CHAPTER TWO - THE EDUCATION FILE
In a Washington, D.C. cafe where interior noise was overwhelmed by water flowing through a monument on a nearby plaza, Apex scrolled through FedSec's detailed blueprint for a domestic cyber security interlocking surveillance system, nicknamed COSA for Complete Online and Surveillance Aggregation. COSA, as far as she could tell, would connect all of the ground surveillance cameras in the country with overhead satellite coverage from outer space, and strategically placed material and body sensors, to track everyone operating in public spaces. To bolster law enforcement's opportunities to catch terrorists on domestic soil before they acted, the Commission was implementing an extensive research initiative to determine how to co-opt every camera already recording on street corners, at intersections and inside public buildings. The next phase would ensure dedicated law enforcement satellites and an army of security drones ready to be directed at any time to focus on specific locations where terrorists, criminals and suspects may be operating. But the ability to view people in the open had to be aligned with a protocol to separately determine the identity of each individual. To achieve that goal, the system would need advanced facial recognition software capable of scanning across databases to match features to known records. But since appearances could be precisely altered, the system also necessitated functions to understand physical body size and shape, movements and gestures, and the capability to decipher clothing and accessories a person was wearing or carrying by cross-referencing personal items to individual shopping records. In the future, the report read, if the system was unable to make a facial or body match, the software would advance to analyzing the person's clothes, determine the color and brand, cross-reference across all purchases of the same product and find a consumer match to the suspect in retail website databases. The idea, claimed FedSec, was to prevent an individual from completely evading the system's ability to utilize surveillance footage for identification and apprehension by wearing hats or dark glasses, or continuously keeping his head down to prevent his face from appearing on camera.
After finishing with the detailed plan, Apex began reading a series of documents from various federal government departments indirectly supporting the project. The Attorney General's office had added an analysis of the legal implications of the functionality, which according to Justice Department researchers, were limited. The country's lawmakers declared the Constitution did not protect an individual operating in a public space from being observed and recorded, because there was no expectation of privacy. Law enforcement was not prevented from using surveillance in a non-invasive fashion against the populace, and later using the evidence of the activities to make a case against an individual who had committed a crime. The only issue would be the advanced science and technology aimed at confirming identity without a facial match. Could the system really determine a person's distinct form of walking down the street? How would the courts interpret a computer's analysis of swagger? Supporters argued the research would address those issues. But detractors noted civil liberties groups would find holes in the entire process. What if someone was ill on the surveillance day or on crutches or had a sore arm? How could the system know every oddity in a person's movements? With the conflicting opinions, DOJ declined to speculate on all of the arguments, but was prepared to begin research immediately.
In a response memo, COSA's sponsors already had an answer for those concerns. Since every aspect of an individual's life would eventually be linked to COSA. If a suspect identified through body movements were on crutches, the data would cross-reference the suspect's medical records and determine if the excuse was valid or advise of the possibility of an incorrect match in the analysis. Apex indignantly shook her head at the depth of the planned invasion into people's personal records and switched to reading the State Department's report.
State had been asked to assess the international receptivity for a global system rollout. Who among the U.S.'s allies would be most willing to finance and construct the same surveillance protocol and link their visual coverage to the U.S.? The system will be at its zenith, FedSec proclaimed, when every inch of the earth was under surveillance and every human had a profile in the system. The global view would isolate any suspect's whereabouts worldwide.
The document laid out several hypothetical case studies for combatting home grown terrorism, including one scenario about a child born in Minnesota who upon the issuance of his birth certificate, would be immediately registered in COSA. Throughout the child's life the system updates when he gets his inoculations, begins school, signs up to play football, takes his first job making burgers, buys his first car, submits a college application, and hands in an employment application to an operating business. His online access by phone, laptop and other devices would create the overall picture of his friends, habits and even word use preferences. Specific access numbers tied to his credit cards, health insurance, college debt, public transit use, travel and shopping habits would be aggregated into his record. The system would continuously scan for activity and ignore those law-abiding citizens who were also functioning as predicted through a standard life plan. But if after the first year of college, the now grown man's activities ceased appearing in the data records, the system could send law enforcement an alert. COSA's algorithms would have to account for out-of-country vacations and use additional tools to cross-reference credit card purchases for airline tickets or hotels stays and restaurant dining in other locations with the same timeframe as the missing activity. But if the search indicated the man had no results for thirty days, a warning could be distributed worldwide. Law enforcement could interpret a missing individual to be a victim, or a suspect who may have disappeared into a clandestine life. If he suddenly re-appeared without explanation, his actions would almost certainly be considered suspicious.
On these scenarios, the Justice Department had more to say. All consumer-facing services would have to rewrite disclaimers to provide transparency about third party uses of the consumer's data. Supporters warned such revelations would undoubtedly lead to a proliferation of service providers who would guarantee privacy for a premium price. Here the government would have a class war challenge. If wealthy individuals were able to buy their way out of COSA, not only would law enforcement miss potential suspects, but also the middle class and economically disadvantaged could launch a revolt. Many cautions were required to make the system palpable to the widest range of people. The government would need to ensure everyone had a profile, regardless of wealth. But to achieve maximum utilization, the government would have to implement standard opt-in protocols before the wealthy could determine how to avoid being covered.
Apex laughed at their naivety. Little did the official researchers know how far behind the government had already fallen on this point. People with money were the primary backers of independent technologists with plans to counteract government initiatives aimed at monitoring online activity. But reading on, she understood how COSA intended to inculcate everyone through the Internet and mobile phones. Utilizing a publically available service would automatically create a profile for anyone not already registered in COSA. The data collected through random use would be transformed into permanent files capable of creating commands for the individual user. 'To avoid this outcome, the rich will have to create their own internet too,' Apex thought. 'More work for me.'
Continuing to read the blueprint for a multi-year research and development strategy, Apex realized COSA would be slowly created by interlocking existing hardware into one controlled system. The server farms currently established in isolated corners near rushing rivers or in hidden valleys in quiet towns would be brought together under COSA's control. The Commerce department's contribution to the report warned the government would need to provide an incentive to businesses to integrate with the system, but not legislation, which would be too public and viewed as draconian. Instead, the department suggested the output of the dedicated research required to cr
eate the system should be shared with businesses from the beginning. The government could allow citizen profiles to be accessible by public companies to use for marketing and tailoring products directly to people based on the details collected about their actual habits. The incentive to business would be the ability to know the exact products and services the populace is purchasing, how much they are spending, and the analysis of trends to predict future consumer activity based on searches and queries. The government would ensure the research included extensive inquiry protocols for consumer-facing industries. In exchange, industry would be expected to cooperate by attaching their server infrastructure to the domestic, and eventually international system. Law enforcement predicted that as the system proved its value by catching terrorists and reducing crime at home, more businesses would be incentivized to voluntarily link to the process.
'What a beautiful plan,' Apex sarcastically concluded as she nearly slammed down her computer screen. 'Too bad, it's doomed.' In the near past, when governments sought to mobilize against their own citizens, the rulers would call up a physical army and order the soldiers to attack the people in the name of the particular stand being taken. But for this mobilization, the people would be able to fight back with their own army, one they did not recruit nor see, but one standing up for their rights and fighting around their powerlessness. As the government began its movement towards solidifying COSA, Apex and independent technologists like her would rise from the public and private ranks to enforce a rational accounting through their technical capabilities. Her colleagues were having their own meetings and making independent plans to stop COSA before the system could be implemented. Their number one weapon would be advanced technology, including the brainpower to 'outcode' government operatives. The only question was when, and where should they start to deploy.