and one they captured with all hercrew. The rest were saved by the valour of the Messenian soldiers, whohad followed the movements of Phormio's vessels along the shore, andnow did good service by boarding the stranded triremes, and haulingthem to land, after a sharp tussle with the enemy.
Meanwhile the eleven ships which had eluded the attack were hotlypursued by the twenty fast-sailing vessels on the Peloponnesian rightwing. All but one got through in safety, and took refuge in the harbourof Naupactus, and drawing up in line, with their prows outwards,prepared to defend themselves if the enemy advanced further againstthem. But the rearmost vessel was hard pressed by a Leucadian ship, andthe rest of the pursuers followed at a considerable distance, singingthe paean [Footnote: A song of victory.] as they rowed, and expectingan easy victory. Now, however, occurred one of those sudden turns offortune so frequent in the course of a sea-fight. The Athenian triremewhich had been left far behind in the chase, made a sudden sweep rounda merchant-vessel anchored at the mouth of the harbour, struck herpursuer amidships, and sank her.
This splendid feat of seamanship filled the Peloponnesians, who wereadvancing in disorder, with amazement and terror. On every trireme thecry of "Hold her!" [Footnote: This was done by thrusting the oars, withthe blades held flat, deep into the water] was heard, and some of thevessels, losing way suddenly, ran aground on the shallows. The othershung back, waiting until the main body of the fleet should come totheir support. Seeing them drifting thus, stupefied and helpless, theAthenians took heart again, and raising a shout rowed swiftly fromtheir station within the harbour, and charged down upon them. ThePeloponnesians, after a feeble attempt at resistance, took to flight,heading for their original station on the opposite coast. Six of theirvessels were captured, and the Athenians, not content with this, fellupon the main body of the fleet, and recovered their own ships whichhad been taken in the strait. The victorious crews of Phormio thenreturned to Naupactus, and set up a trophy at the place where they hadbeen moored when this splendid rally was made, opposite to the templeof Apollo. The Peloponnesians also raised a trophy, to commemoratetheir first success, and then, fearing the arrival of the fresh shipsfrom Athens, they sailed off to Lechaeum, the northern harbour ofCorinth.
III
In strange contrast with the disgraceful exhibition of cowardice andincompetence which we have just witnessed, we have now to record adaring attempt, undertaken shortly afterwards, to strike at the veryheart of the Athenian power. While the beaten crews of thePeloponnesian fleet were waiting to be paid off at Lechaeum, theysuddenly received orders to take their oars and rowing-cushions, andproceed to Nisaea, the port of Megara. The pl
an was to embark them onforty vessels, which were lying in the dockyards, and make anight-attack on Peiraeus. The suggestion came from the Megarians, butin carrying it out the Peloponnesians were probably influenced by thebold and enterprising spirit of Brasidas. And in fact, the meditateddescent on Peiraeus was neither so wild nor so rash as it may at firstsight appear. For the Athenians, never dreaming that they might betaken by surprise, had not taken the precaution to close the entranceof their harbour, or to station guard-ships for its defence.
Without delay, the officers in charge of the expedition mustered theircrews at Nisaea, and embarking by night, got their ships under way. Butat the last moment their hearts failed them, and instead of sailing toPeiraeus, they landed on the island of Salamis, and after attacking asea-side fort, and capturing three triremes which were riding at anchornear it, they spread themselves out, and began ravaging and plunderingthe country.
Meanwhile fire-signals had been raised, conveying the alarm to Peiraeusand Athens. A wild panic ensued, and a rumour ran through the uppercity that the enemy had sailed into Peiraeus, while in the harbour-townit was generally supposed that Salamis was lost, and Peiraeus on thepoint of being invaded. The Peloponnesians employed in this adventureafterwards pretended that they had been hindered by contrary winds fromcarrying out their original design. But this was a mere excuse, and ifthey had chosen they might have sailed unopposed to Peiraeus, andinflicted terrible injury on Athens. But it was now too late, for theAthenians, as soon as the news was brought, had marched down with theirwhole military force to Peiraeus, and occupied every assailable pointin the harbour, while at the same time every ship in the docks waslaunched and manned, and sent off in headlong haste to Salamis.
By this time it was broad daylight, and the Peloponnesians, beingwarned that a rescue was on the way from Peiraeus, made off with theirbooty, and getting, on board their ships, sailed back to Nisaea. Theyhad the more reason for hastening their departure, as the Megarianships which had carried them to Salamis, having lain a long while indry-dock, were leaky and unseaworthy; for the harbour of Megara had forsome time past been kept in close blockade by the Athenians.
This memorable incident, following close on the brilliant victories ofPhormio, taught the Athenians to take better precautions for thefuture. Hitherto they would have scoffed at the suggestion that theirown arsenals and dockyards were exposed to attack. But now theyprovided for the safety of Peiraeus by closing the harbours and keepinga vigilant watch. And that terrible night left an impression on theirminds which was not soon forgotten.