Enemy pressure increasing and attempt to block lake continuing. Substantial quantity of Congolese money urgently needed to prevent isolation. Offensive continuing and advancing. Necessary to move fast. We are preparing to defend base.
This was dated November 10. The following telegram was sent at the same time to Dar es-Salaam and Kigoma:
If as result of offensive we have to retreat and lose contact with you, don’t fail to call us daily at 12:30 and at 5:00 p.m. until contact is reestablished.
We heard from Kigoma that Kabila would not be coming because his boat was not in working order. This was supposed to explain why he had not arrived on the 9th as he had said he would do without fail—another of Kabila’s long list of unkept promises. At the same time, he sent a note to Kiwe telling him to prepare to go with him to the Tricontinental Conference in Havana.6 Make of this what you will.
Our defensive disposition at that time was the following:
Mbili, with a group of Rwandans under his command, controlled the road leading straight from Nganja to the lake, while the road that passed by the base was defended by Azima and the Congolese.
Moja was responsible for defending the Lake [Base] from Kazima, and Aly in Kabimba. We had what seemed to me a reasonable chance of resisting the enemy, when I received the following note from Compañero Mundandi:
Comrade Tatu:
With regard to the situation, which is very serious, I must tell you that I am unable to maintain the position and ensure its defense. The local population has already sold out and given cows to the enemy soldiers, and is now beginning to work with them, so that the enemy is better guided and has better intelligence about our position than we have ourselves. I beg you to understand: I have decided to order a retreat; I am not abandoning the Cuban compañeros, but I must assume my responsibility to the Rwandan people. I cannot expose all the Rwandan comrades to annihilation. If I did, I would not be a good revolutionary commander because a good revolutionary (let alone a Marxist) must analyze the situation and avoid a war of attrition. It would be my fault if all the comrades were wiped out. I sought to help this revolution so that it would be possible to make another one in our country. If the Congolese won’t fight, I prefer to die on the soil of the Rwandan people. If we die on the way, that is alright too.
With revolutionary feelings,
Mundandi
Mundandi was thus preparing to abandon the struggle definitively. This worried us because it was the flank (in the Nganja area) where we could reasonably expect the enemy to attack, and that is where we would be most weakened by this desertion. Just when we thought we had stabilized our defenses, a new turn of events turned everything upside down again.
1. This refers to the second ordinary session of the assembly of heads of state and governments of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) held October 21–25, 1965, in Accra, the capital of Ghana. During the meeting Joseph Kasavubu, who was still president of the Congo, announced that the rebellion in his country had practically ceased, making it possible to send the white mercenaries back to their respective countries. In view of this decision, the African countries decided that they should put an end to their aid for the Congolese rebels. This was codified in the “Declaration on the Problem on Subversion,” signed by the participants, in which they committed themselves to not tolerate “any subversion originating in our countries against another state that belongs to the Organization of African Unity.” It also banned “the use of our territories for any direct subversive activity against any member state.”
2. The indications are that Che used here the false name that appeared on the passport, instead of the real name (Francisco Semanat Carrión) of the combatant known as Awirino in Swahili.
3. Che uses here the false name on the passport of Orlando Puente Bayeta, which was the real name of the combatant who used the Swahili nom de guerre Bahasa.
4. Che’s note: This optimism of mine was unfounded.
5. Che’s note: A little more than a dollar at that time.
6. The first Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America was held in Havana January 3–15, 1966, with the participation of more than 500 delegates. As a result of the conference the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL) was founded as well as the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) on October 16, 1966. The Tricontinental Conference and the organizations that emerged from it represented an important effort to promote solidarity and the coordination and unity of the struggles of Third World People against colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism. Che consistently argued for the need to break the isolation of Third World peoples and unite their struggles, put most succinctly in his “Message to the Tricontinental” published in April of 1967 that stated, “Create two, three, many Vietnams, that is the watchword.” See: Che Guevara Reader (Ocean Press) and also Che Guevara’s article, “America from the Afro-Asian Balcony,” published in the September–October 1959 issue of Humanism magazine.
THE EASTERN FRONT SINKS INTO A COMA
It was already November 12 when I received the following letter from Massengo:
Comrade:
After yesterday’s telephone conversation with you, I see nothing wrong with Comrade Moja’s proposal, in other words, I think it’s a good idea.1
Nevertheless, I still insist that my own proposal should be discussed. That is:
First, some artillerymen should be made available to me, their number to be communicated later.
Second, I should be loaned 50 FAL rifles to give to trusted people: 20 rifles to the 20 unarmed combatants stationed in Rwandasi; 10 rifles to the Kibamba school; 20 rifles to the Kavumbwe barrier; 20 rifles to combatants that you see fit to bring down from the [Upper] Base.
My main objective is to launch an attack on Kazima, and in spite of the present difficulties. I am willing to assume this responsibility.
In the present circumstances, I think that the Cuban comrades should mainly concern themselves with the defense of the Lake Base and Nganja. I believe you will agree with me about everything that flows from this.
There were a number of problems with this letter. Apart from the arithmetical mistake of requesting 50 rifles and handing out 70, it was based on Congolese wishful thinking about our FAL reserves that was contradicted by what we had already told Massengo. We had distributed as many as 15 rifles to the Congolese compañeros, and at that time there were only one or two left in reserve. We had distributed the others with considerable misgivings because they had belonged to compañeros in charge of handling heavy weapons who would now be left unarmed if we lost those pieces or if we were forced to retreat and leave them in a safe place. Not believing us, Massengo insisted on the figure of 50 or 70. And after assuring us that he would take responsibility for the attack, he advised us to concentrate on defending the lake and Nganja. This was just a few days after I had been given wide powers as head of operations in the region, which implied that I should concern myself with the whole defense of the front. The lack of trust persisted.
In addition to the aspects of “disloyalty,” there were a few other problems with the letters such as the order to lay anti-personnel mines on some of the access roads against my express request to delay the action until it could be properly coordinated in a way that avoided accidental injury to our patrols; and Massengo’s refusal to accept that Aly should concentrate his forces in Kibamba to defend the southern end of the base from attack.
I spoke with the chief of staff again, and on this occasion, too, I didn’t mention the semi-official attitude of the Tanzanian government. I stressed that our strategy had to make us independent of the lake, and insisted that my position as head of operations was purely theoretical. We talked about the attack on Kazima, for which he accepted responsibility as chief of staff (although I thought it was not the right time to attack there, especially as the very poor reconnaissance work of both Congolese and Cubans meant that we ha
d no precise knowledge of the enemy positions). But I could not accept being relegated to the defense of one sector because—as is obvious—defense has to be united and harmonious with a reserve that can be moved to the points of greatest danger in a rapidly moving turn of events. Finally, I recommended several times that no weapons or ammunition should be given out to phantom units that would simply lose them. I said that most of the reports about major actions at Fizi and elsewhere were a pack of lies.
Compañero Massengo complained about our attitude at Kazima, where things were tense following an attempt to make the Congolese forces withdraw. In fact, I had ordered Moja to concentrate all the Cubans in Kisoshi as a reserve force and he had interpreted this to include the Congolese as well; they refused to obey and in the process some parts of a mortar vanished, so that it was left incomplete in the hands of its Cuban operator.
Massengo promised to call Salumu in for an interview with Moja and agreed that he should lead the proposed attack in line with a simple plan: an advance at one or two points, with ambushes at others where reinforcements might come or the soldiers might try to flee. He would try to ensure that the attack would cost as little as possible should there be a sudden disorderly retreat. He also consented to allow Aly to come, and agreed not to distribute ammunition without a precise idea of why it was needed.
In the course of our conversation, I showed him the letter from Mundandi. He was furious and said he would go there in person the very next day to disarm him. Knowing what the Rwandan compañeros were like, I immediately wrote to Mbili so that he could prepare things there, ask them for the heavy weapons still in their possession, and say that I guaranteed they could cross to Kigoma if they handed over all their arms. Wanting to avoid a senseless spilling of blood at this tense time, I thought I could influence Massengo to allow their smooth passage. No blood was shed because Massengo could not go there himself and promised to send a political commissar. In the end, no one went to disarm Mundandi.
We also had a talk in which Massengo assured me that Kabila would be coming in the next few days. My reply was categorical: Kabila would not cross over because he could see that things were coming to an end and had no interest in coming under such conditions. Our conversation on this sensitive point was awkward because other compañeros were present, but my views were made more than clear about the arrival of the commander-in-chief.
The people in Fizi continued their undermining activity throughout all this, as if it was an election period in a war-free country. Two or three more communications arrived, one suggesting that I attend a meeting on the 15th and asking me to acknowledge receipt. In reply, I explained that I thought the meeting a waste of time and that it would be impossible for me to attend as I had to defend the base at all costs. I said I considered these events as a revolt against the revolutionary power. My government, I stated, had not sent me to take part in such activities. Things developed to such an extreme that, in one of their letters accusing Massengo of murder, they nevertheless guaranteed to respect his life during the time he was in Fizi. So members of the army were promising to respect their commander’s life! That was now the state of affairs.
The minister of public health, Compañero Mutchungo, also showed that he had taken leave of his senses when he sent some letters that provoked violent responses on my part, and then came to explain it.
In one of these letters, he said that Lambert had written to him denouncing our removal of the heavy weapons and asked for them to be returned so that they could carry out some actions; I had to entangle myself in a lengthy discussion of Lambert’s attitude in this whole business. A second letter referred to a meeting of peasants in that area (Jungo), and informed me of the outcome of the meeting. I was not invited and had no reason to go to such meetings that did not fit in with my work, but the list of requests was so absurd that I must have provoked a reaction on Compañero Mutchungo’s part. For example, point three said:
Request to our friends:
Each friendly country should send us 12,000 volunteers. These are revolutionary countries. Tshombe is fighting us with the help of foreigners.
Assuming that the number of friendly countries was two or three, this would have meant 24,000 or 36,000 men. This could be considered a children’s game, as this was a meeting of peasants with a minimal level of development and who were desperate because of the situation they faced. But it should have provoked some reaction from Compañero Mutchungo, given his position as minister of public health and a leading representative of the Supreme Council of the Revolution.
After pointing out the childish nature of the proposal, I asked him if he was aware of the Fizi compañeros’ liquidationist tendency. He replied that he had heard something, but what he did know was that 300 men were marching from Fizi to reinforce and save Kibamba; these statements made it impossible to continue discussing such matters. Moving on to more personal topics, he complained about Massengo’s attitude and said that he was refusing to evacuate his wife and six children, which was creating a very difficult situation for him. I discussed this with Massengo, and it was decided that all the combatants’ wives and children would be evacuated to Kigoma at the first available opportunity.
Changa crossed the lake in the pre-dawn hours of [November] 14, this time without incident. He brought abundant provisions and a message for me from Rafael explaining that the situation remained the same with regard to the attitude of the Tanzanian government, which was waiting for a reply from us; it had given no sign of trying to rush things or of changing its attitude. Rafael asked whether I thought that, given the Tanzanian government’s attitude, it might be wise to start establishing a clandestine base. I answered immediately saying that this should be done.
That same day Massengo, who was still unaware of Tanzania’s explicit decision, sent the following telegram, illustrating the general situation and his own state of mind, in particular.
Kabila:
Military situation very grave. Mundandi front invaded by enemy, who are advancing on Nganja in direction of base. Mundandi, Calixte and Mbili have taken up position in Nganja. We have enemy infiltration on many roads in direction of base. I am notifying you of food shortage. Send urgently beans, rice, salt. We insist on immediate dispatch of weapons and .30, Mauser, “pepechá” and mortar ammunition, artillery, bazooka and anti-tank shells, and mine fuses. Favorable possibility for encirclement of enemy offensive at Mukundi. Lack of immediate supplies threatens our force with annihilation. I request energetic intervention with Tanzanian authorities. We consider crushing of Congolese revolution negligence by African countries. Consider this final appeal. To prevent starvation, send financial aid.
Massengo
Apart from the optimistic statement about the possibility of an offensive at the Mukundi front, for which there was a lack of relevant information, Massengo’s telegram summed up the situation. Our own telegrams almost gave a sense of panic, partly to activate the compañeros and partly as a result of the actual situation. When our man in Kigoma consulted me about Kabila’s request to go to Dar es-Salaam, I responded:
Indispensable that they (ie the boats) come today, we are hungry and surrounded, Kabila can go.
The SOSs circulated with the utmost pathos. Among the impedimenta brought by Changa were 40 Congolese who had been studying in the Soviet Union. Full of themselves, they promptly asked for a fortnight’s leave complaining that they had nowhere to put their suitcases and that no weapons had been laid out for them; if it had not been so tragic, it would have been rather comical to observe the cast of mind of these kids in whom the revolution had placed its faith.
Massengo subsequently put these elements under my command, and my only satisfaction was to read them the riot act with perfect clarity now that we were able to speak in French. But there wasn’t an atom of revolutionary spirit in them. I got the officers to come to the Upper Base, and put things to them very sharply. I told them that they would be tested in shooting and that those who passed the test wou
ld go straight to the front; if they were happy with this, I would accept them, otherwise they should pull out because I didn’t want to waste any time (and we didn’t have any to waste). The leader among them, who was quite reasonable, accepted the conditions and over the next few days they went up to the base to strengthen our defenses or, more accurately, to take the weapons of those who fled (for they had come unarmed).
The latest intelligence from Mbili was that scouts had seen the guardsmen near the Jungo road, and so he had sent some compañeros to lay mines at the start of the road. This mine-laying was dangerous for our men because Mbili was doing it on one side of the road and I had sent scouts out on the other side in the same direction. It was only by chance that a mine didn’t explode under the feet of one of our own men. This machine had no pilot; each part moving under its own momentum.
From the Nganja-Kananga area it was possible to head toward the lake on four different roads; we didn’t know along which one the enemy would make his push, or if he would come along all of them. They even had the advantage over us in knowing the terrain; they had the better guides, in the shape of local peasants who lived among them and supplied them with food. By this time the soldiers had learned some lessons in countering guerrilla warfare, and they seemed to be treating the peasants with the greatest deference, while we were paying for past errors by suffering the consequences in the form of their current disloyalty.
Following his custom of sending us all the groups of men who showed up around there, Massengo treated me to a seven-member suicide squad whose desire for destruction was directed toward the sinking of a transport ship that linked Albertville and Kigoma. I explained to them that the operation was relatively easy and could be carried out at any time as the ships did not travel in a convoy, but I thought it very inappropriate to do this when relations with Tanzania were so cool and it could become a pretext for further restrictions. But I had other tasks for them: to cross behind enemy lines with some Cubans to carry out actions and capture weapons; but in this action they would be subject to strict discipline. They said they would think about it and I never heard from them again.