and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
This vivid simile . . . is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.
with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the . . . Government, but does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed “Father and mother of the people.”
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.
Owing to . . . double meanings . . . , the latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: “And thus, the weapon, not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect.”
The 101st has no history, but it has a rendezvous with destiny.
Maj. Gen. William C. Lee, rallying the men of the nascent 101st
Airborne Division (1942)
This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him;
Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.
if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
The saying . . . at first sight . . . appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu’s meaning: “Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” Chang Yü thus further elucidates the point: “If our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front.”
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
Li Ch’üan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: “If attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general will fight.”
When the enemy is equal in the number of its forces, there should be an immediate retreat, and then the enemy should be ambushed or eliminated by means of sharp-shooters.
U.S. Dept. of the Army, Handbook on Aggressor Insurgent Warfare (1962 edition)
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
Chang Yü reminds us that the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.
if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at all points, the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
As Li Ch’üan tersely puts it: “. . . If the general’s ability is not perfect (i.e., if he is not thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack strength.”
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
“Hobbling the army” is one of those graphic metaphors which from time to time illuminate Sun Tzu’s work. . . . Li Ch’üan . . . adds the comment, “It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop.” One would naturally think of “the ruler” in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: “A kingdom should not be governed from without, an army should not be directed from within.” Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong orders.
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldiers’ minds.
Ts’ao Kung’s note is . . . : “The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves.” And Chang Yü says: “Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civic virtues.”
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
Tu Mu [quotes another commentator]: “The skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death.”
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
Chang Yü says: “If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.”
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly. . . . Chang Yü expounds the saying more satisfactorily: “By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult ground.’ ”
After The Art of War, the treatise referred to as Wu Tzu (written by Wu Ch’i, who died in 381 B.C.) is probably the oldest military work in Chinese history and the one cited most often. DG
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Tu Yu quotes [another commentator] as saying: “It is the sovereign’s function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle is the function of the general.” It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by any central authority.
Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.
Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of victory.”
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundr
ed battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
Li Ch’üan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: “I have the population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?” Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
Chang Yü offers the best commentary. . . . He says that these words “have reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive.” He adds, “Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an attack.” It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.
This man, I say, is most perfect who shall have understood everything for himself, after having devised what may be best afterward and unto the end.
Hesiod, Works and Days (c.800 B.C.)
IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
Where force is necessary, there it must be applied boldly, decisively, and completely. But one must know the limitations of force; one must know when to blend force with a maneuver, a blow with an argument.
Leon Trotsky (1932)
The Chinese given as the heading here is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. . . . It is best taken as something between, or perhaps combining, “tactics” and “disposition of troops.” Ts’ao Kung explains it as “marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other’s condition.” Tu Mu says: “It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to defeat.” Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can “secure success by modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy.”
1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
That is, of course, by a mistake on his part.
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
Chang Yü says: “By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions.”
but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
The commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, “He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,” is plausible enough, but . . . highly improbable.
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;
Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his whereabouts.
Batista has 3,000 men in the field against us. It is a battle against time, and time is on our side. They never know where we are, but we always know where they are.
Fidel Castro (February 24, 1957)
he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.
Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the commentators, though Ts’ao Kung, followed by Tu Yu, explains “secret recesses” as the hills, rivers, and other natural features which will afford shelter or protection to the attacked, and “topmost heights of heaven” as the phases of weather which may be turned to account by the attacking party.
Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
As Ts’ao Kung remarks, “The thing is to see the plant before it has germinated,” to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch’üan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch’êng-an, said to his officers, “Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner.” The officers hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary.
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: “To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood.” Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that
“the world’s coarse thumb
And finger fail to plumb.”
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Mei Yao-ch’ên says: “He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease.”
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
Tu Mu explains this very well, “Inasmuch as his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.”
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
Ch’ên Hao says: “He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks.” The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yü: “One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win.”
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Position need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: “In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured.”
We make this wide encircling movement in the Mediterranean, having for its primary object the recovery of the command of that vital sea, but also having for its object the exposure of the underbelly of the Axis, especially Italy, to every attack.
; Winston Churchill, debate in House of Commons (1942)
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
There is a very strong temptation . . . for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for the advantage of being the government.