“What makes you think that?” asked Sir Len Watkins, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.
“Several things,” he replied. “As you would expect, the place is alive with Chinese people. Not just building or construction engineers and others of that sort, or even nuclear experts, although there are plenty of both it seems. We have information, however, which suggests that many of the Chinese people at the site are also weapons experts. Reliable information, I have to say. We even have the names of a few of them.”
“How on earth did you get that?” asked the Home Office man.
Salisbury looked around, fidgeting with his hair again, seemingly to assess whether or not he could trust them all. He supposed he could, or they wouldn’t be there.
“We have available to us in the SIS access to some of the most modern technology in the world, especially the world of espionage. I will give you no details. Those of you who need to know about it already do so.”
He looked at the Head of MI6.
“I will simply say that, for some time now, we have been able to monitor - um - several sources of communication. Around the world. Not just tapping mobile phones or e-mails. We have available to us the output from several highly sophisticated and sensitive satellites. Not all those satellites are ours, by the way, but GCHQ is getting quite good at - er - how shall I put this; cyber warfare, I believe is the popular description.”
He scratched and began another circuit of the table.
He looked again at the screen, still showing the last slide.
“We have far better images than this,” he waved his pointer. “And we have listened in to conversations taking place on the ground.”
He looked around at his audience, sitting in stunned silence.
“So I am reasonably sure of what I am talking about.”
He rested his hands on the back of the chair taken by Sir William Forsyth, Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office.
“We all know, I am sure, that North Korea is said already to possess a few viable nuclear weapons, and some short range delivery systems. We believe the weapons to be of Chinese origin, and we also believe that North Korea’s allies across the border are helping with the construction, at other sites, of the facilities needed to enrich uranium. Once those facilities are complete, North Korea will be able to construct its own nuclear weapons.”
He stopped at the head of the table.
“Perhaps I could briefly explain, for the benefit of those who may not know, the difficult, expensive, lengthy and technically challenging process of uranium enrichment by the use of centrifuges, which, until the advent of inexpensive, high-precision computer-controlled machining equipment, were out of the reach of most countries.”
He adjusted his glasses, and, head bowed slightly, set off on another stroll behind his attentive audience.
“Uranium oxide contains two isotopes of uranium: U-235 and U-238. What you need if you want to make a bomb or fuel a nuclear power plant is U-235, but this forms only about one percent of the oxide. The rest is U-238, which is no use. So you need to increase the amount of U-235 somehow and separate it from the U-238, which is slightly heavier than the other isotope. The process of concentrating the U-235 is called enrichment, and centrifuges are a central part of that process.”
Salisbury looked around at his audience, as if to seek encouragement to continue.
“The first step is to turn the oxide in a gas called uranium hexafluoride. This is then spun at very high speed in the centrifuge, which creates a force thousands of times more powerful than the force of gravity. The heavier U-238 atoms tend to move out toward the walls of the centrifuge, and the U-235 atoms tend to stay more toward the center of it.
“Although it is only a slight difference in concentrations, when you extract the gas from the center of the centrifuge, it has slightly more U-235 than it did before. This process is repeated thousands of times, until a gas that is highly enriched in U-235 is created. At a uranium enrichment plant, thousands of centrifuges are chained together in long cascades. At the end of this, you have uranium hexafluoride gas containing a high concentration of U-235 atoms. It is a relatively simple process to turn the uranium hexafluoride gas back into uranium metal.”
“The creation of these centrifuges is a huge technological challenge, until recently, as I said, out of the reach of most countries They must spin at a rate of 100,000 rpm, which means they must have very light, yet strong and well-balanced rotors, spinning on high-speed bearings, usually magnetic to reduce friction.”
He stood behind the Head of MI6.
“I have bored you with this technical diatribe because we all need to have some understanding of the enrichment process, if we are to understand and appreciate the importance of what I have to say next.”
He reached across the table between the Chief of Defence Staff and the Head of MI6, who were seated next to one another.
“May I?” he asked.
He took a glass of water and sipped thoughtfully.
“Centrifuges are expensive and slow,” he said. “You may be forgiven for thinking that there has to be a better way.”
He replaced the glass.
“Well. There is.”
He looked around.
“China has developed it, and means to exploit it. At Punggye-ri, in North Korea.”
He shouldered his pointer, rather like a rifle, and meandered slowly back towards the screen at the end of the conference room.
“I can no longer bore you with technical details, because we do not – as yet – have access to them. Suffice it to say that the Chinese equipment consists of large pressure vessels of some kind, encased in very high powered electro-magnets, rather like those used at CERN in Switzerland where they discovered the Higgs Boson. The flasks contain gaseous uranium hexafluoride again, which is bombarded by a concentration of high-energy fiber laser beams.
“By some combination of particle physics and nuclear chemistry, the Uranium 235 is much more quickly concentrated and more easily extracted.”
He paused and glanced at his audience.
“In very large quantities.”
By now, the panel of experts before him was looking increasingly concerned.
“The Chinese, we know, have built at least two prototypes of these – um – machines,” continued Salisbury.
“The first was tested in a remote area of the country, and exploded, killing and injuring many hundreds of workers and local villagers, and spreading radioactive waste for some hundreds of miles downwind. The second prototype was more successful, in that it did not blow up. But it seems to have failed in other ways, similarly spreading clouds of radioactive waste into the atmosphere. However, our understanding is that before doing so, it did manage to produce a limited amount of enriched U 235.”
He stabbed at the screen, still showing the view of the Punggye-ri.
“It is planned to construct a further prototype here. If it fails, the prisoners of camp 16 will suffer even more than they do at present – together, no doubt, with a few Chinese experts.”
He turned away from the screen.
“Hence the new roads, the new tunnels and the extended and modernized railway link to China, which will carry the equipment needed to build the new processor. This will not be completed in a hurry. It is mountainous and difficult terrain, as you can see,” another stab at the screen, “even for – er, um - slave labour.
“If it succeeds, however, as the Chinese confidently expect, it will be put into full productive use, to supply both the North Korean and the Chinese nuclear programs.”
He looked around at his audience.
“I leave you to judge the consequences of that, gentlemen.”
Some shook their heads. All of them looked increasingly concerned.
“Do the Americans know about this?” asked the Foreign Office man, Sir William Forsythe.
“I shall be very surprised if they do not,” replied Salisbury. “But they will not hav
e the details of how the new system of enrichment works. They would give a king’s ransom to find out.”
“As we would, I am sure,” said Sir William.
“If we could discover the details and brief them,” said Salisbury, looking at the Cabinet Secretary, “we could immediately undo the enormous damage done to our relationship by the - um- treacherous behaviour of your predecessor.”
Salisbury looked around him.
“And we can get those details, gentlemen. Indeed, we almost have them already.”
“How can that be possible?” asked the Chief of the Defence Staff.
“Because,” he almost whispered as if even he could hardly believe it, “we have a man on the ground, at the site.”
“WHAT?” There was a murmur of disbelief.
“The agent, shall I describe him, is effectively a defector, although he has declined our offer of asylum. He is an English-speaking North Korean nuclear physicist who has become so disillusioned with the state of affairs in his country, that he is willing, it seems, to put at mortal risk his own life and that of all his family to share with us the information to which he has access.”
He turned again, looking at those seated at the table in front to him, smoothing his hair as he began yet another circuit of the oval table.
“Which brings me, gentlemen,” he looked around him, “to the point of my briefing.”
He stopped and lent against the chair at which the Head of MI6 – ‘C’ – was seated.
“You will all know that there is no such thing as freedom of movement in North Korea. Our man, who is in a senior managerial cum technical position at Punggye-ri, has in his possession the plans of the site, and detailed technical drawings of the new Chinese enrichment plant which is being built. He is so fearful of the international consequences of this project should it eventually succeed and which his research is helping to develop, that he has decided to give this country the details so that we may – with our allies, of course – produce effective counter-measures. He has started to copy this technical information in detail, mostly on to 4-terabite USB memory sticks.”
“The memory sticks are for us.”
He paused, and rested his hands on the back a chair opposite Sir Geoffrey Sefton.
“The problem is that he cannot get them to us,” he said.
“If you all agree that they are worth having,” he looked around him, “then we have to collect.”
There was no dissent.
He looked directly at the Head of MI6.
“One for you then, I think, Geoffrey, as we have discussed.”
“Collecting our trophy, if I may call it that, will not be an easy operation, gentlemen. As you will have gathered, both the planning and execution will be difficult, but if we do not make the effort, then the information currently available to us will be passed to another. Probably the Americans. Frankly, I believe this country should get there first if humanly possible. After all, we have a head start.
“I should tell, you, however, that we have already suffered what some colleagues regard as something of a setback. I regard it however, as a success.”
He looked at ‘C’.
“I took the liberty, as I hinted, of discussing all this with Geoffrey at an earlier meeting, since the planning of our recovery operation will be down to him, and the execution also, no doubt, will fall to his people.”
“I must tell you, gentlemen, that we have already made one attempt to make contact with our – um – informant. This was in an attempt to show our resolve and, shall I say, support for his endeavours. We were successful in making contact with him, but he was not sufficiently trustful of our team to pass on any information, which by then he had not even seriously started collecting for us.”
Salisbury looked at those before him.
“I am sorry to tell you that we have lost contact with one of our people, although we believe the other – there were two of them – is successfully making his way home. If anything, this emphasises the difficulties which we face. We must now make a renewed effort.”
“Could this be a job for our Special Forces?” asked the Chief of the General Staff. “We have had SAS people there in the past, for various reasons.”
The Chief of the Defence Intelligence staff shuffled uncomfortably.
“I have to admit, General, that it was our special forces who we sent in a short time ago. It is one of them who is missing.”
“But I knew nothing of this,” protested CDS, enraged.
“This was a Top Secret mission,” said Salisbury, “and it was on my instructions that very few people indeed knew about it. I take full responsibility for not having briefed you.”
“We have discussed the possibility of sending them in again, to collect the information,” said ‘C’, “but concluded not. I still have people there as well, in various guises, and we shall not be operating totally without local help, either. Using military resources in many ways would add to the difficulties. There are two major problems, as I see it. One is getting the team in, and the other, far more problematic, is getting them out again with the - er - trophies, I think you called them, Jack.”
Salisbury nodded.
“So we shall not be sending in a team,” he said. “This will be a one-man operation.”
Salisbury looked around at the people seated at the table, and briefly caught Northcot’s eye, sitting with a few other officials behind the oval table. They did not acknowledge one another.
“He is our most experienced field officer, who has travelled, shall I say, far and wide on similar missions. He has been fully briefed, and absolutely understands and accepts the risks he will be taking. We are confident that he will succeed.”
“It could be a suicide mission, I hope he realises that,” said Sir William Forsyth from the Foreign Office. “The North Koreans take no prisoners.”
“He knows. He has the advantage of speaking and reading the language, and there are not too many people around who can say that,” said Sefton.
“There is one major factor in our favour,” added Salisbury, “and that is that there is no real urgency in terms of the nuclear development itself. The project, which is just starting, will take many years to complete, so we have time on our side to get the information, analyse it, and plan for whatever action we deem to be necessary.”
He paused to adjust his uncomfortable tie, looking carefully at his audience.
“On the other hand,” he continued, “we must get on with the utmost urgency. Our defector and benefactor, if I may call him that, has contracted radiation sickness, which has recently developed into cancer. He is dying.”
There was silence for a moment.
“I agree that we simply must get hold of this information while there is time and before the Americans do if that is at all possible,” said Forsyth. “It could make a real difference to the success of this mission if they ever get a whiff of what we’re doing. In that case,” he turned to Watkins, “we may very well need to call on some of your SAS people to help out. If you can do so without in any way endangering security, I suggest a bit of contingency planning might be in order, just in case.”
“Agreed,” replied Watkins, turning to the Chief of General staff, who nodded his consent.
Jack Salisbury stretched.
“Some of the planning we did to get your two fellows in there recently will be a good start.”
“But I must warn you, gentlemen,” said ‘C’, “that the Americans are already sniffing around. They sent one of their top CIA men over here only last week following the execution of what the Koreans claimed to be one of their spies.”
“We shall make sure that those of you who need to know are kept in touch with progress,” said Salisbury, winding up his briefing. “Meanwhile, Geoffrey and I will turn our attention to ways and means of retrieving the information which will soon become available to us.”
He looked again at the assembled meeting.
“Finally, please
let me emphasise once again and in the strongest possible terms the importance of keeping politicians out of this loop for the time being. At some stage, I suppose I shall probably have to brief one or two Ministers, but we simply must leave that for as long as possible. In the meantime, the slightest whiff of a leak could put this whole operation into jeopardy.”
He looked around him. “Are we all quite clear about that?”
They were.
They collected their mobile phones on their way out.
14.
THE TOURIST
Maurice Northcot went straight from the briefing to Bourleywood House, in the Cotswolds.
“It’s good of you to drive me down, James,” he said to Piper. “It’s not often I get the boss to take me out in his car for a ride through the British countryside!”
“It’s not often I get to visit The House, either,” replied the Head of Section 7. “Good chance to do so, since you’ll be there. We can talk for a bit, but I must get back after dinner.”
“I thought the briefing went rather well, didn’t you?” queried Maurice.
“Funny chap, Jack Salisbury,” replied Piper. “On top of his job and on top of his subject, but never appears as if he is, somehow.”
“Nobody quibbled about anything.”
“More than they dared do, probably. There’s nobody higher than him to complain too, apart from the PM!”
“It was a bit frightening, in a way, being there with all that lot,” said Maurice. “It made me realise that I have to succeed, with all that power behind the operation. I’ve never been to a briefing quite like that before.”
“You’ll succeed,” countered Piper. “You wouldn’t be going if we didn’t believe that.”
“A couple of weeks down here will be useful though. Brush up my technical Chosŏnŏ, for a start.”
“There’s a lot more to it than that. Your whole time there is specially tailored towards you and what you have to do at the end of it. You are the sole centre of attention for those selected to help you and to run the course. There is nobody else.”
“I’ve been on the lecturing side of courses like that before, a couple of times. Who’s in charge? Anyone I know?”
“Warren Russell.”
“I thought he was Director of the place?”