It is to the credit of British intellectuals and institutions that the documents showcasing this electoral swindle are now available. Series A, Volume 4 of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP), published by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, provides a bounty of startling revelations.
Sources: Robin Ramsay, Politics & Paranoia (Geat Britain: Picnic Publishing, 2008), p. 258; Johannes Harnischfeger, Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), p. 63, fn. 90.
The Decline
1. Chinua Achebe, “The Duty and Involvement of the African Writer.” Excerpted from Wilfred Cartey and Kilson, Martin, The Africa Reader (New York: Random House, 1970).
The Role of the Writer in Africa
1. “The Beginnings of African Literature,” http://www.unc.edu/~hhalpin/ThingsFallApart/literature.html.
2. Bacon, “Atlantic Unbound”; Achebe, “The Duty and Involvement of the African Writer”; Achebe, “Chinua Achebe on Biafra,” Transition, no. 36 (1968), pp. 31–38. Published by Indiana University Press on behalf of the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute, www.jstor.org/stable/2934672; Lindfors, Conversations with Chinua Achebe. Achebe Foundation Archives © 2004–2011.
3. Ode Ogede, Achebe and the Politics of Representation (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2001).
4. Bacon, “Atlantic unbound”; Achebe, “The Duty and Involvement of the African Writer”; Achebe, “Chinua Achebe on Biafra,” Transition; Lindfors, Conversations with Chinua Achebe. Achebe Foundation Archives © 2004–2011.
5. Ali Mazrui, The Trial of Christopher Okigbo, African Writers Series (London: Heinemann, 1971). Achebe Foundation Archives © 2004–2011.
6. Ibid.
7. Bacon, “Atlantic Unbound”; Achebe, “The Duty and Involvement of the African Writer”; Achebe, “Chinua Achebe on Biafra,” Transition; Lindfors, Conversations with Chinua Achebe. Achebe Foundation Archives © 2004–2011.
8. Ibid. See also the preface I wrote for Richard Dowden’s book Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles (London: Portobello Books, 2008).
9. Ibid.
10. Adapted and updated from the following: Bradford Morrow, “Chinua Achebe, An Interview,” Conjunctions 17 (Fall 1991); Achebe, “Chinua Achebe on Biafra,” Transition; Lindfors, Conversations with Chinua Achebe.
11. Ibid.
12. From the preface I wrote for Richard Dowden’s book Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles.
1966
1. Chinua Achebe, Collected Poems (New York: Anchor Books, 2004).
January 15, 1966, Coup
1. An honorific title whose original meaning was likely “war leader” or “captain of the bodyguards,” depending on the Hausa language expert one talks to.
The Dark Days
1. It is important to mention that Dr. Ogan was educated in Great Britain and was the first board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist not just in Nigeria, but if I am not mistaken, in all of West Africa! Dr. Ogan is a remarkable man who came from an extraordinary family of achievers in Item, Imo state; his younger brother Agu Ogan, a future professor of biochemistry and rector of Federal Polytechnic, Owerri, also became a close friend. Dr. Okoronkwo Ogan served his nation admirably and, with so many others, he served Biafra with equal distinction when the time came, in his case as a wartime surgeon at several places, including St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, Umuahia. I remember being told by him how he was often overwhelmed by the sheer number of war wounded brought to his surgical service. These were Biafran army casualties, killed and maimed at the hands of Egyptian mercenary pilots flying for the Nigerian air force because the Nigerians, not surprisingly, did not have enough well-trained pilots!
2. Ikejiani was well-known for his attempts to end nepotism and clannishness in the Coal Corporation, fully integrating the organization that he ran with qualified Nigerians from all over the nation. His efforts drew great ire in many quarters.
3. Author’s recollections. Also Ezenwa-Ohaeto, Chinua Achebe: A Biography.
4. Ibid.
5. Chinua Achebe, “Chinua Achebe on Biafra.” Transition.
6. Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960–1967. African Studies Series, vol. 4 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press Archive, 1971), p. 17.
7. Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1983), p. 43.
BENIN ROAD
1. Chinua Achebe, Collected Poems (New York: Anchor Books, 2004).
A History of Ethnic Tension and Resentment
1. Achebe The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 46.
2. Ibid. Paul Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos,” Journal of Modern African Studies 5, no. 2 (September 1967), pp. 163–79. Anber’s work provides a snapshot of the threat that Igbo educational, economic, and political success posed to other ethnic groups in Nigeria’s perpetual internal struggles for political and economic dominance. His work also provides useful background information on the ethnic rivalry that existed in Nigeria right up to independence and beyond. Robert M. Wren, J. P. Clark (Farmington Hills, MI: Twayne Publishers, 1984).
3. Anber. “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
4. Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 46.
5. Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
6. Ibid. Anber’s own observations of this shortcoming are instructive:
Like most parvenus, many Igbos also became arrogant and self-righteous in their new status, thus arousing the resentment of other ethnic groups, the Northerners in particular, whom the Igbos generally regarded contemptuously as backward and inferior. Caught in the “revolution of rising expectations,” confronted with a political system in which the numerically superior Northerners were destined to maintain dominance, cognisant of the corruption in government circles and the obstacles to effective constitutional change, the Igbos also quickly became aware of the contradiction between their aspirations and the actualities of their condition. Their elevated status, educationally and economically, contrasted with their subordinate status politically.
7. Ibid. See also Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, pp. 48–49.
8. Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
9. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 467.
10. Ibid.
11. Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
12. Ibid. See also Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 25.
13. Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism, p. 467.
14. Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 25.
15. Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, with special attention to timeline and notable people in Nigerian history; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria.
The Army
1. Information passed on to me directly from Christopher Okigbo and other personal sources; Alexandar Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980), p. 14; Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup (Ibadan, Nigeria: Evans Brothers, 1981).
2. Ademoyega, Why We Struck; Luckham, The Nigerian Military.
3. Alex Madiebo, Robin Luckham, Dr. Nowa Omoigui, and other authorities on this subject suggest that over two scores of military officers and civilians were killed during that bloody coup. These include: “Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister of the Federation; Brigadier Zakari Mai-Malari, Commander of the 2nd Brigade Nigerian Army; and Colonel K. Mohammed, Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army. Other casualties of this coup were Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General; Li
eutenant-Colonel J. T. Pam, Adjutant General, Nigerian Army; Lieutenant-Colonel A. Largema, Commanding Officer 4th Battalion, Ibadan; and S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western Nigeria.”
Apart from Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, “the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria, others killed in the north included Brigadier S. Ademulegun, Commander of the 1st Brigade NA; Colonel R. A. Shodeinde, Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Defense Academy; Ahmed Dan Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) to the North Regional Government; and Sergeant Duromola Oyegoke of the Nigerian Army. There were rumors that the senior wife of Sir Ahmadu Bello and the wife of Brigadier Ademulegun were also killed.”
There were a number of political leaders whose lives were spared but were nevertheless arrested and detained in Lagos and Kaduna: “Sir Kashim Ibrahim—Governor of Northern Nigeria; Aba Kadangare Gobara—Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria; Alhaji Hassan Lemu—Principal private secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria; and B. A. Fani-Kayode—at the time Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria.”
Sources: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Arthur Nwankwo and Samuel Ifejika, Biafra: The Making of a Nation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969); Nowamagbe Omoigui, “Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966,” Part I, Urhobo Historical Society, www.org/nigerdelta/nigeria_facts/MilitaryRule/Omoigui/1966Comp=Part1.html.
4. Major General Alexander Madiebo (Ret.), commander of the Biafran army, recalls this period this way:
The January coup was widely acclaimed all over the country, including the northern Region, where top civil servants celebrated its success and apparently happy ending by holding parties both in their homes and in public places. Acting against my advice that it was improper from the protocol point of view, Katsina [Governor of the Nigerian Northern Region] visited my house immediately after his appointment. He brought with him his entire entourage of police outriders and patrol cars and a carload of drinks. We all drank to the health of Ironsi. We drank to the health of the new governors. We drank to the survival of a new Nigeria. Katsina would probably say now, I did all that to deceive old Alex into believing all was well. I sincerely believed that he was acting in good faith that night we drank the toasts.
Source: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.
5. The coup plotters had killed Brigadier Zak Maimalari, Lieutenant Colonel Abogo Largema, and the prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.
6. Members of his supreme military council included: “Babafemi Ogundipe as Chief of Staff, Nigerian Defense forces; Yakubu Gowon as Chief of Staff, Army; and Military governors of the four regions at the time. These were Chukwuemeka Ojukwu—Military Governor of Eastern Region; Adekunle Fajuyi—Military Governor of Western Region; David Ejoor—Military Governor of Mid-western Region; and Hassan Katsina-Military Governor of the Northern Region.”
Sources: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Henryka Schabowska and Ulf Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis: News, Attitudes, and Background Information: A Study of Press Performance, Government Attitude to Biafra and Ethno-Political Integration (Upsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978).; Philip Effiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton: Sungai, 2004); Ademoyega, Why We Struck; Metz, Nigeria.
Interviews with retired Nigerian soldiers; and Omoigui, “Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966.”
7. They were actively being told this, mainly by local and foreign observers and radio and diplomatic types.
8. Nzeogwu was moved to Aba’s prison. Of his coconspirator: Major Ifeajuna was transferred to Uyo’s prison; Majors Adewale Ademoyega and Tim Onwuatuegwu to Enugu’s prison; Captain Gbulie to Abakaliki’s prison; and Major I. H. Chukwuka and Captain Nwobosi were both transferred to Owerri’s prison.
Sources: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Ademoyega, Why We Struck; and Omoigui, “Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966.”
9. The most bizarre story is the one that says the riots were provoked by a brand of bread named Nzeogwu that had a picture depicting him as St. George the crusader slaying a dragon drawn in the likeness of the Sardauna of Sokoto.
Countercoup and Assassination
1. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, p. 43; Luckham, The Nigerian Military.
2. Ibid.
3. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p, 62; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; interviews with retired Nigerian soldiers; Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Schabowska and Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis.
6. Here are some chilling statistics: Of the 206 individuals murdered during this countercoup (almost ten times as many as during the January 15 coup), 185 were from the East, 19 were from the Mid-Western Region, and 6 from the Western Region. Not a single person from the North lost their life during this blood fest.
Source: Luckham, The Nigerian Military.
7. Achebe, “The Duty and Involvement of the African Writer”; Also Chinua Achebe, The Education of a British-Protected Child (London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2009).
The Pogroms
1. Chinua Achebe, “Chinua Achebe on Biafra,” Transition, pp. 31–38.
2. The hysteria would be heightened by a most sensational news item of that time: A four-engine propeller plane, “a Royal Air Burundi DC-4M Argonaut, flown by . . . Henry Wharton/Heinrich Wartski, crashlanded at Garoua, in Cameroun [sic], while carrying a load of arms from Rotterdam.” Henry A. Wharton, a German-American, was arrested. The newspapers alleged that the load of arms was en route to Biafra.
Sources: Tom Cooper, “Civil War in Nigeria (Biafra) 1967–70,” Western & Northern African Database, November 13, 2003; Metz, Nigeria.
PENALTY OF GODHEAD
1. Chinua Achebe, Collected Poems (New York: Anchor Books, 2004).
The Aburi Accord
1. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, p. 92; Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Schabowska and Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis; Joe O. G. Achuzia, Requiem Biafra (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1986); Metz, Nigeria.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon—the Nigerian head of state—Colonel Robert Adebayo, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu—governor of the Eastern Region—Lieutenant Colonel David Ejoor, Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Katsina, Commodore J. E. A. Wey, Major Mobolaji Johnson, Alhaji Kam Selem, Mr. T. Omo-Bare.
3. Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Schabowska and Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis; Achuzia, Requiem Biafra; Metz, Nigeria.
4. Ibid. Also J. Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon—The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman (Ibadan, Nigeria: West Books Publisher, 1986).
5. Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Achuzia, Requiem Biafra; Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Schabowska and Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis; Metz, Nigeria.
6. Ibid.
7. Odumegwu Ojukwu. Encyclopedia Britannica; retrieved July 20, 2005, using Encyclopedia Britannica Premium Service; interviews with former Nigerian and Biafran soldiers, diplomats, and government officials, Achebe Foundation. T. C. McCaskie, “Nigeria,” Africa South of the Sahara 1998 (London: Europa, 1997); Harold Nelson, Nigeria: A Country Study (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982); Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Schabowska and Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis; Metz, Nigeria; Audrey Smock, Ibo Politics: The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.
8. Ibid.
GENERATION GAP
1. Chinua Achebe, Collected
Poems (New York: Anchor Books, 2004).
The Nightmare Begins
1. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, p. 93.
2. A memorandum from the American Jewish Congress in 1968 provides some more clarity to this murky milieu:
A definite step [toward secession] was taken in March when the Government of the Eastern Region announced that all revenues collected on behalf of the Federal Government would be paid to the Treasury of the Eastern Region. The Federal Government, it was alleged, had refused to pay the salaries of refugee civil servants forced to flee their areas of employment, and the East now had some 2 million refugees whose displacement from other parts of Nigeria was “irreversible.” Moreover, the Federal Government, it was alleged, had refused to pay the East its statutory share of revenues for months.
Faced with virtual secession, Colonel Gowon finally attempted to deal with grievances about Northern domination and also to appeal to minorities throughout Nigeria. He proposed that the Northern Region be broken up into six states, the East into three, and the West into two. The new states would coincide, to a large extent, with natural ethnic divisions. Notably, the East would be divided in such a way that the oil reserves would be located in states without an Ibo majority.
Source: Phil Baum, director, Commission on International Affairs, American Jewish Congress, “Memorandum to Chapter and Division Presidents, Chapter and Division CIA Chairmen, CRC’s, Field Staff,” December 27, 1968.
3. There is confirmation of this analysis from the CIA World Factbook:
Gowon rightly calculated that the eastern minorities would not actively support the Igbos, given the prospect of having their own states if the secession effort were defeated. Many of the federal troops who fought the civil war, known as the Biafran War, to bring the Eastern Region back to the federation were members of minority groups.
Sources: The Library of Congress Country Studies: Nigeria Civil War, http://workmall.com/wfb2001/nigeria/nigeria_history_civil_war.html; CIA World Factbook: Nigeria, the 1966 Coups, Civil War, and Gowon’s Government; Metz, Nigeria.