CAPTURE OF A HUNDRED AND TWENTY SPARTANS AT SPHACTERIA
I
The result of six years of desultory fighting had fully justified theforebodings of Archidamus, and the sanguine anticipations of Pericles.In spite of the terrible ravages of the plague, Athens had easily heldher own against the whole power of the Peloponnesian league. As yet,however, no decisive advantage had been gained on either side. But inthe seventh year of the war an event occurred which would have enabledthe Athenians, but for their own folly, to conclude an honourable peace.
The ablest of the Athenian generals at this time was Demosthenes,[Footnote: To be carefully distinguished from the great orator, bornabout forty years after the date reached in this chapter (425 B.C.).]who in the previous year had greatly distinguished himself by abrilliant campaign in Aetolia. In the following summer he obtainedpermission to take passage on board a fleet which was bound on a voyageto Corcyra and Sicily. He sailed in a private capacity, but he wasauthorized to use the ships against the coasts of Peloponnesus, if hesaw any opening which might be utilized in the interests of Athens.
On a rocky promontory, at the northern end of the spacious bay ofNavarino, lies the little town of Pylos, generally believed to havebeen the home of the Homeric Nestor. Since the conquest of Messenia bythe Spartans, the town had remained in ruins, and the country for somedistance round was a desert. The natural advantages of the adjacentcoast had already caught the keen eye of Demosthenes, and he had formedthe plan of raising a fortified outpost on the spot, to be held by apicked troop of the banished Messenians, and thus planting a thorn inthe side of Sparta.
Fortune favoured his design. For on rounding the western headland ofPeloponnesus, the fleet encountered a storm, and was compelled to seekshelter at Pylos. Demosthenes now urged the admirals to employ theirenforced leisure in fortifying the place. But they repulsed him rudely,and treated his suggestion with contempt. He next tried to interest theinferior officers in his project, but meeting with no better success,he began to fear that this grand opportunity would be thrown away. Thediscussion, however, had reached the ears of the soldiers, and havingnothing else to do, they agreed among themselves to pass the time bybuilding a fort. Choosing a place of great natural strength, where therocky coast descends abruptly to the open sea, they went to work with awill. As they had no tools for stone-cutting, they picked out thestones, and fitted them together according to their shape; and for wantof hods they carried the mortar, wherever it was required, on theirbacks, stooping forward and clasping their hands together behind them,to prevent it from slipping off. They carried out their self-imposedtask with great energy, and after six days of vigorous labour the fortwas completed, for the natural defences of the site were so strong thatin most places there was no need of a wall. As the weather was nowfavourable, the fleet proceeded on its voyage, leaving Demosthenes withfive ships to garrison the fort.
The news of the occupation of Pylos soon reached the Spartans, but atfirst they paid little heed, thinking that they could expel theaudacious intruders whenever they chose to exert themselves. Moreover,they were just then engaged in keeping one of those religious festivalsof which the Spartan calendar was so full, and a good part of theirarmy was absent in Attica. Agis, however, the Spartan king, and thoseunder him who were commanding in Attica, took a wiser view of thesituation, and cutting short their operations they led their forceswith all speed back to Sparta. They were the more inclined to do thisas the season was yet early, the weather inclement, and, the corn beingstill green, they wanted means to nourish their troops. Thus theinventive genius of Demosthenes had already proved of signal service tohis country; for this was the shortest of all the Peloponnesianinvasions, lasting only fifteen days.
On the return of their troops from Attica the Spartans sent a smallforce to commence the attack on Pylos, and ordered the main body oftheir army to follow. There was some discontent among those who hadalready been serving abroad at this second levy, and the full muster ofthe troops was consequently delayed. In the meantime a message wasdespatched to a Peloponnesian fleet then sailing to Corcyra, which atthis time was in a state of revolution, with orders to return at once,and assist in the campaign against Pylos. Demosthenes was now inimminent danger, being threatened with an immediate assault by sea andland, which he had no adequate means of repelling. Having sent off twoof his ships to recall the Athenian squadron from its voyage toCorcyra, he prepared to defend himself, until the arrival of succour,as best he could.
The Peloponnesian fleet was the first to arrive, and the Spartans, whowere now present in full force with their allies, determined to makethe most of their time. They hoped, by a simultaneous onslaught oftheir army and fleet, to carry the fort before the Athenian ships hadtime to return. But in case they should fail in this, they intended tocripple the movements of the relieving squadron, by blocking theentrances to the bay. For the long, narrow island of Sphacteria forms anatural break water, converting the harbour of Navarino into aland-locked basin, with two narrow passages at the northern andsouthern end. [Footnote: The description of Thucydides does notcorrespond to the picture of the harbour given in our modern maps. Butin the course of twenty centuries great changes may well haveoccurred.] These inlets the Spartans proposed to close, by anchoringtriremes close together, with their prows turned seawards, which theycould easily have done, for at the southern entrance there was onlyroom for eight or nine vessels to sail abreast, and at the northernentrance only room for two. This precaution, however, was never carriedout; and the Spartans, as if blinded by fate, adopted another measure,which led to fatal consequences for themselves. Wishing to keep commandof every spot of land in the neighbourhood of Pylos, they landed a bodyof their own men, numbering four hundred and twenty, with the usualproportion of Helots, on the island, and the same time posted troops atevery assailable point on the opposite coast.
Thinking now that the little garrison at Pylos, surrounded on all sidesby enemies, would fall an easy prey, they sent orders to the fleet toget under way, and prepared to attack the fort on the land side.Meanwhile Demosthenes had not been idle: having drawn his threeremaining ships under the shelter of the fort, and protected them infront by a stockade, he armed the crews with such weapons as he had,including a number of wicker-shields, taken from a thirty-oaredMessenian galley which had recently come to his assistance with a forceof forty hoplites. Then, having posted the greater part of his troopsfor the defence of his position against the Peloponnesian army, hehimself descended with a picked body of sixty hoplites, and took up hisstation on the rocky shore. For on this side the defences were weakest,as the Athenians, in building the fort, had never anticipated an attackfrom the sea.
Demosthenes had just time to address a few words of caution andencouragement to his men, assuring them of victory, if they would onlystand fast, when the Peloponnesian fleet was seen bearing down uponthem; and at the same moment a loud shout from the fort announced thatthe garrison was already engaged behind them. The assault was fiercestat the point where Demosthenes and his men were stationed, and thePeloponnesians made desperate efforts to effect a landing. But theywere embarrassed by the difficult and rocky coast, which only allowed afew ships to approach at a time. As fast as one division was beatenback, another came on, with the white foam spouting round the prows,and the waters roaring and eddying to the strokes of the gigantic oars,while the cliffs resounded with the shouts of their comrades in theships behind, cheering them on to the attack.
Conspicuous among those who fought on the ships was seen the gallantfigure of Brasidas, who exerted himself, by voice and by example, toinfuse his own heroic spirit into the rest of the crews and theirofficers. His ringing tones were heard above the tumult, urging on thecaptains and steersmen, when they hung back in fear lest their shipsshould be shattered on the rocks. "Spare not these timbers," he cried,"but let every hull among them go to wreck, rather than suffer theenemy to violate the soil of Lacedaemon. Where is your loyalty toSparta? Have you forgotten the debt which you owe t
o her? Have at them,I say, and hurl this fort with its defenders into the sea." Saying thishe ordered the master of his own trireme to beach the vessel, and stoodready on the gangway, that he might be the first to leap on shore. Butas he attempted to land he was hurled back by the Athenians, and fellfainting, covered with wounds, on the deck. His shield slipped off hisarm, and dropped into the sea, and having been washed ashore, waspicked up by the Athenians, who used it to adorn the trophy which theyafterwards erected.
After the fall of Brasidas the Peloponnesians still continued theirefforts to effect a landing, but they were baffled by the obstinatedefence of the Athenians, and the rugged and inhospitable coast. It wasa strange reversal of affairs which had been brought about by thefortune of war. On one side were the Spartans, trained to militaryservice on land, but now compelled to serve on board a fleet, in orderto obtain a footing on their own territory, and on the other side theAthenians, whose natural element was the sea, drawn up on land to repela naval attack.
Next day the assault was repeated, but again without success. TheSpartans sent for a supply of timber, to construct siege engines,intending to try and batter down the Athenian wall where it overlookedthe harbour, as at this point there was a better landing-place for theships. In this task, however, they were interrupted by the suddenappearance of the Athenian fleet, now numbering fifty vessels, havingbeen reinforced by four Chian ships, and six from Naupactus. Findingthe harbour occupied by the Peloponnesians, and the whole coast linedwith troops, they retired for the night to the little island of Prote.Next day they weighed anchor early, and dividing their fleet, sailedinto the harbour of Navarino by both entrances at once. Though taken bysurprise, the Peloponnesians manned their ships, and as fast as theywere ready put out to meet them; but before their array was completethey were attacked by the Athenians, who disabled many of theirvessels, captured five, and drove the rest ashore. So complete was therout that the Athenians pursued the flying ships into the very interiorof the harbour, and rammed some of them after they had been brought toland. Others they charged while the crews were still getting on board,and began to tow off the disabled hulls. But in the heat of victory theAthenians had pushed their advantage somewhat too far, and they paidfor their audacity by the loss of a considerable number of their men.For the Lacedaemonians, in wild dismay at the defeat of their ships, bywhich their comrades on the island would be cut off from all help, madedesperate exertions to save their fleet, wading into the water in theirheavy armour, and hauling back the vessels as they were being towedoff. In the confined space manoeuvring was impossible, and thesea-fight had now become a furious hand to hand encounter, as betweentwo armies on land. After a prolonged struggle, in which both sidessuffered severely, the Spartans succeeded in saving their ships, exceptthose which had been taken at first, and the Athenians then retired totheir station.
The result of this battle was to give the Athenians complete command ofthe sea, for the Peloponnesian fleet was in no condition to renew theengagement. From their camp on the mainland the Spartans could see theAthenian triremes rowing round and round the island, and keepingvigilant watch, to prevent those who were confined there from escaping.News of the disaster was sent without delay to Sparta, and themagistrates, recognising the gravity of the crisis, proceeded at onceto Pylos, wishing to inform themselves on the spot, and then decidewhat was best to be done. Finding on their arrival that there was noprospect of rescuing their men on the island, they applied to theAthenian commanders for a truce, to enable them to send envoys toAthens, and arrange some terms for the recovery of the imprisonedSpartans. The Athenians consented, and a truce was made on thefollowing conditions: The Spartans were to surrender all their fleet,including any ships of war on the coast of Laconia, to the Athenians,and to refrain from any attack on the fort, until the return of theenvoys. The Athenians, on their part, agreed to allow provisions to besent to the Spartans on the island, all such provision being conveyedthither under their own inspection, and none by stealth. They furtheragreed to carry the envoys to Athens in one of their own triremes, andto suspend all hostilities until the expiration of the truce. When theenvoys returned, the Peloponnesian ships were to be given back.
It was a proud moment for Athens when the Spartan envoys appearedbefore the assembly, bearing the humble petition from her great enemy.The terms offered by the spokesman of the embassy in the name of Spartawere simple and concise, peace and friendship with Sparta, in returnfor the men shut up on the island. The rest of his speech was made upof grave moral reflections, such as are generally paraded by those onthe losing side. Let the Athenians beware of abusing their advantage;though they had the upper hand to-day, they might be brought to theirknees to-morrow. War was a game of hazard, in which the luck was alwayschanging. Now they had an opportunity of concluding an honourablepeace, and establishing a lasting claim to the gratitude of Sparta. Andif the two leading states of Greece were once united, they coulddictate what terms they pleased to the rest.
The notorious selfishness of Spartan policy is glaringly manifested inthis speech. In their anxiety to recover their own citizens, theSpartans completely ignored the interests of their allies, and held outthe right hand of fellowship to the people whom they had lately brandedas the oppressors and spoilers of Greece. The Athenians might welldistrust the professions of these perfidious statesmen, who repudiatedtheir sworn obligations with such cynical levity. The Spartans inSphacteria were already, they thought, prisoners of Athens, to be dealtwith as they pleased; and were they to resign this costly prize, inreturn for a vague promise of friendship from Sparta? Their answer wasframed on the advice of Cleon: they could not, they said, enter intoany discussion, until the men on the island had surrendered themselves,and been brought to Athens. Then, if the Spartans agreed to restore tothe Athenians Nisaea and Pegae, [Footnote: The harbour-towns ofMegara.] and some other places which they had held before the ThirtyYears' Truce, peace might be made, and the prisoners restored. TheSpartan envoys were somewhat startled by these demands, which involveda gross breach of faith to their own allies; so they affected to ignorethe proposal, and suggested a private conference between themselves andselect Athenian commissioners. It is not impossible that the termsoffered, infamous as they were to Sparta, might have been accepted; butthe whole negotiation was frustrated by the violence of Cleon, who, onhearing the suggestion of the envoys, overwhelmed them with abuse,accusing them of double-dealing and bad faith. The envoys wereconfounded by this specimen of Athenian manners, and seeing that theywere wasting their time to no purpose, they turned their backs on thecity of free speech.
On their return to Pylos the truce expired, and the Spartans demandedback their ships, but the Athenians refused to restore them, on theground of some alleged violation of the conditions laid down. Thereuponhostilities were resumed with vigour on both sides. The Spartans maderepeated attacks on the fort, and watched for an opportunity ofbringing off their men from the island: and the Athenians kept avigilant guard to prevent their escape. During the day two triremessailed continually round Sphacteria in opposite directions, and atnight their whole fleet, now raised to the number of seventy by thearrival of twenty fresh ships, was moored about the island, except onthe exposed side in windy weather.
Before long the Athenians began to feel the difficulties of theirposition. They were but scantily supplied with food, and had muchtrouble in obtaining water. The only spring to which they had access,and even that by no means abundant, was in the citadel of Pylos, andmost of them were reduced to scraping the shingle, and thus obtaining ameagre supply of brackish water. On land their quarters were straitenedand uncomfortable, and they had no proper anchorage for their ships, sothat the crews had to go ashore in turns to get their meals. They weregreatly disappointed to find their task thus prolonged, for they hadsupposed that a few days' siege would suffice to starve the imprisonedSpartans into a surrender, as the island was barren and ill-furnishedwith water. But day followed day, and still they waited in vain for anysign of yielding. For th
e Spartan magistrates had offered large rewardsto anyone who succeeded in conveying wine, meal, or other portableprovisions, to the island, and many were tempted to run the risk,especially among the Helots, who were offered their liberty in returnfor this service. They put out from various points of the mainland, andlanded under cover of night on the seaward side of the island, choosingtheir time when the wind was blowing strong from the sea, which made itimpossible for the Athenian triremes to keep their exposed anchorage.The Spartan hoplites stood ready on the rocks to help them; and so longas they could get ashore with their freight, they cared nothing whathappened to their boats, for if they were wrecked, the Spartans hadpledged themselves for the full value. Others, still bolder, swam,across the harbour, dragging after them leather bags filled with amixture of poppy-seed or linseed and honey, [Footnote: Poppy-seed wasvalued in ancient medicine as an antidote against hunger, and linseedagainst thirst.] and attached to a cord. These were soon detected; butthe other source of supply remained open, and it seemed likely that thesiege would be protracted till winter, when it would have to be givenup.
The Athenians at home were much concerned when they were informed ofthis state of affairs, and they began to regret that they had notaccepted the terms offered by Sparta. They were suspicious and uneasy,and Cleon, on whose advice they had acted, saw himself in danger offalling a victim to their resentment. But his boundless self-confidenceserved him well in this crisis. At first he affected to disbelieve thereport sent from Pylos, and proposed to send commissioners to inquireinto the true state of the case. His motion was carried, and he himselfwas nominated as one of the commissioners. Cleon was now placed in anawkward position: either he would have to confirm the statement of themessengers from Pylos, and thus make himself ridiculous, or, if hecontradicted them, he would be convicted of falsehood. So he turnedround again, and advised the Athenians, if they believed the report, towaste no more time, but to order an immediate attack on the island. "IfI were general," [Footnote: The chief civil and military magistrate atAthens, corresponding to the Roman consul.] he said, with a meaningglance at Nicias, who was then holding that office, "it would not belong before these Spartans were brought in chains to Athens. TheAthenians want a _man_ to lead them."
This Nicias, on whom the demagogue had so scornfully reflected, was agreat noble, and the chief political opponent of Cleon. When he heardthe boastful words of his rival, it struck Nicias that there was a fineopportunity of bringing him to ruin, by thrusting upon him a commandfor which he was totally unqualified. Encouraged by the shouts of themultitude, who were crying to Cleon, "Why don't you go and do it?" herose from his place, and proposed that the tanner should be sent incharge of an expedition to take the men at Sphacteria. At first Cleonagreed to go, thinking that Nicias was jesting; but when he saw thatthe proposal was made seriously, he began to draw back. "It is yourbusiness, not mine," he said to Nicias. "I am not general--you are; whyshould I do your work for you?" "Never mind the title," answeredNicias; "I resign my office on this occasion to you." The dispute grewhotter and hotter, much to the amusement of the Athenians, who fellreadily into the humour of the situation, and loudly applauded theproposal of Nicias. The more Cleon objected, the more they shouted thathe should go. Finding that he must make good his words, Cleon at lastplucked up a spirit, and accepted the honour thus contemptuously forcedupon him. "I am not afraid of the Spartans," he declared valiantly."Give me the contingent of soldiers from Lemnos and Imbros, theThracian peltasts, [Footnote: Light-armed soldiers.] and four hundredarchers, and without taking a single Athenian from the city, withinthree weeks I will either bring those Spartans as prisoners to Athens,or kill them where they are."
There was some laughter among the Athenians at Cleon's vain-gloriouspromise; but the more sober-minded were not displeased at hisappointment, expecting that, if he failed, they would be rid of anuisance; while, if he succeeded, they would gain an immense advantageover their enemies. Such, at least, is the comment of the historian;but he makes no remark on the incredible levity of the Athenians, towhom the gravest interests of state were matter for mirth and pastime;and he has not a word of censure for Nicias and his "sober-minded"partisans, who, in their eagerness to ruin a political opponent, showeda criminal disregard for the welfare of Athens.
II
When Cleon arrived at Pylos with his forces, he found Demosthenesengaged in active preparations for an attack on the island. For histroops were growing impatient, and clamouring to be led into action,and a happy accident had recently occurred, which greatly increased theprospect of success. Till quite lately Sphacteria had been covered witha dense growth of underwood, and Demosthenes knew by his experience inAetolia that an attacking force would be at a great disadvantage inmarching against an enemy who fought under cover, and knew every inchof the ground. But a party of Athenian soldiers, who had landed on theisland to cook their breakfast, accidentally set fire to the brushwood,and a wind springing up, the flames were carried over the greater partof the island, leaving it a blackened waste. Demosthenes now discoveredthat the besieged Spartans were more numerous than he had supposed,having hitherto believed that their number had been purposelyexaggerated, to give an excuse for sending more food; and the mainobstacle being now removed, he issued the welcome order to make readyfor an immediate assault.
When he received his commission, Cleon had prudently stipulated thatDemosthenes should be associated with him in the command. The twoill-assorted colleagues--the turbulent demagogue, and the veterangeneral--now took counsel together, and after a last fruitless attemptat negotiation, they set sail at night with a force of eight hundredhoplites, and disembarking just before dawn on both sides of the islandat once, led their men at a run against the first guard-station of theSpartans. They found the enemy posted in three divisions: the first,consisting of thirty hoplites, formed an advanced guard; some distancebehind these, where the ground forms a shallow basin, containing theonly spring in the island, was stationed the main body, commanded byEpitadas; and at the extreme north, opposite Pylos, there was a smallreserve force, left to guard a sort of natural citadel, which wouldserve as a last retreat, if Epitadas and his men were overpowered.
The thirty Spartans in the outpost were taken by surprise, and cut downto a man; for though they had seen the Athenian ships putting out, theyhad no suspicion of what was intended, supposing that they were merelyproceeding to their anchorage for the night. At daybreak the rest ofthe fleet put in at the island, bringing the whole of the forces whichDemosthenes had at his disposal, except a few, who were left togarrison the fort at Pylos. They were a motley host, armed for the mostpart with slings, javelins, and bows, but admirably suited for the workwhich was to be done. Swarming over the island by hundreds and bythousands they took up their stations on every piece of rising ground,threatening the enemy in front, in the rear, on the right flank, and onthe left. The Spartans, in their heavy armour, were helpless againstthese agile foes, who eluded every attempt to come to close quarters,and kept up a continual shower of arrows, javelins, and stones. Suchhad been the orders of Demosthenes, which were now carried into effect.
When the Spartans under Epitadas saw their advanced guard cut up, andthe Athenians marching against them, they drew up in order, and triedto come within spear-thrust of the enemy; but they were unable toeffect their purpose, for the Athenian hoplites kept their ground, andat the same moment they themselves were assailed on both flanks and inthe rear by a cloud of light infantry. It was a kind of warfare towhich the Spartans were totally unaccustomed: if they attempted toadvance, their nimble assailants drew back, and pursuit was impossibleon the rocky and broken ground. For a time the light-armed troopsapproached them with caution, being somewhat cowed in spirit whenbrought face to face with the renowned warriors of Sparta, hithertosupposed to be invincible. But seeing how the Spartans wereembarrassed, they took courage, and came on in a roaring multitude,surrounding them on all sides, and leaving them not a moment to takebreath. The air was darkened by a tempest of missil
es; and a fine dust,caused by the ashes of the late fire, rose in choking clouds from thetrampling of many feet. Exhausted by their violent exertions, stunnedby the uproar, and blinded by the dust, the Spartans began to giveground, and closing their ranks fell back on the stronghold where theirreserve was stationed. They were hotly pursued, and some few were cutoff in the retreat, but the greater part succeeded in reaching thefort, where they turned at bay, and prepared to defend themselves tothe last. Until a late hour in the day the Athenians made vain attemptsto dislodge them from their position, which was only assailable infront. At last, when both sides were sorely distressed by the longconflict under a burning sun, an officer who was in command of theMessenian troops came to the generals, and offered, if they would placea few light-armed soldiers at his disposal, to lead them up theprecipitous cliffs at the northern end of Sphacteria, and take theSpartans in the rear. Permission being readily granted, he chose hismen, and taking care that his movements were not perceived by theenemy, made his way with them along the perilous and slippery face ofthe cliffs to the rear of the beleaguered garrison, scaled the steepascent, and suddenly appearing on the heights, struck terror into theSpartans, and gave fresh courage to their assailants.
The situation of the Spartans was now similar to that of theirancestors when they made their last stand at Thermopylae. They wereattacked in front and rear, and hemmed in on both sides by the naturaldifficulties of the place. In their weak and exhausted condition itwould have been an easy task to make an end of them. But the greatobject of Cleon and Demosthenes was to take them alive. They thereforesuspended the attack, and sent a herald, and summoned them to lay downtheir arms. When they heard the proclamation, most of them loweredtheir shields, and waved their hands in the air, to show that they haddropped their weapons. The Athenian generals then entered into a parleywith Styphon the third in command of the Spartans; for Epitadas, thechief officer, was slain, and Hippagretus, the second, had been leftfor dead on the field. Styphon requested permission to communicate withthe Spartan authorities on the mainland, and ask what he and hiscomrades were to do; and the Athenian commanders sent one of their ownmen to carry the message. Having heard his report, the Spartanmagistrates sent a herald to see how matters stood; and after more thanone messenger had passed to and fro between their camp and the island,they sent their final instructions, conveyed in these words "TheSpartans bid you to decide for yourselves, but to do nothingdishonourable."
Fifty years before, these wounded and weary men would have needed noinstructions to tell them their duty. According to the ancienttradition of Sparta they had but one course open to them--to die attheir posts. But the lapse of time had softened the stern fibre of theSpartan character; and the broken remnant now brought to bay inSphacteria interpreted the ambiguous mandate in their own favour, andsurrendered themselves and their arms.
The number of the prisoners was two hundred and ninety-two, of whomabout a hundred and twenty were Spartans of pure descent, several ofthem belonging to the highest families in Sparta. They were distributedamong the captains of the fleet for transportation to Athens. Datingfrom the first sea-fight, the siege had lasted altogether seventy-twodays; and during seven weeks of this period they had subsisted on thecasual supplies smuggled over by the blockade-runners from themainland. Great was the joy at Athens when that costly freight wasbrought safely into the harbour of Peiraeus; and Cleon, whose bustlingenergy had really helped to precipitate a crisis, was the hero of thehour. He had promised to settle the business, one way or the other,within twenty days, and this promise, which had been laughed at as apiece of crazy vanity, was fulfilled to the letter. The whole merit ofthe performance, however, belonged to Demosthenes, who had planned theattack on Sphacteria with admirable sagacity, and led the operationsfrom first to last.
The surrender of a picked troop of Spartan warriors caused a revolutionof feeling throughout Greece. Hitherto it had been assumed as a matterof course that no Spartan soldier, in any circumstances, would yield toan enemy; but now more than a hundred Spartans had preferred life tohonour. It was generally believed that the survivors were inferior invalour to those who had fallen; and some time afterwards one of thecaptives was asked this insulting question by one of the Athenianallies: "Your _brave_ comrades were buried on the field, I suppose?"The Spartan's answer was couched in a riddle: "It would be a mightyclever spindle, [Footnote: Arrow.] which singled out the brave." Hismeaning was that the stones and arrows had dealt out death among hiscomrades without distinction.