Read The Media Candidate – politics and power in 2048 Page 15

CHAPTER EIGHT

  Star Manager

  COPE was rapidly computerizing everything. Over the years, nearly all of the human interaction with the data had been turned over to one of COPE’s computers. The philosophy at COPE was that humans introduced security risk, and they could minimize exposure to security errors and espionage by relying on computers to perform every phase of the operations. COPE management felt that some of COPE’s clandestine operations could be seriously jeopardized by humans with access to broad ranges of data. Thus, a data clerk like Joe with a straightforward and well-constrained job presented little security risk simply because he couldn’t deduce any meaningful picture of COPE clandestine operations.

  For this reason, many of the higher-level analytical jobs had been computerized first. These were jobs that required considerable mathematical, scientific, and logical analysis. These high-level analysts had to access not only data of all kinds, but also details of the goals of the organization. Thus, in years gone by, a large number of high-level analysts and decision makers would know a broad range of details about COPE operations that made COPE executives feel vulnerable. Top management decided to reduce that vulnerability by replacing these analysts with super-intelligent computer programs.

  COPE developed complex computer programs using fuzzy intelligence and chaos theory to perform these high-level functions. This procedure eliminated most of the human intervention by replacing thousands of highly skilled mathematicians and engineers with computer software. But the price was to accept computer systems, programs, and networks whose complexity grew to exceed any individual’s ability to understand.

  COPE even had its own geosynchronous satellites to handle most of the bus traffic among its mainframe computers while using commercial systems to accommodate the overflow. The system was of mind-numbing complexity. No one person or department could track its evolution, so COPE created a computer system to document the system of work stations, desktops, and mainframes as it proliferated. Another computer program managed the networks. COPE operations had become totally dependent on its computer.

  Traditionally, a single person, the system manager, was responsible for the operation and maintenance of a large computer system. COPE adhered to that tradition with one exception. The COPE computer system manager was such a critical position that the Director decided that the system manager’s identity should be a closely guarded secret to shield them from influences that might have system-wide effects. Thus, only the Director and the Associate Director for Data Services knew who the system manager was.

  COPE management believed that plans and objectives were safe now that they’d been tucked into the folds of a computer network. They believed that, to the extent they could limit human access to information, a secure and faultless operational computer system could be maintained. This assumption might have some merit by traditional computer standards, but the COPE computer did not comprise traditional technology. It was not static. It was on a fast track toward computer preeminence. COPE management still had a lot to learn about computers.