The Changing representations of the Nanking massacre: its impact on historical truth
The Japanese government’s representation of the Nanking massacre is divided into three major phases: initial pride, post-war denial, and the acknowledgment of guilt by Japan’s liberal academic movement. The changing depiction of Japan’s imperialism from traditional beliefs to the progressive nature of modern academia, demonstrates the impact of a historian’s subjectivity on the construction of history.
The Nanking War Crimes Tribunal acknowledges that the six-week Japanese occupation of Nanking in 1937 resulted in the death of 150,000 to 300,000 non-combatants1 as well as the rape of 20,000 to 80,000 women2. Japan remains unapologetic for its role in Nanking and imperial deniers remain politically and socially active. Modern Nanking deniers are believed to be a product of the lack of international pressure by the United States. The Japan times writes that the American government’s dependency to uphold capitalism in the East and prevent the spread of communism throughout the mid 20th century resulted in the acquittal of war criminals 3. Towards the end of the occupation, Emperor Hirohito announced that he would offer an apology to the affected nations. Japanologist Patrick Tierney criticizes the US treatment of this apology, claiming that US general Douglas MacArthur, attempting to conceal culpability, never acknowledged Hirohito’s regret4.
Professor Bix of Harvard University received praise from the ‘Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars’ who described his study of wartime Japan as “monumental”5. Herbert Bix comments, "MacArthur's measures to save Hirohito from trial had a distorting impact on Japanese understanding of the lost war6”. Bix speculates that the Japanese emperor was able to escape prosecution due to the efforts of the American military who eased the reality of US occupation by allowing Hirohito to remain on the throne7. Bix argues that Emperor Hirohito was portrayed as a “passive onlooker” towards the imperial attitude of Japan rather than a key military leader. Similarly, war journalist, Edward Behr writes, “Despite the agreed secrecy…in his memoirs MacArthur quoted the emperor as saying: I bear sole responsibility for whatever happened…I bear direct and sole responsibility for every action taken in Japan's name”8. Hirohito’s culpability remains an area of debate in Japanese society, with many scholars identifying the emperor with a powerless cultural identity, isolated from any form of military decision. This contrasting depiction demonstrates how the self-interest of an author can result in the omission of truth from historical works.
Prior to US intervention, Japanese society patriotically boasted about its imperial efforts, suggesting that the dramatic transformation from pride to denial of war atrocities was the result of Western intervention and the United States’ revision of the Japanese constitution. The 1946 constitution aimed to provide Japan with a democratic society and adhere to “the will of the people”9. Despite this egalitarian approach, Japan’s traditional mentality would develop and distort in following years, manifesting itself in the theories of academic apologists, suppression of truths by Japanese officials and the glorification of war criminals in conservative museums.
Despite remaining unapologetic towards the Nanking massacre, the Japanese government has shown sympathy to several nations for its imperial behaviour. Most recently in March 2011, directed to five prisoners of war soldiers from Australia. Although foreign minister Kevin Rudd described the apology as being “made in a spirit of reconciliation”10, others, such as Chinese journalist Huang Xiangyang, criticise Japan’s agenda. Xiangyang describes all of Japan’s apologies as ‘insincere’, attributing them to Japan’s desire to prosper economically11.
However, scholars such as professor Jane Yamazaki believe that Japan has sincerely expressed regret for its imperial behaviour. Yamazaki remains sympathetic towards the Japanese government, writing, "Japan acknowledged its moral failings to a morally superior Korea"12. This 1984 Korean apology consisted of nothing more than Hirohito meeting with Korean president, Chun Doo Hwan, stating, “It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century, and I believe it should not be repeated”13. The contrasting perspectives of Chinese journalist Xiangyang and Japanese historian Jane Yamazaki can be attributed to the traditional beliefs and customs of each nation. This idea is continually reflected in their opposing academic works, highlighting the subjectivity of each portrayal.
Throughout the six-week Nanking campaign, the Japanese government glorified the brutality of their army. On the 14th of December 193714, a U.S ambassador to Germany sent a telegram to President Roosevelt. The telegram read, “The Japanese Ambassador here boasted a day or two ago of his country’s having killed 500,000 Chinese people”15.
While this telegram displays Japan’s jingoistic pride, it was not uncommon for the Japanese government to exaggerate military activities to promote the superiority of their nation. Professor Cannon notes that in 1944, following a brief and uneventful conflict between Japanese and US pilots off the coast of Formosa, Japan made greatly exaggerated claims of success. Cannon claims that these exaggerations were “accepted jubilantly” on Japan’s home front to such an extent that the people thought America’s war effort was on the verge of collapse16. Japan’s history of military exaggeration influenced political conservatives to disregard any form of governmental acknowledgement of unnecessary conflict as nothing more than pro-Chinese propaganda.
Conservatives would refute any accusation of military aggression suggesting that numbers were distorted for propagandist use. Many claimed that no more than 60,000 Chinese citizens were killed (some figures as low as 40,00017). Other Japanese historians such as Shūdō Higashinakano, professor of intellectual history at Asia University, believe that any claim of a Nanking massacre is “groundless war propaganda”18 and denies allegations of rape and murder19. Higashinakano claims to disprove the massacre using primary documents recently uncovered from the highly controversial Yasukuni shrine, a religious monument to the ‘Kami20’ of soldiers killed during battle. Representing Japan’s tradition and culture, it is criticized for its role in the promotion of Japanese militarism and glorification of war criminals. Iris Chang describes the shrine as “politically equivalent to erecting a cathedral for Hitler in the middle of Berlin”21. Historian Kevin Walsh continues to question the impact of museums, noting that they “promote an uncritical patriotism which numbs our ability to understand and communicate with other nations”22. The claims of Walsh and Chang suggest that the glorification of war criminals has greatly influenced the depiction and acceptance of past brutality.
Despite the traditional support of conservative historical revisionism and the existence of Imperial deniers, journals from Japanese soldiers and witnesses as well as the publications from coetaneous media institutions regularly incriminates Japanese behaviour. This combination of imperial pride and inability to admit guilt highlights the lack of objectivity that has prevented the attainment of historical truth in Japanese society.
The December 13th 1937 issue of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun (Tokyo Daily News) printed an article describing a competition between two Japanese officers, Toshiaki Mukai and Tsuyoshi Noda23. Both soldiers competed to see who could kill the most Chinese citizens using a sword. Ten years later, they would plead not guilty during the Nanking War Crimes Tribunal, Noda would claim that the “beastly and wicked killings” were a fabrication from the Tokyo Daily News, after Mukai had bragged of these imaginary feats to create publicity and national pride24. Mukai intended to link the competition to Japan’s samurai
history, promoting ‘Bushido’ or the traditional code of the warrior. Regardless of the competition’s validity, it highlights the subjective partisanship of the Japanese soldiers and government.
In 1987, Japanese soldier Azuma Shiro would publish his diary, followed by that of eyewitness John Rabe in 1998. Both journals were withheld from publication until the late 20th century as Western audiences and the Japanese themselves were beginning to investigate the reality of Japanese imperialism. Nazi businessman, John Rabe recorded over four hundred entries describing atrocities that he witnessed or had been informed about25. Rabe’s diary describes Japanese soldiers “looting and breaking into almost every shop”, as well as his discovery of hundreds of Chinese corpses shot dead as they fled the city26. Both accounts document the barbarity of the Japanese army, as Rabe attempted to highlight Japanese brutality, and Shiro to record his own experiences throughout the Nanking campaign.
Shiro became the first soldier to officially apologize for his role in the Nanking massacre through the publication of his diary, which resulted in heavy criticism and death threats from conservative Japanese citizens27. After being charged with “lying” by rightist politicians in 199328, he would attempt to appeal claiming his journal to be a valid account of the Nanking massacre, but was denied by the Japanese Supreme Court29. The subjectivity of Japan’s civil servants is evident as nationalism and tradition continues to manifest itself in a distorted judicial system. Despite his regret, Shiro only publicly renounced his past behaviour following the publication of his diary. Creating the speculation that his decision may have been driven by an agenda to sell his work, demonstrating how the portrayal of the past is inevitably affected by the historian’s self-interest.
The records of Azuma Shiro not only support the claims of unlawful behaviour of Japanese soldiers in China, but also display the proud attitude of the Japanese during the Nanking massacre, contradicting with the denial claims that exist today. This clash between Rabe and Shiro’s depiction, and that of imperial sympathizers emphasises the subjectivity of the historian and its impact upon the modern Japanese political and social state.
The post-war occupation of Japan aimed to establish a new democratic government by enforcing political purges. Main offenders were prosecuted, removing around 80,000 individuals30 and restricting Japanese politicians from public office if they demonstrated “exponents of militant nationalism and aggression”31. However, Professor Allan Bird claims that the majority of those purged were ‘unpurged’ by 1951 and Japan would return to a sovereign state within three years32.
Historian, Richard Mitchell writes that the continuation of Japan's bureaucracy was the result of an “indirect occupation”33 that merely worked through the existing political structure. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party was formed in 1955 as a coalition of two prominent right-wing political groups. The LDP would remain in power from 1955 to 200934, reinforcing the claims of many political analysts including Stephen Johnson, who describes 20th century Japan as a “one-party state”35.
The fifty-four year reign of the LDP would establish a conservative attitude, preventing sincere acknowledgement of Japan’s imperial past. Many Japanese historians, and governmental officials would conduct illegitimate historical revisionism to deny or justify past behaviour. In March 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe denied any abuse of women during the massacre, telling journalists “The fact is, there was no evidence to prove there was coercion”36. Later that month, Abe proposed a bill encouraging nationalism in schools, detailing the importance of teaching the “love for one's country and hometown”37. As Prime Minister of Japan, Abe’s conservative attitude demonstrates the influence of societal dignitaries and their traditional beliefs.
While some Chinese citizens such as Nanking victim, Xia Shuqin have been successful in challenging Japan’s conservative stance, most have had their appeals ignored based on the self-interest of each nation to sustain political and economic relations. In 2004, Shuqin was awarded 1.6 million yuan38 for the emotional suffering that resulted from the publication of the highly controversial ‘A Complete Investigation into the Nanking Massacre’39. However, sceptics question the reality of Shuqin’s victory, suggesting that the jurisdiction of the local Nanking court was heavily motivated by an emotional appeal, not recognized in similar cases. In 2007, two Nanking survivors sought compensation from the Japanese government, claiming that they had been kidnapped and worked as ‘comfort women’40. Although the Japanese Supreme Court acknowledged that the women had been forced into sexual slavery, compensation and an apology was denied. Ruling that the women’s rights to reparations had ended when the two nations settled their diplomatic disputes in the 1972 signing of ‘the Joint Communiqué’41. Professor of Law, Mark Levin, describes the case as “a masterwork of legal instrumentalism”42.
In 2001, Christopher Barnard conducted an investigation into the portrayal of the Nanking massacre in public high schools. Selecting eighty-eight history textbooks approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Barnard concluded that the general consensus was to “subtly gloss over the nature of the atrocities”, denying the Japanese people and government's knowledge of the events 43. The reputation of Japanese textbooks remains controversial as nationalists such as the founder of the ‘Society for history textbook reform’, Nobukatsu Fujioka,44 enforces strict regulations on Japan’s academic institutions. Fujioka’s focus is the removal of “dark history” and production of history that promotes a “positive view” for Japanese society45. Although the Ministry of Education’s authorization of Fujioka’s publications remains criticized, it is an example of the modern political representation of imperial Japan and the results of a nation placing its own self-interest over historical truth.
Despite the conservative dominance within the public education system, Japan’s private academic institutions exhibit a liberal approach to the events that occurred during Japan’s imperialism. Professor Tomio Hora was of the first Japanese academics to write about national culpability after conducting research in China in 1966. Hora’s “Nankin Jiken” promoted the acceptance of “Japanese responsibility”46, and he would continue to write several books on the subject.
After his death, Professor Takashi Fujitani, would praise Hora, stating, he was to “play a prominent role in the debate”47. Hora’s prominence is demonstrated with contributions made by The Study Group on the Nanjing Incident, which he founded in 1984. Among other causes, the study group worked to promote and publish Nanking accounts that challenged conservative theories.
These efforts were met with similar progressive-thinking academics such as Honda Katsuichi, a Japanese journalist who defied social conventions to interview Chinese survivors in the 1970s and 1980s48. The work of Katsuichi and Hora would allow universities and book publishers to discuss the Nanking massacre from an objective perspective. The progressive nature of Japanese academia remains constantly scrutinized and criticised by the existing social structures, however its endurance aided in the formation of the Democratic Party of Japan in 1998. The DPJ were elected in 2009, claiming that Japan “must overthrow the ancient regime…and create a new, flexible, affluent society which values people's individuality and vitality”49. Contrasting Abe’s government, the DPJ continue to promote progressive policies that challenge the existing nature of Japanese society.
It is therefore evident, that the modern Japanese understanding of its imperial history exists within the clash between the beliefs of war apologists, and those of privatized academia. Debate continues to socially and politically divide Japan as new perspectives promote the importance of historical objectivity. However, Japan’s conservative culture identifies the adherence to a honourable, bushido-like existence, unconnected with aggression or injustice. These contrasting beliefs demonstrate how the subjectivity of government officials and historians can shape the way past events are perceived. The resulting struggle for historical truth inevitably affects the interrelationship of Japan’s political, social and
academic structures as well as its representation of the past.