taken a new term, being so far without knowledge that A belongs to
C. Or again suppose that the terms intermediate between B and C are
few: for thus too we are nearer knowledge. For example let D stand for
squaring, E for rectilinear figure, F for circle. If there were only
one term intermediate between E and F (viz. that the circle is made
equal to a rectilinear figure by the help of lunules), we should be
near to knowledge. But when BC is not more probable than AC, and the
intermediate terms are not few, I do not call this reduction: nor
again when the statement BC is immediate: for such a statement is
knowledge.
26
An objection is a premiss contrary to a premiss. It differs from a
premiss, because it may be particular, but a premiss either cannot
be particular at all or not in universal syllogisms. An objection is
brought in two ways and through two figures; in two ways because every
objection is either universal or particular, by two figures because
objections are brought in opposition to the premiss, and opposites can
be proved only in the first and third figures. If a man maintains a
universal affirmative, we reply with a universal or a particular
negative; the former is proved from the first figure, the latter
from the third. For example let stand for there being a single
science, B for contraries. If a man premises that contraries are
subjects of a single science, the objection may be either that
opposites are never subjects of a single science, and contraries are
opposites, so that we get the first figure, or that the knowable and
the unknowable are not subjects of a single science: this proof is
in the third figure: for it is true of C (the knowable and the
unknowable) that they are contraries, and it is false that they are
the subjects of a single science.
Similarly if the premiss objected to is negative. For if a man
maintains that contraries are not subjects of a single science, we
reply either that all opposites or that certain contraries, e.g.
what is healthy and what is sickly, are subjects of the same
science: the former argument issues from the first, the latter from
the third figure.
In general if a man urges a universal objection he must frame his
contradiction with reference to the universal of the terms taken by
his opponent, e.g. if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects
of the same science, his opponent must reply that there is a single
science of all opposites. Thus we must have the first figure: for
the term which embraces the original subject becomes the middle term.
If the objection is particular, the objector must frame his
contradiction with reference to a term relatively to which the subject
of his opponent's premiss is universal, e.g. he will point out that
the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of the same
science: 'contraries' is universal relatively to these. And we have
the third figure: for the particular term assumed is middle, e.g.
the knowable and the unknowable. Premisses from which it is possible
to draw the contrary conclusion are what we start from when we try
to make objections. Consequently we bring objections in these
figures only: for in them only are opposite syllogisms possible, since
the second figure cannot produce an affirmative conclusion.
Besides, an objection in the middle figure would require a fuller
argument, e.g. if it should not be granted that A belongs to B,
because C does not follow B. This can be made clear only by other
premisses. But an objection ought not to turn off into other things,
but have its new premiss quite clear immediately. For this reason also
this is the only figure from which proof by signs cannot be obtained.
We must consider later the other kinds of objection, namely the
objection from contraries, from similars, and from common opinion, and
inquire whether a particular objection cannot be elicited from the
first figure or a negative objection from the second.
27
A probability and a sign are not identical, but a probability is a
generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to
happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a
probability, e.g. 'the envious hate', 'the beloved show affection'.
A sign means a demonstrative proposition necessary or generally
approved: for anything such that when it is another thing is, or
when it has come into being the other has come into being before or
after, is a sign of the other's being or having come into being. Now
an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs,
and a sign may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the position
of the middle term in the figures. For it may be taken as in the first
figure or the second or the third. For example the proof that a
woman is with child because she has milk is in the first figure: for
to have milk is the middle term. Let A represent to be with child, B
to have milk, C woman. The proof that wise men are good, since
Pittacus is good, comes through the last figure. Let A stand for good,
B for wise men, C for Pittacus. It is true then to affirm both A and B
of C: only men do not say the latter, because they know it, though
they state the former. The proof that a woman is with child because
she is pale is meant to come through the middle figure: for since
paleness follows women with child and is a concomitant of this
woman, people suppose it has been proved that she is with child. Let A
stand for paleness, B for being with child, C for woman. Now if the
one proposition is stated, we have only a sign, but if the other is
stated as well, a syllogism, e.g. 'Pittacus is generous, since
ambitious men are generous and Pittacus is ambitious.' Or again
'Wise men are good, since Pittacus is not only good but wise.' In this
way then syllogisms are formed, only that which proceeds through the
first figure is irrefutable if it is true (for it is universal),
that which proceeds through the last figure is refutable even if the
conclusion is true, since the syllogism is not universal nor
correlative to the matter in question: for though Pittacus is good, it
is not therefore necessary that all other wise men should be good. But
the syllogism which proceeds through the middle figure is always
refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when the
terms are related in this way: for though a woman with child is
pale, and this woman also is pale, it is not necessary that she should
be with child. Truth then may be found in signs whatever their kind,
but they have the differences we have stated.
We must either divide signs in the way stated, and among them
designate the middle term as the index (for people call that the index
which makes us know, and the middle term above all has this
character), or else we must call the arguments derived from the
extremes signs, that derived from the middle term the index: for
that which is proved through the first figure is most generally
a
ccepted and most true.
It is possible to infer character from features, if it is granted
that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural
affections: I say 'natural', for though perhaps by learning music a
man has made some change in his soul, this is not one of those
affections which are natural to us; rather I refer to passions and
desires when I speak of natural emotions. If then this were granted
and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign, and we
could state the affection and sign proper to each kind of animal, we
shall be able to infer character from features. For if there is an
affection which belongs properly to an individual kind, e.g. courage
to lions, it is necessary that there should be a sign of it: for ex
hypothesi body and soul are affected together. Suppose this sign is
the possession of large extremities: this may belong to other kinds
also though not universally. For the sign is proper in the sense
stated, because the affection is proper to the whole kind, though
not proper to it alone, according to our usual manner of speaking. The
same thing then will be found in another kind, and man may be brave,
and some other kinds of animal as well. They will then have the
sign: for ex hypothesi there is one sign corresponding to each
affection. If then this is so, and we can collect signs of this sort
in these animals which have only one affection proper to them-but each
affection has its sign, since it is necessary that it should have a
single sign-we shall then be able to infer character from features.
But if the kind as a whole has two properties, e.g. if the lion is
both brave and generous, how shall we know which of the signs which
are its proper concomitants is the sign of a particular affection?
Perhaps if both belong to some other kind though not to the whole of
it, and if, in those kinds in which each is found though not in the
whole of their members, some members possess one of the affections and
not the other: e.g. if a man is brave but not generous, but possesses,
of the two signs, large extremities, it is clear that this is the sign
of courage in the lion also. To judge character from features, then,
is possible in the first figure if the middle term is convertible with
the first extreme, but is wider than the third term and not
convertible with it: e.g. let A stand for courage, B for large
extremities, and C for lion. B then belongs to everything to which C
belongs, but also to others. But A belongs to everything to which B
belongs, and to nothing besides, but is convertible with B: otherwise,
there would not be a single sign correlative with each affection.
-THE END-
.
350 BC
ON PROPHESYING BY DREAMS
by Aristotle
translated by J. I. Beare
1
As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be
based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt
or give it implicit confidence. The fact that all persons, or many,
suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire
us with belief in it [such divination], as founded on the testimony of
experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards
some subjects, be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of
reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting all
other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no probable cause to
account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust. For, in
addition to its further unreasonableness, it is absurd to combine
the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the fact
that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but
merely commonplace persons. If, however, we abstract from the
causality of God, none of the other causes assigned appears
probable. For that certain persons should have foresight in dreams
concerning things destined to take place at the Pillars of Hercules,
or on the banks of the Borysthenes, seems to be something to
discover the explanation of which surpasses the wit of man. Well then,
the dreams in question must be regarded either as causes, or as
tokens, of the events, or else as coincidences; either as all, or
some, of these, or as one only. I use the word 'cause' in the sense in
which the moon is [the cause] of an eclipse of the sun, or in which
fatigue is [a cause] of fever; 'token' [in the sense in which] the
entrance of a star [into the shadow] is a token of the eclipse, or [in
which] roughness of the tongue [is a token] of fever; while by
'coincidence' I mean, for example, the occurrence of an eclipse of the
sun while some one is taking a walk; for the walking is neither a
token nor a cause of the eclipse, nor the eclipse [a cause or token]
of the walking. For this reason no coincidence takes place according
to a universal or general rule. Are we then to say that some dreams
are causes, others tokens, e.g. of events taking place in the bodily
organism? At all events, even scientific physicians tell us that one
should pay diligent attention to dreams, and to hold this view is
reasonable also for those who are not practitioners, but speculative
philosophers. For the movements which occur in the daytime [within the
body] are, unless very great and violent, lost sight of in contrast
with the waking movements, which are more impressive. In sleep the
opposite takes place, for then even trifling movements seem
considerable. This is plain in what often happens during sleep; for
example, dreamers fancy that they are affected by thunder and
lightning, when in fact there are only faint ringings in their ears;
or that they are enjoying honey or other sweet savours, when only a
tiny drop of phlegm is flowing down [the oesophagus]; or that they are
walking through fire, and feeling intense heat, when there is only a
slight warmth affecting certain parts of the body. When they are
awakened, these things appear to them in this their true character.
But since the beginnings of all events are small, so, it is clear, are
those also of the diseases or other affections about to occur in our
bodies. In conclusion, it is manifest that these beginnings must be
more evident in sleeping than in waking moments.
Nay, indeed, it is not improbable that some of the presentations
which come before the mind in sleep may even be causes of the
actions cognate to each of them. For as when we are about to act [in
waking hours], or are engaged in any course of action, or have already
performed certain actions, we often find ourselves concerned with
these actions, or performing them, in a vivid dream; the cause whereof
is that the dream-movement has had a way paved for it from the
original movements set up in the daytime; exactly so, but
conversely, it must happen that the movements set up first in sleep
should also prove to be starting-points of actions to be performed
in the daytime, since the recurrence by day of the thought of these
actions also has had its way paved for it
in the images before the
mind at night. Thus then it is quite conceivable that some dreams
may be tokens and causes [of future events].
Most [so-called prophetic] dreams are, however, to be classed as
mere coincidences, especially all such as are extravagant, and those
in the fulfilment of which the dreamers have no initiative, such as in
the case of a sea-fight, or of things taking place far away. As
regards these it is natural that the fact should stand as it does
whenever a person, on mentioning something, finds the very thing
mentioned come to pass. Why, indeed, should this not happen also in
sleep? The probability is, rather, that many such things should
happen. As, then, one's mentioning a particular person is neither
token nor cause of this person's presenting himself, so, in the
parallel instance, the dream is, to him who has seen it, neither token
nor cause of its [so-called] fulfilment, but a mere coincidence. Hence
the fact that many dreams have no 'fulfilment', for coincidence do not
occur according to any universal or general law.
2
On the whole, forasmuch as certain of the lower animals also
dream, it may be concluded that dreams are not sent by God, nor are
they designed for this purpose [to reveal the future]. They have a
divine aspect, however, for Nature [their cause] is divinely
planned, though not itself divine. A special proof [of their not being
sent by God] is this: the power of foreseeing the future and of having
vivid dreams is found in persons of inferior type, which implies
that God does not send their dreams; but merely that all those whose
physical temperament is, as it were, garrulous and excitable, see
sights of all descriptions; for, inasmuch as they experience many
movements of every kind, they just chance to have visions resembling
objective facts, their luck in these matters being merely like that of
persons who play at even and odd. For the principle which is expressed
in the gambler's maxim: 'If you make many throws your luck must